5

**Submitted by:**

(b)(6)

# Twenty-third International Workshop on Global Security: Analysis of the Defense Policy Implications

Berlin Germany 18-20 May 2006

Workshop Patron and Opening Speaker:
German Defense Minister Franz-Josef Jung

Principal Speaker:
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
General James L. Jones, USMC

Workshop Chairman:
Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon

Anne D. Baylon (Ed.)

(b)(4)

**Submitted to:**

(b)(6)

Date: 26 October 2006

*with appreciation*

His Excellency Franz-Josef Jung
Minister of Defense of Germany

*Patron and Keynote Speaker of the*
*Twenty-third International Workshop on Global Security*

*the twenty-third international workshop on global security is presented by:*

*center for strategic decision research*
*in association with the ILA Berlin Air Show*

*principal sponsors*

---

German Ministry of Defense

BDLI (German Aerospace Industries Association)

EADS (European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company)

Northrop Grumman Corporation

Microsoft

Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense
*Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics*
*Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration)*
*Defense Threat Reduction Agency*
*Net Assessment*

*major sponsors*

Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A.
The Boeing Company
Lockheed-Martin
MITRE Corporation
Raytheon

*associate sponsors*

*EDS Deutschland*
*General Dynamics European Land Combat Systems*
*IAP Worldwide Services*
*Iridium Satellite LLC*

*acknowledgements of past host and sponsoring governments*

*Czech Republic*
*Kingdom of Denmark*
*Federal Republic of Germany*
*Republic of Greece*
*Republic of Hungary*
*Kingdom of the Netherlands*
*Kingdom of Norway*
*Republic of Poland*
*Republic of Portugal*
*Ministry of Defense of Austria*
*Ministry of Defense of France*
*Ministry of Defense of Italy*
*Canadian Armed Forces*
*Russian Ministry of Industry, Science, and Technology*

# Table of Contents



## Part One

# Part Two

# Part Three

# Part Four

# Part Five

# Part Six

## Part Seven

# Contributors

Ambassador Revaz Adamia
*Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations*

Ambassador Munir Akram
*Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations*

Ms. Claude-France Arnould
*Director for Defense Aspects, Council of the European Union*

General Gerhard W. Back
*Commander, Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum*

Ms. Anne D. Baylon
*Co-Director, Center for Strategic Decision Research*

Mr. Tim Bloechl
*Executive Director, Microsoft Worldwide National Security and Defense*

Mr. Stefano Bortoli
*Co-Director General, Alenia Aeronautica*

Ambassador Gábor Bródi
*Hungarian Ambassador to the United Nations*

Professor Dr. Reinhard Burger
*Robert Koch Institute of the German Ministry of Health*

Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
*Chief of Defense of Italy*

State Secretary Espen Barth Eide
*Norwegian Ministry of Defense*

His Excellency Karl Erjavec
*Minister of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia*

Ambassador Asif Ezdi
*Ambassador of Pakistan to Germany*

Lieutenant General Christian-Charles Falzone
*Deputy Director, French Armed Forces General Staff*

Dr. Werner Fasslabend
*Member of the Austrian National Assembly*

Dr. Scott Harris
*President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin*

Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins
*Principal Deputy to Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs*

Mr. Carl O. Johnson
*President, Northrop Grumman International Inc.*

General James L. Jones, USMC
*Supreme Allied Commander, Europe*

General George Joulwan (Ret.)
*Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe*

Ambassador Jean-Pierre Juneau
*Canadian Ambassador to NATO*

His Excellency Franz Josef Jung
*Minister of Defense of Germany*

Professor Dr. Hans-Dieter Klenk
*University Hospital Giessen and Marburg*

General Harald Kujat
*Former Chairman of NATO Military Committee; former Chief of Defense of Germany*

Mr. Robert Lentz
*Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII)*

Dr. Hilmar Linnenkamp
*Deputy Chief Executive, European Defense Agency*

Lieutenant General Michel Maisonneuve
*Chief of Staff, HQ, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation*

Ambassador Zoltán Martinusz
*Hungarian Permanent Representative to NATO*

Colonel-General Anatoly Ignatievich Mazurkevich
*Chief of Main Directorate for Military Cooperation, Russian Federation Ministry of Defense*

Ambassador Bogdan Mazuru
*Romanian Ambassador to Germany*

His Excellency Fatmir Mediu
*Minister of Defense of the Republic of Albania*

His Excellency Evangelos Meimarakis
*Greek Minister of National Defense*

His Excellency Zurab Nogaideli
*Prime Minister of Georgia*

Ambassador Jaromir Novotný
*Czech Ambassador to Japan*

Ambassador Dr. Jerzy Nowak
*Permanent Representative of Poland to NATO*

Ambassador Victoria Nuland
*U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO*

Lieutenant General Jean-Paul Perruche
*Director General, European Union Military Staff*

Mr. Jonas Persson
*Chief Technology Officer, Microsoft Western Europe*

Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter
*Director General, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons*

Ingénieur Général de l'Armement Robert Ranquet
*Deputy Director, Strategic Affairs, French Defense Ministry*

Vice Admiral Norman Ray
*President, Raytheon International Europe*

Mr. Joerg Schönbohm
*Minister of the Interior, Federal State of Brandenburg, Germany*

Mr. Kent Schneider
*President, Northrop Grumman Information Technology Global*

General Rainer Schuwirth
*Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)*

General of the Armed Forces Jirí Šedivý
*Former Chief of the Czech General Staff*

Ambassador Stefan Tafrov
*Bulgarian Permanent Representative to the United Nations*

Under-Secretary-General Nobuaki Tanaka
*U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs*

His Excellency Borys Tarasyuk
*Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*

Ambassador Harri Tiido
*Permanent Representative of Estonia to NATO*

Mr. Alfred Volkman
*Director for International Cooperation, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (AT & L)*

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon
*Workshop Chairman and Founder, Co-Director of Center for Strategic Decision Research*

Dr. Linton Wells II
*U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII)*

Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf
*Director, NATO CIS Service Agency*

General Richard Wolsztynski
*Chief of Staff of French Air Force*

Major General ZHAN Maohai
*Vice Chairman of the China Institute of International Strategic Studies, Former Director General of Foreign Affairs, Chinese Defense Ministry*

# Foreword

## *The Value of the Transatlantic Partnership*

General George Joulwan[1]

I have been asked to introduce our speaker, General Jim Jones, and to make a few brief remarks with regard to the workshop. I am going to do so from the perspective of one who has been involved in Europe for over 45 years and who believes in the value of the transatlantic partnership.

As has been the case since the inception of this workshop 23 years ago, today we find our mutual security and way of life challenged globally. Three decades ago it was the Cold War and the threat of Communism and nuclear war. Fifteen years ago it was the post-Cold War period and the threat of ethnic strife in the Balkans and tribal warfare in Africa. Today it is fanatical religious terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that threaten our democracies and way of life.

How we as an alliance and an international community confront these latest threats will, in my opinion, determine the quality of life for our children and grandchildren and their children. And in my opinion there is no better forum to address these issues—candidly, honestly, and directly—than this workshop.

In the last 15 years, we have witnessed a true transformation of NATO. The requirements for collective defense and collective security now go well beyond the borders of the Alliance. This workshop has provided the venue for such discussions, from the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain to the building of a new Europe whole and free, democratic and prosperous, and with a deep respect for the dignity and worth of each individual citizen, to the challenges of the 21st century.

It was through this workshop that former adversaries had a chance to become partners and allies and participate in the debate that would shape their future. In the 1994 workshop, we discussed for the first time the term "the new NATO." It was here that we debated the criteria for membership and developed military-to-military relationships between former adversaries. As a result, 36 nations, including Russia, joined the NATO effort to bring peace to Bosnia and the Balkans—and we succeeded! It was also here that we confronted directly the need for NATO and the European Union to work together to meet the challenges of the 21st century. And it continues to be here, in May 2006, that military leaders, ambassadors, ministers, politicians, and leaders of European and U.S. defense industries come together to address the needs of the new NATO.

Tonight NATO is on the verge of committing its sons and daughters and its political credibility to the war in Afghanistan. The one who will have overall operational control of the Afghan operation is the cur-

[1] General George Joulwan is a former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

rent Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Jim Jones. General Jones has been our speaker before but never at a more important time for NATO, Europe, and indeed the world. I have known him for many years, since, as a brigadier general, he was responsible for airlift operations into Sarajevo, relief for the Kurds in northern Iraq, and humanitarian efforts in Africa. He has held command positions at every level in the Marine Corps and served as Legislative Liaison to the Congress, military assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. He has been a superb Supreme Allied Commander Europe since January 2003. And he has a great asset for being SACEUR—because he was raised in France and Belgium he speaks fluent French! Most important, he has both moral courage and respect for political control of the military, but is not afraid to stand up and be counted on difficult issues. Please join me in a warm welcome for the 15th Supreme Allied Commander, Europe General Jim Jones.

# Preface

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon
Workshop Chairman

As patron of the 23rd International Workshop on Global Security, German Defense Minister Franz-Josef Jung invited the workshop to Berlin on 18–20 May 2006 and gave the opening keynote address at the Hotel Palace. In association with the ILA Berlin Air Show, the Center for Strategic Decision Research presented the wokshop with the principal sponsorship of the German Defense Ministry, the U.S. Department of Defense, the German Aerospace Industries Association (BDLI), EADS, Northrop Grumman, and Microsoft. The workshop sponsors were Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A., the Boeing Company, Lockheed Martin, MITRE, and Raytheon; associate sponsors were General Dynamics European Land Combat Systems, EDS Deutschland, IAP Worldwide Services, and Iridium Satellite LLC.

*Minister Franz-Josef Jung's Keynote Address and the Opening Presentations by Senior Leaders.* Minister Jung's opening keynote address on 18 May was followed by major presentations by Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli, Greek Defense Minister Evangelos Meimarakis, and Slovenian Defense Minister Karl Erjavec. That evening, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General James Jones, returned to the workshop for the second time in three years to give a major dinner address. Former SACEUR General George Joulwan moderated General Jones's address as well as an additional session of discussion with General Jones after the dinner. We appreciate General Joulwan's many years of energetic contributions to the workshop, beginning in 1994 when he succeeded General John Shalikasvili as SACEUR and Honorary General Chairman of the workshop.

*NATO's Operational Role in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Iraq, Afghanistan, Darfur, and the NATO Response Force.* On the morning of 19 May, General Rainer Schuwirth, Chief of Staff of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), presented the opening address, entitled "The New Operational Challenge of NATO: the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Iraq, Afghanistan, Darfur, and the NATO Response Force." General Gerhard W. Back, Commander of Allied Joint Force Command, Brunssum, with command responsibility for NATO's mission in Afghanistan, then led a senior panel on Afghanistan with Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, Chief of Defense of Italy; General Richard Wolsztynski, Chief of Staff of the French Air Force; and Ambassador Jean-Pierre Juneau, Permanent Representative of Canada on NATO's North Atlantic Council. Ambassador Munir Akram, Pakistan's long-serving representative to the United Nations, added his views based on his deep understanding of the culture and politics of a broad region extending from Iraq to Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

*The Future of NATO.* The luncheon address by Ambassador Victoria Nuland, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, entitled "Towards a 21st Century NATO," was introduced and moderated by Hungary's Ambassador to NATO, Zoltan Martinusz. Ambassador Nuland's impressive presentation was followed by a panel discussion on "NATO, the EU, and How They Can Work Together to Address the Challenges" led by Ambassador Harri Tiido, Estonia's Permanent Representative on the

North Atlantic Council. The panel consisted of Ambassador Dr. Jerzy M. Nowak, Poland's Ambassador to NATO; Lieutenant General Michael Maisonneuve, Chief of Staff, Headquarters Supreme Allied Power Transformation; Lieutenant General Jean-Paul Perruche, Director-General of the European Union Military Staff; and Ms. Claude-France Arnould, Director for Defense Aspects of the Council of the European Union.

*Moving NATO from the Industrial Age to the Information Era.* Mr. Robert Lentz, Director of Information Assurance in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, chaired the panel that discussed this issue. Panel participants were Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf, Director of the NATO CIS Service Agency; Mr. Kent Schneider, President, Defense Group, Northrop Grumman Information Technology; and Mr. Jonas Persson, Chief Technology Office, Microsoft EMEA.

*Security Challenges in the Balkans and Black Sea Region.* Addressing the security challenges of the Balkans and Black Sea region were His Excellency Fatmir Mediu, Minister of Defense of Albania; His Excellency Borys Tarasyuk, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (who addressed the workshop this year for the 14th time); Ambassador Stefan Tafrov, Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations; Ambassador Bogdan Mazuru, Romanian Ambassador to Germany; and Colonel General Anatoly I. Mazurkevich, Chief of the Main Directorate for Military Cooperation, Russian Federal Ministry of Defense. At the Bode Museum the evening following these addresses, General Rainer Schuwirth introduced His Excellency Zurab Nogaideli, Prime Minister of Georgia, who gave the dinner address, one of the workshop's major presentations. Everyone appreciated the excellent Georgian wines that were served with dinner as a gift of the Georgian government.

*Dealing with Impending Crises.* On 20 May, United Nations Under Secretary General Nobuaki Tanaka opened the day's presentations and discussion with a key address. His speech was followed by a series of panel discussions on "Impending Crises" that were chaired by General of the Armed Forces (Ret.) Jiri Sedivy, former Chief of Defense of the Czech Republic. The first panel, which focused on "Dealing with Avian Influenza," consisted of Professor Dr. Hans-Dieter Klenk, Center for Hygiene and Medical Microbiology, University Hospital Glessen and Marburg, and Professor Dr. Reinhard Burger, Vice President of the Robert Koch Institute of the German Ministry of Health. A presentation by Norwegian State Secretary Espen Barth Eide, on "Energy and Security," was followed by a panel discussion of "The Emerging Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Risks"; panel participants were Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins, Principal Deputy to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, and Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The final panel on "Impending Crises" addressed "The Iranian Challenge, including the Dangers of Nuclear Proliferation," with thoughtful analyses by Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, and Major General ZHAN Maohai, Vice Chairman of the China Institute of International Strategic Studies and Former Director-General of Foreign Affairs, Chinese Defense Ministry.

*International Cooperation.* Mr. Alfred Volkman, Director for International Cooperation, Office of the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,) led the panel on "International Cooperation" with panelists Dr. Hilmar Linnenkamp, Deputy Chief Executive, European Defense Agency; Mr. Stefano Bortoli, Co-Director-General for Strategies, Business Development, International and Military Sales, Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A.; Mr. Carl O. Johnson, President, Northrop Grumman International, Inc.; Dr. Scott Harris, President for Continental Europe of Lockheed Martin Global; and Vice Admiral Norman Ray, President of Raytheon International Europe.

*Workshop Wrap-Up.* Ambassador Gabor Brodi, Ambassador of Hungary to the United Nations, led the wrap-up panel, with presentations by Ing. General Robert Ranquet, Deputy Director of Strategic

Affairs, French Ministry of Defense; Ambassador Revaz Adamia, Georgian Ambassador to the United Nations; and Ambassador Asif Ezdi, Ambassador of Pakistan to Germany.

*Reichstag Reception and Dinner.* At the final workshop event, Interior Minister Joerg Schoenbohm of the Federal State of Brandenburg welcomed participants to an evening reception in the Reichstag and a visit to the spectacular Dome, designed by British architect Sir Norman Foster. After dinner at the Reichstag's Kaefer Restaurant, Dr. Linton Wells II, U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, and General Harald Kujat, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and the former Chief of Defense of Germany, addressed important issues related to information technology following introductory remarks by Mr. Tim Bloechl of Microsoft.

## Principal Sponsors of the 23rd International Workshop on Global Security

The 23rdInternational Workshop was presented in association with the ILA Berlin Air Show, with the following principal sponsors:

- German Ministry of Defense, with the patronage of Minister Franz-Josef Jung
- BDLI (German Aerospace Industries Association)
- EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company)
- Northrop Grumman Corporation
- Microsoft Corporation
- U.S. Department of Defense (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration; Office of the Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Defense Threat Reduction Agency)
- Center for Strategic Decision Research, which instituted the workshop series and has presented workshops annually for 23 years

*German Ministry of Defense.* As the workshop's patron, Defense Minister Franz-Josef Jung gave the opening keynote address. Among the many other vital contributors to the proceedings from the German Armed Forces were General Rainer Schuwirth, currently Chief of Staff at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe); General Gerhard Back, Allied Joint-Force Commander, Brunssum; Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf, Director of the NATO CIS Service Agency; and General (Ret.) Harald Kujat, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and Chief of Defense of Germany. In addition to facilitating Minister Jung's keynote address, Colonel Peter Braunstein, Adjutant des Bundesministers, as well as his deputy, Dirk Gaertner, were instrumental in coordinating participation by government leaders of other invited countries.

*BDLI (German Aerospace Industries Association).* The support of BDLI Director Hans-Joachim Gante as well as BDLI's Chairman Dr. Thomas Enders, who also serves as Co-CEO of EADS, is much appreciated. BDLI was a principal sponsor of the workshop in 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 and through the association's encouragement the workshop was held in each of those years in association with the prestigious ILA Berlin Air Show. At BDLI, Ms. Mirja Schueller, Ms. Alexandra Friedhoff, and Dr. Ekkehard Muenzing have been especially helpful. Ekkehard Muenzing played a key role in facilitating several major events, including Minister Jung's opening keynote address and the final reception and dinner at the Reichstag and its Kaefer Restaurant. It was truly a great pleasure to work again this year with these highly professional managers.

*EADS.* We greatly appreciate the interest and assistance of several people at EADS: Professor Dr. Holger Mey, head of Customer Relations in Defense and Security Systems; Dr. Stefan Zoller, President and CEO of EADS Defence and Communications Systems; Mr. Wolf-Peter Denker, Senior Vice President of EADS Germany; EADS Co-CEO Dr. Thomas Enders; and Admiral Jean Betermier of EADS France.

*Northrop Grumman.* After many years as a leading supporter of the International Workshops, Northrop Grumman was a vital Principal Sponsor for the third year. Under the leadership of Northrop Grumman executives Mr. Tom Vice, Mr. Carl O. Johnson, Mr. Bill Ennis, Mr. K.C. Brown, Mr. James Moseman, and Mr. Jacques Pous as well as Mr. Kent Schneider, Mr. Tom Baker, Mr. Joseph Penarczyk, and Vice Admiral Malcolm Fages, Northrop Grumman helped us broaden and strengthen the workshop's senior military dimension and added greatly to the discussion of Alliance transformation and network-centric operations (including Allied Ground Surveillance).

*Microsoft.* Microsoft is a Principal Sponsor of the workshop for the first time this year, which corresponds to the establishment of a Microsoft corporate element supporting military, national security, police, and fire department customers world-wide. We were delighted to welcome Mr. Tim Bloechl, Executive Director, Microsoft Worldwide National Security and Defense and Mr. Jonas Persson, Chief Technology Officer, Microsoft Western Europe as speakers at this year's Workshop, as well as Brigadier General Dieter Löchel, Microsoft Deutschland GmbH and Mr. Bernard Marty, Defense and Security, Microsoft France.

*Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.* In the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, we are grateful for the advice and support of Mr. Alfred Volkman, who developed and chaired the panels on international cooperation over the last several years, as well as Mr. Robert Bruce, Mr. Roger Golden, Colonel Rodney Schmidt, and Ms. Karen Kay. We also appreciate the efficient assistance of Ms. Rita Bidlack.

*Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration).* Thanks to Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Linton Wells II, Mr. Robert Lentz, and Mr. Tim Bloechl (now at Microsoft), network-centric operations have become an increasingly important component of the International Workshops. We also appreciate the helpful administrative support of Lieutenant Colonel Richard Palermo and Ms. Cecilia Jones.

*Office of the Director of Net Assessment.* Over the last two decades, the Director of Net Assessment in the U.S. Department of Defense, Mr. Andrew Marshall, has sponsored the workshops, which we greatly appreciate. We also appreciate the very skillful administration of the project by Ms. Rebecca Bash as well as her careful review of this report prior to publication.

*Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).* At DTRA, Colonel Robert Dickey, Director Dr. James Tegnelia, and Mr. Doug Englund greatly facilitated our efforts. Because Dr. Dale Klein was named to head the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins, Principal Deputy to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, very effectively addressed the workshop on his behalf.

**Major Workshop Sponsors**

*Alenia Aeronautica.* At Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A., we appreciate the participation of Mr. Stefano Bortoli, Co-Director-General for Strategies, Business Development, International and Military Sales, as well as the continued support of CEO Dr. Giovanni Bertolone. We also are grateful for the long-term interest and encouragement of Ing. Dr. Giorgio Zappa, now COO of Alenia's parent company, Finmeccanica.

*The Boeing Company.* The continued participation of Mr. Fred Spivey as well as the continued interest and encouragement of Senior Vice President Thomas Pickering are greatly valued. We wish both of these men the very best following their recent retirement from Boeing.

*Lockheed Martin Corporation.* We would like to thank Dr. Scott Harris, who has contributed to the workshop for many years, both as a participant and as a speaker, in his initial role as executive at Lockheed Martin's Bethesda headquarters and more recently as Lockheed Martin Global's President for Continental Europe.

*MITRE Corporation.* MITRE's two decades of support of the international workshops and the specific support of Mr. Raymond Haller, Mr. Vince Maguire, and Mr. John Kreger are greatly appreciated.

*Raytheon International.* Vice Admiral Norman Ray has supported the workshop for over a decade in his various roles as Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Assistant Secretary General of NATO, and, more recently, as President for Europe of Raytheon International, for which we thank him. We also appreciate the interest shown by Mr. Torkel Patterson.

## Associate Sponsors

*General Dynamics European Land Combat Systems.* Mr. Michael Malzacher, CEO of Land Combat Systems Europe, represented General Dynamics this year. We are grateful for the long-time support of General Dynamics, including that of General George Joulwan, member of the General Dynamics Board of Directors and former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

*Iridium Satellite LLC.* Our thanks go to Chairman and CEO of Iridium Satellite Mr. Carmen Lloyd, who has been a strong workshop supporter. We especially appreciate the support of Executive Vice President Greg Ewert.

*IAP Worldwide Services.* At IAP Worldwide Services, we are grateful for the support and participation of Mr. David Swindle, board member General George Joulwan, and investor representative Mr. George Kollitides, Senior Vice President of Cerberus Capital Management.

*EDS Deutschland.* At EDS Deutschland, we appreciate the participation of Mr. Reinhard Clemens and General (Ret.) Harald Kujat.

*Sponsoring Governments.* Special thanks go this year to the German Ministry of Defense and Defense Minister Jung. We also are grateful to the following governments that, over two decades, contributed to the workshop series: Czech Republic, Kingdom of Denmark, Republic of France, Federal Republic of Germany, Republic of Greece, Republic of Hungary, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Kingdom of Norway, Republic of Poland, Republic of Portugal, Austrian Ministry of Defense, Italian Ministry of Defense, Canadian Armed Forces, Russian Ministry of Science and Technology, and Russian Ministry of Communications.

## Workshop Patrons, Advisors, and Participants

*Workshop Patrons and Honorary Chairmen.* We appreciate the encouragement and support of the workshop's honorary chairmen, patrons, and keynote speakers:

Her Excellency Michèle Alliot-Marie, Minister of Defense of France (Workshop Patron and Keynote Speaker, 2005 and 2007)

His Excellency Franz-Josef Jung, Minister of Defense of Germany (Workshop Patron and Keynote Speaker, 2006)

His Excellency Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland (Workshop Patron, 1996; Principal Speaker, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2002)

His Excellency Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic (Workshop Patron, 1997; Principal Speaker, 1996, 1997)

His Excellency Arpad Goencz, President of Hungary (Workshop Patron, 1999; Principal Speaker, 1993)

His Excellency Peter Struck, Minister of Defense of Germany (Keynote Speaker, 2004)
His Excellency Rudolf Scharping, Minister of Defense of Germany (Workshop Patron, 2000, 2002)
His Excellency Jan Troejborg, Minister of Defense of Denmark (Workshop Patron, 2001)
His Excellency Dr. Werner Fasslabend, Minister of Defense of Austria (Workshop Patron, 1998)
His Excellency Volker Ruehe, Minister of Defense of Germany (Workshop Patron, 1995)
Mr. Rainer Hertrich (Workshop Honorary General Chairman, 2000, 2002, 2004)
General George Joulwan, Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Honorary General Chairman, 1994–1997)

*Advisory Board.* Members of the workshop's Advisory Board have provided vital contributions and guidance in developing the workshop over more than two decades:

His Excellency Valdas Adamkus, President of Lithuania
Dr. Hans E. Birke, Former President, BDLI (German Aerospace Industries Association)
Dr. Manfred Bischoff, Member of the Board of Directors, EADS
Ambassador Javier Conde de Saro, Ambassador of Spain to Japan
His Excellency Mikulas Dzurinda, Prime Minister of Slovakia
Dr. Thomas Enders, Co-CEO, EADS
The Honorable Gordon England, United States Deputy Secretary of Defense
His Excellency Dr. Werner Fasslabend, Austrian Parliament, Former Defense Minister
Mr. Hans-Joachim Gante, President, BDLI (German Aerospace Industries Association)
Dr. Robert Hermann, Senior Partner, Global Technology Partners, LLC
General George A. Joulwan (Ret.), Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Ambassador Jean-Pierre Juneau, Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO
Ambassador Karel Kovanda, European Commission Deputy Director-General
His Excellency Linas Linkevicius, Lithuanian Permanent Representative to NATO
General Klaus Naumann, Former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
Ambassador Jaromir Novotný, Ambassador of the Czech Republic to Japan
Ambassador Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Secretary General, OSCE
Dr. Andrey Piontkovskiy, Director, Strategic Studies Center, Moscow
Mr. Jean de Ponton d'Amécourt, Director for Strategic Affairs, French Ministry of Defense
Ambassador Jean de Ruyt, Ambassador of Belgium to Italy
General Jirí Šedivý (Ret.), Former Chief of Defense of the Czech Republic
General John Shalikashvili (Ret.), Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
His Excellency Borys Tarasyuk, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
His Excellency Dr. Alexandr Vondra, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic
Ing. Dr. Giorgio Zappa, COO of Finmeccanica and Chairman of Alenia Aeronautica

*Participants.* At this year's 23rd International Workshop on Global Security, participants represented more than 30 countries and international organizations, including the U.N., NATO, the EU, the OPCW, and the IAEA. We appreciate their very active involvement in developing the workshop agenda, suggesting speakers and themes, and participating in workshop discussions:

Dr. Reza Abedin-Zadeh, Nuclear Safety & Security, International Atomic Energy Agency
Ambassador Revaz Adamia, Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations
Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations
Ambassador Mohamed Al-Orabi, Egyptian Ambassador to Germany

Ms. Claude-France Arnould, Director for Defense Aspects, Council of the European Union
Mr. Vladimer Babunashvili, Advisor, Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration
General Gerhard W. Back, Commander, Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum
Colonel Henk Bank, Executive Asst. to Chief of Staff, HQ, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
His Excellency Giorgi Baramidze, Minister of Euro-Atlantic Integration of Georgia
Ms. Anne D. Baylon, Co-Director, Center for Strategic Decision Research
Deputy Minister Martin Belcik, Czech Deputy Minister of Defense for Defense Policy
Colonel Marcello Bellacicco, Army Attaché, Italian Embassy to Germany
Admiral Jean Betermier, Special Advisor to the Chairman of EADS
Dr. Hans Birke, BDLI, Space and Defense Advisor
Mr. Tim Bloechl, Microsoft Worldwide National Security and Defense
Mr. Stefano Bortoli, Co-Director-General, Alenia Aeronautica
Ambassador Gábor Bródi, Hungarian Ambassador to the United Nations
Professor Reinhard Burger, Vice President of the Robert Koch-Institute of the German Ministry of Health
Mr. Dmitry Cherkashin, First Secretary, Embassy of the Russian Federation
Lieutenant General Mieczyslaw Cieniuch, Polish Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee
Mr. Reinhard Clemens, CEO, EDS Deutschland
Brigadier General Alain Daniel, French Military Attaché
Captain Greg Davis, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
Mr. Wolf-Peter Denker, Senior Vice President, EADS
Colonel Robert Dickey (Ret.), Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, Chief of Defense of Italy
Mr. Lubos Dobrovský, Advisor to Deputy Minister of Defense of the Czech Republic
Ambassador Ihor Dolhov, Ambassador of Ukraine to Germany
State Secretary Espen Barth Eide, Norwegian Ministry of Defense
Dr. Thomas Enders, Chief Executive Officer, EADS
Mr. William Ennis, Northrop Grumman International Inc.
His Excellency Karl Erjavec, Minister of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia
Ambassador Asif Ezdi, Ambassador of Pakistan to Germany
Vice Admiral Malcolm Fages (Ret.), Northrop Grumman Information Technology
Lieutenant General Christian-Charles Falzone, Deputy Director, French Armed Forces General Staff
Dr. Werner Fasslabend, Member of the Austrian National Assembly
Mr. Eduard Frangaj, Counselor of Albanian Minister of Defense
Lieutenant Commander Giovanni Galoforo, Counselor, Office of Italian Chief of Defense
Mr. Hans-Joachim Gante, Managing Director, BDLI (German Aerospace Industries Association)
Mr. Dragos Gabriel Ghercioiu, Advisor to the State Secretary of Romania
Lieutenant Colonel Gabriele Ghione, Deputy Army Attaché, Italian Embassy
Mr. Darko Göttlicher, Deputy Head of Counter-Terrorism, Croatian Ministry of the Interior
Mr. Rafael Grossi, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Professor Jaroslaw Gryz, National Defense University of Poland
Dr. Scott Harris, President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin
Ambassador Erich Hochleitner, Director, Austrian Institute for European Security Policy
Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins, Principal Deputy to Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs
Dr. Edward Ifft, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University
Mr. Carl O. Johnson, President, Northrop Grumman International Inc.

General James L. Jones, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
General George Joulwan (Ret.), Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Ambassador Jean-Pierre Juneau, Canadian Ambassador to NATO
His Excellency Franz-Josef Jung, Minister of Defense of Germany
Mr. Crt Kanoni, Public Affairs Advisor to the Slovenian Minister of Defense
Professor Dr. Hans-Dieter Klenk, University Hospital Giessen and Marburg
Mr. George Kollitides, Senior Vice President, Cerberus Capital Management
Mr. Idriz Konjari, Director of Defense Policy, Albania
Ambassador Vladimir Kotenev, Russian Ambassador to Germany
Mr. John Kreger, Director, Enterprise Systems Engineering Office, The MITRE Corporation
Mr. Vladimir Krulík, Advisor to the Deputy Minister of Defense, Czech Republic
General Harald Kujat, Former Chairman of NATO Military Committee
Ambassador Clyde Kull, Ambassador of Estonia to Germany
Mr. Daniel Kunin, Advisor to the Government of Georgia
Mr. Robert Lentz, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII)
Dr. Hilmar Linnenkamp, Deputy Chief Executive, European Defense Agency
Brigadier General Dieter Löchel, Microsoft Deutschland GmbH
Ambassador Stathis Lozos, Greek Ambassador to EU Political and Security Committee
Mr. Vince Maguire, The MITRE Corporation
Lieutenant General Michel Maisonneuve, Chief of Staff, HQ, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
Mr. Michael Malzacher, President, General Dynamics European Land Combat Systems
Ambassador Zoltán Martinusz, Hungarian Permanent Representative to NATO
Mr. Bernard Marty, Defense and Security, Microsoft France
Brigadier General Edvardas Mazeikis, Lithuanian Military Repres. to NATO Military Comm.
Colonel-General Anatoly Ignatievich Mazurkevich, Chief of Main Directorate for Military Cooperation, Russian Federation Ministry of Defense
Ambassador Bogdan Mazuru, Romanian Ambassador to Germany
His Excellency Fatmir Mediu, Minister of Defense of the Republic of Albania
His Excellency Evangelos Meimarakis, Greek Minister of National Defense
Professor Dr. Holger Mey, Vice President, Advanced Concepts, EADS Defense & Security Systems
Mr. James Moseman, Director, Europe and NATO, Northrop Grumman
Dr. Ekkehard Muenzing, BDLI (German Aerospace Industries Association)
Mr. Nikoloz Natbiladze, Deputy Foreign Minister of Georgia
Mr. Simeon Nikolov, Deputy Defense Minister of Georgia
His Excellency Zurab Nogaideli, Prime Minister of Georgia
Ambassador Jaromir Novotný, Czech Ambassador to Japan
Ambassador Dr. Jerzy Nowak, Permanent Representative of Poland to NATO
Ambassador Victoria Nuland, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO
Ambassador Maia Pandjikidze, Ambassador of Georgia to Germany
Mr. Joseph Penarczyk, Vice President, Northrop Grumman IT Global
Lieutenant General Jean-Paul Perruche, Director-General, European Union Military Staff
Mr. Jonas Persson, Chief Technology Officer, Microsoft Western Europe
Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter,Director-General, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Ms. Ganna Poliyevets, Office of the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Colonel Brad Pray, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
Colonel Rumen Radev, Defense Ministry of Bulgaria

Ing. Gen. de l'Armement Robert Ranquet, Deputy Director, Strategic Affairs, French Defense Ministry
Vice Admiral Norman Ray, President, Raytheon International Europe
Colonel Jean-Marc Rebert, Senior Armament Attaché, French Embassy
Captain Fabio Ricciardelli, Italian Naval Attaché, Italian Embassy
State Secretary Edgars Rinkevius, Latvian Ministry of Defense
Ms. Hélène de Rochefort, Cabinet of the French Minister of Defense
Lieutenant Colonel Holger Schäfer, Aide-de-Camp to General Gerhard W. Back
Mr. Guillaume Schlumberger: Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
Colonel Rodney Schmidt, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)
Mr. Kent Schneider, President, Northrop Grumman Information Technology Global
Mr. Joerg Schönbohm, Minister of the Interior, Federal State of Brandenburg, Germany
General Rainer Schuwirth, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
General of the Armed Forces Jiří Šedivý, Former Chief of the Czech General Staff
Captain Johannes Semmler, Aide-de-Camp to Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf
Ms. Ana Slevec, Protocol, Slovenian Defense Ministry
Ms. Martina Šourková, Advisor to Deputy Minister of Defense, Czech Republic
Mr. Fred Spivey, Business Development, The Boeing Company
Mr. David W. Swindle, Jr., President, IAP Worldwide Services
Ambassador Stefan Tafrov, Bulgarian Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Under Secretary General Nobuaki Tanaka, U.N. Under Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs
His Excellency Borys Tarasyuk, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
Ambassador Harri Tiido, Permanent Representative of Estonia to NATO
Brigadier General Vitalijus Vaiksnoras, Lithuanian Chief of Defence Staff
Mr. Alfred Volkman, Director for International Cooperation, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
Dr. Hans-Heinrich Weise, Former Ministerialdirektor, German Ministry of Defense
Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon, Workshop Chairman and Founder
Dr. Linton Wells II, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII)
Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf, Director, NATO CIS Service Agency
General Richard Wolsztynski, Chief of Staff of French Air Force
Ambassador Youcef Yousfi, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the U.N.
Dr. Giorgio Zappa, Chief Operating Officer (COO), Finmeccanica
Major General Zhan Maohai, Vice Chairman of the China Institute of International Strategic Studies, Former Director-General of Foreign Affairs, Chinese Defense Ministry
Mr. Giorgi Zurabischvili, Chief of Protocol Department, Georgian Embassy

## Acknowledgements:The Pergamon and Bode Museums, the Reichstag and Its Kaefer Restaurant, the Hotel Palace Berlin, and the Workshop International Staff

*Pergamon and Bode Museums on Museum Island.* After a reception at Berlin's famous Pergamon Museum on Museum Island, Prof. Dr. Peter-Klaus Schuster, Director-General of the Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, welcomed us with a broad introduction to the museum and its significance. The Pergamon is named after one of its most famous exhibits—the Pergamon Altar—that was taken from the ruins of the ancient Hellenic city of Pergamon on the western coast of Turkey. The museum is also famous for its reconstructed Ishtar Gate, the main gate into the ancient Mesopotamian city of Babylon, which was built during the reign of Nebuchadnezzar II around 575 BC and is located slightly south of modern Baghdad.

Following guided visits of the museum in small groups, coordinated by the very effective and indispensable Ms. Tanja Bleske, workshop participants enjoyed dinner in the adjacent Bode Museum.

*Reichstag.* On the workshop's final evening, Mr. Joerg Schönbohm, Interior Minister of the German Federal State of Brandenburg, welcomed participants to a reception under the Reichstag's splendid glass dome. The reception was followed by dinner at the Käfer Dachgarten Restaurant on the building's rooftop. We appreciate Ms. Yvonne Wellner's very effective coordination of the evening together with Dr. Ekkehard Muenzing of BDLI (German Aerospace Industries Association).

*Hotel Palace Berlin.* This year's workshop was held for the fourth time at the Hotel Palace Berlin, which is conveniently located near the historic Kurfuerstendamm and the Berlin Zoo. The Hotel Palace's facilities have now been completely renovated with new conference facilities and redesigned guest rooms, which were ideal for our event. As always, we received truly outstanding support from the hotel's Managing Director, Kurt Lehrke, and from his effective and well-trained staff, including Marietta Herman, Helge Schul, Daniela Ruehlmann, and Tanja Spital.

*Workshop International Staff.* This year, Britta Schultheis, Dr. Eugene Whitlock, Jean Lee, and Caroline Baylon returned to share their workshop experience with us. Britta handled the workshop's all-important central database with her customary precision, Eugene managed the workshop logistics, Jean was responsible for the workshop's graphics and photography (all of the photos in this publication are hers), and Caroline handled the overall coordination of staff activities. The staff also welcomed this year three recent graduates of Stanford University: Wendy Ong, now a Ph.D. student at Carnegie-Mellon University; Ian Spiro, a B.S. and M.S. graduate from Stanford's famous computer science department; and Whitney Hopkins, who returned to graduate school to prepare for a career in museum curation. For the third time, Mrs. Kirsten Schellhorn-Piontek handled the cultural program in Berlin for workshop spouses with her usual organizational skill and imagination. Without the tireless efforts and years of experience of everyone on this outstanding staff, the workshop would be hard to imagine.

*Workshop Publications.* As CSDR Co-Director, Anne D. Baylon played a key role in every aspect of the workshop's development as well as the editing of this volume, for which she was responsible. She acknowledges the contributions of her editorial team, including Carol Whiteley, and Kevin Cotter's valued assistance with layouts and printing.

Menlo Park, California, and Paris, France October 2006

# Overview

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon[1]

*Abstract.* With the expansion of serious crises from the Balkan Peninsula to Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and North Korea, it is vital that international organizations including the NATO Alliance, the EU, and the U.N. continue to transform themselves and cooperate far more effectively. Since the U.S., U.K., and other militaries are overstretched, budgets are under pressure, and public support is falling (at least for the Iraq War), there is a widely-felt need to explore new strategies, and we may already be on the cusp of fundamental changes.

## SETTING THE RIGHT COURSE

In his opening address to this year's 23rd International Workshop on Global Security, German Defense Minister Franz-Josef Jung calls 2006 "a key year…for setting the right course for security in the 21st century." According to Supreme Allied Commander, Europe General James Jones, it is now time for NATO's transformation to enter a new phase that will "enable the new NATO as it accepts…operations in Africa, in Afghanistan, in Iraq." General Jones sees NATO's Riga Summit on 28-29 November 2006 as the occasion for the Alliance's political leaders to agree on the key issues. Italian Chief of Defense Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola views the current international security situation as a "revolution" that calls for a broad international dialogue of experts and leaders, with an "open and frank debate and exchange of ideas which is necessary to arrive at "decisions for a safer, more stable and more peaceful global future." We hope that the series of annual International Workshops on Global Security contributes to a useful exchange of views that will help our political and military leaders find the right course. As General Jones suggests, we also hope that the Workshops will help explain to our publics what NATO does and why it is important.

## EXPANDING CRISES, OVERSTRETCHED MILITARIES, AND FALLING PUBLIC SUPPORT

With the expansion of serious crises from the Balkan Peninsula to Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and North Korea, capabilities and resources of the international community (including the NATO Alliance, the EU, and the U.N.) are stressed, and militaries are overextended. In this difficult context, it is vital for the key international actors to put aside past differences and cooperate far more effectively. Fortunately, there seems to be a new willingness to do so. There is also a pressing need to find new strategies for dealing with insurgencies, for successful reconstruction, and to recover public support. There are no other options.

In addition to the continuing tensions in the Balkans, the Black Sea region, and elsewhere, several crises have taken on particularly grave dimensions since the Berlin Workshop:

---

1 Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon is the Workshop's Chairman and Founder.

- *Lebanon.* Following Israel's July invasion, the French-led U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is seeking to maintain calm while the country struggles to recover.
- *Iraq.* With the situation in Iraq deteriorating, falling public support has cost the Republican Party its control of the House of Representatives and Senate.
- *Afghanistan.* NATO has now assumed responsibility for all of Afghanistan, but its troops are facing intensified Taliban attacks.
- *Iran and North Korea.* Both Iran and North Korea continue to provoke the international community with their nuclear ambitions, while North Korea has exploded a nuclear device.

## LEBANON: EFFECTS OF ISRAEL'S JULY INVASION

In Lebanon, the UNIFIL (U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon) is restoring calm but the price may prove to be heavy. France now leads UNIFIL, and Italy will assume command in January. These countries and their U.N. partners are committing scarce military and other resources to Lebanon. As long as these assets remain in that country, they will be unavailable to deal with Afghanistan, the Darfur situation, or other crises that may arise. Moreover, there is a risk that the French, Italian, and other U.N. troops in Lebanon will at some point become hostages of Hezbollah—and that could make it difficult for their countries to take firm political stances against countries such as Syria, or Iran, or to easily face other difficult international challenges.

*Lessons from the July War.* The lessons from Israel's invasion of Lebanon should be a "wake-up call." The fighting was characterized by extreme violence—more than one million on each side were displaced or forced to take shelter. Yet, despite the mutual suffering, both countries seemed to relish the damage done to the other. Many Israelis believe that their country suffered a defeat, and, as a result, the government has been forced to shift further to the right with the appointment of Avigdor Lieberman as Deputy Prime Minister. Among Arabs, there was an international feeling that was close to glee. Hezbollah's strong military capability was only one of several unexpected developments. Other surprises were Hezbollah's ability to maintain secrecy, in contrast with past successes of Israeli agents in penetrating other organizations; the determination of Hezbollah fighters willing to die to defend their villages and to maintain the fight against Israel for 34 days (a first for an Arab army), and Hezbollah's ability to attack Israel with increased sophistication (the third group to use rockets against Israel).

*Consequences for Israel and the U.S.* The international effects of the July War are serious. Millions of Arabs and their governments will long remember the U.S. insistence on delaying the negotiation of a cease-fire until Israel had time to destroy Hezbollah. Among the consequences are the following:

- Israel will be blamed for the damage to Lebanon and its infrastructure, and for the strategy of deliberately harming Lebanese civilians in order to turn them against Hezbollah. (Actually, it turned Lebanese even more against Israel, while many believe that harming civilian populations in this way is a war crime).
- Both the U.S. and Israel will be perceived as being far weaker than expected; Israel's aura of invincibility has been shattered.

The U.S. has also lost considerable credibility with respect to any future efforts to:

- promote democracy in the region, since it supported the invasion of Lebanon, or
- offer to mediate potential future conflicts involving Israel.

*The significance of Hezbollah.* Considering Hezbollah as merely a terrorist organization misses the point that it has unique political, social, and economic roles in addition to its military dimension. Moreover,

Hezbollah represents deeply-felt Arab desires to fight back against the experiences of mistrust and mistreatment by their own governments, the humiliation of defeat by Israel (and Israel's record as an occupying power), and a century's long-tradition of European powers imposing their will on the region.

## IRAQ: TOUGH FIGHTING AHEAD

*Falling public support for the Iraq War.* In his recent assessments of the Iraq War, President George Bush remains confident and continues to predict victory, but acknowledges that there will be "tough fighting ahead." Following gains by the Democratic Party in the November mid-term elections, however, former CIA Director Robert Gates has been nominated to replace Secretary Rumsfeld. The Iraq Study Group, headed by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, will soon present their recommendations, and U.S. political and military leaders are expected to approach the Iraq situation in a more bi-partisan manner. Some Republican leaders, including Senators John Warner, John McCain, Lindsey Graham, Chuck Hagel, and Susan Collins, have expressed varying degrees of frustration and concern over the war's direction. A few leading neo-conservatives have even joined the critics. As the U.S. elections have demonstrated, public support for the war has dropped significantly—partly due to heavy casualties among U.S. forces, its coalition partners, and the Iraqis themselves (estimates of civilian casualties range from 50,000 to hundreds of thousands). The falling support probably also reflects distress over the large numbers of seriously wounded soldiers, Abu Ghraib prison, U.S. policies on torture, secret CIA flights, and the lack of a clear and convincing strategy for either winning or leaving. The costs of the war, for which estimates range up to $2 trillion, is undoubtedly an important factor, too.

*How to achieve progress.* Hopes for progress in Iraq rest on efforts to pass responsibilities to the Iraqis, which would relieve the pressures on the U.S. and coalition troops. The Iraqi government will be encouraged to disband the militias, which are at the heart of much violence. According to recent media speculation, there may be proposals for the creation of semi-autonomous Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish regions, with central control limited to a few areas such as oil revenues and foreign policy. In order to achieve such goals, it could be necessary to talk with Iran and Syria. This, of course, would represent a fundamental policy shift, but the U.K. has already taken this step as has James Baker in the context of the Iraq Study group efforts. Another challenge will be to move forward on the reconstruction of the country, but the withdrawal from Iraq by Bechtel, one of the largest construction contractors, certainly presents a challenge. If Bechtel could not be successful despite its huge size, vast international experience, and close political ties to the Administration, what are the chances that other companies will be able to succeed where Bechtel failed?

*Pressures on U.K. forces.* Since it will be vital to keep the coalition together in Iraq, consideration must be given to the growing domestic pressures on British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Public support is low and he has been challenged by several of the nation's most prestigious military leaders: General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of the British General Staff, has said that the presence of British troops in Iraq "exacerbates" the difficulties the British Army is facing in Afghanistan. Field Marshal Lord Inge, Britain's former Chief of Defense, believes that the U.K. does not have a "clear strategy in either Afghanistan or Iraq." Britain's former ambassador to the U.N. and advisor on Iraq, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, has called the Iraq War "a failure" with "only bad options for the coalition from now on." (Sir Jeremy suggests a "massive new effort of regional diplomacy" involving Syria and Iran.) More recently, General the Lord Guthrie, another former Chief of Defense, has added his voice to the debate in saying that "to launch the British army in [Afghanistan] with the numbers there are, while we're still going on in Iraq is cuckoo." There is concern in the U.K. that British forces are so over-stretched in Iraq that the mission in Afghanistan could be at risk and both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars might be lost.

## AFGHANISTAN: GROWING DIFFICULTIES WITH THE TALIBAN

*NATO's most dangerous operation.* SACEUR General Jones describes Afghanistan as "the most dangerous operation NATO has taken on." NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has now assumed responsibility for the entire country. Its mission is to establish a "secure, self-sufficient, democratic and stable Afghanistan" (Amb. Juneau)—which is the only way to assure that the country will not become a base for Al-Qaeda or continue to supply the majority of heroin now arriving in Europe. As Allied Joint Force Commander General Gerhard Back notes, there have been many successes there: "Governance is improving, free elections have been achieved, and reconstruction and security sector reforms are showing progress." However, ISAF is now facing growing difficulties as the Taliban import techniques that they have found to be effective in Iraq:

> "...improvised explosive devices against Coalition and ISAF forces, and more recently, a rise in suicide bombers. The older tactics of intimidation and violence against government officials, NGOs and other soft targets have, if anything, increased. In addition, the insurgents are proving adept at capitalizing on links with criminal and narcotics elements to garner support and generate funds." (General Back)

These links between insurgents and criminality, according to General Back, lead to a "difficult paradox." Security and stability cannot be achieved without tackling "...the wider problems of factionalism, power brokers, illegally armed groups, narcotics, and criminality." This means that the test of success is not purely military but "whether the Afghan people feel safe in their homes and villages, whether they are free of corruption or bribery, and whether they can exercise the rights guaranteed to them in the new constitution."

*The need to develop a bond of trust with local populations.* In order to truly succeed in Afghanistan, we must "win the hearts and minds" of the people, and "...if we take a military approach...in which the main issue is to use the full power of our military forces, we may end up creating more problems than solutions" (Admiral Di Paola). In dealing with poppy production, for example, this means that:

> "It is of little use to target the farmers who are merely scratching out a living to support their families and who have few if any options. It is the bigger players we need to target. A comprehensive approach is needed that encourages farmers to turn to alternatives. Until they have choices, eradication alone will not solve the problem." (General Back)

Traditionally, Afghanistan was organized around clans, not a central government. So the challenge is to "build something from scratch that never existed there...and that will take a long, long time" (Admiral Di Paola). NATO forces will need to develop a bond of trust with the local populations, avoid the perception of being an occupying force, and maintain public support in home countries once NATO troops begin to incur casualties.

## IRAN, NORTH KOREA, AND INDIA: THE CHALLENGE OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Over the longer term, Iran's continued efforts to develop nuclear technology (a second chain of centrifuges is now ready for operation) present a serious threat to regional stability; North Korea has now exploded a nuclear device; and India has been able to enter the exclusive club of nuclear powers with what amounts to a "free pass." As more countries seek to acquire nuclear weapons or avoid IAEA controls, other countries may come to believe that nuclear weapons are essential to their security.

In the face of these trends, United Nations Under-Secretary General Nobuaki Tanaka understandably points out that the "international non-proliferation regime is in crisis," but, at the same time, "moments of deep crisis in international relations are also moments of opportunity." Many experts are calling for

more dialogue, including IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei who wants the international community to move beyond the idea that dialogue rewards bad behavior.

## THE NEED FOR NEW APPROACHES

Since these challenges are clearly testing the limits of the resources of key allies, a major shift in diplomatic and military strategy is vitally needed. We may already be on the cusp of that change. While it is too early to know what new policies are in store for Iraq or other regions of crisis, there are already signs that: (a) the U.S. and its European allies are ready to work together far more closely and effectively than ever before, (b) policy makers are ready to consider options that were almost unthinkable until quite recently.

Since the U.S. mid-term elections have passed control of the House and Senate to the Democratic Party, much depends on the willingness of the new Congressional leaders and President Bush to work effectively together—and with their global allies. In any case, President Bush and Secretary of Defense Gates now have an extraordinary chance to begin a new chapter in U.S. relations with other nations—and to further strengthen ties with NATO, the EU, the U.N., and other key international organizations. We hope that this unique opportunity will be understood and seized.

# Part One

# Chapter 1

## Workshop's Patron Opening Address

His Excellency Dr. Franz Josef Jung[1]

It is a pleasure for me to welcome you to the 23rd International Workshop on Global Security in Berlin. The fact that such an event is being held for the 23rd time shows me the continuing interest the international strategic community has in the Workshop started by Dr. Weissinger-Baylon.

The subject of this year's workshop is "Toward Peace and Security in the 21st Century—Decision-Making in the Global Era." The subject needs no further justification, because the importance of security for our world is growing, even in the minds of the general public. We only have to glance in the newspapers each morning to see that we are confronted with security problems all over the globe, with CNN transmitting pictures of these problems—Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Iran, Africa, Kosovo—directly into our living rooms. We are living in a world whose regions are growing closer together all the time.

This situation increases the significance and the necessity of a security policy that addresses global security, not just regional security. It also requires us to talk about NATO, the EU, and the United Nations when we discuss our subject and to base our ideas on a comprehensive concept of security.

### SECURITY MEASURES AT THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS

The year 2006 is a key year—at both the national and international levels—for setting the right course for security in the 21st century and for developing a comprehensive concept of security.

At the national level, we Germans have been prompted by the World Cup being held in our country to think very carefully about the security threats and risks of today and tomorrow because of the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid, and London. We are in the process of taking all conceivable measures to avert such attacks and have realized that providing protection against terrorist attacks and other asymmetrical threats is a challenge for every national government and one that can only be mastered on an international basis. That requires that new approaches be adopted and new state procedures be found for ensuring security.

---

1 His Excellency Franz Josef Jung is the Minister of Defense of Germany.

The year 2006 is also a key year for the major international institutions responsible for our collective security, namely, the Alliance, the European Union, and the United Nations. At the NATO summit in November 2006, heads of state and government will approve the key documents that update the Strategic Concept of 1999 and adapt the organization to the security environment of tomorrow. The Comprehensive Political Guidance will set extremely far-reaching standards.

## MAJOR SECURITY THREATS

During the preparation of these documents, a broad consensus was achieved that stated that tomorrow's threats and risks lie in:

- International terrorism, with the threat becoming even greater as terrorists acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities
- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in association with the availability of long-range delivery means
- Collapsing or failing states that offer refuge to terrorist organizations or provide bases from which they can operate
- The centuries-old potential for national and international conflicts along ethnic and religious boundaries in Europe and its periphery
- Corrupt and inefficient governments, massive population growth, economic hardship, and starvation in parts of Africa and Asia, a result of state collapse that brings on uncontrolled migration, which can contribute to destabilization of an entire region
- A wide range of other cross-border risks that are being increased by growing migration, worldwide mobility, global trade, and the availability of new technologies and means of communication

The most important feature of the Comprehensive Political Guidance is that it indicates the road that must be taken to counter these threats and risks, a view shared by the 26 NATO allies, 19 of which are also members of the EU. These nations agree that cooperation must be greatly intensified between the international organizations, notably NATO, the EU, and the U.N. All available political, diplomatic, civil, and military instruments must be organized to effectively counter tomorrow's challenges, from prevention to combat to stabilization to reconstruction support and humanitarian relief. With this consensus I believe we are all on track to master the challenges facing us.

## GERMANY'S EU PRESIDENCY

I also believe that 2006 is a very important year for the EU because we are preparing for Germany to assume the EU presidency for the first half of 2007. The crucial task will be to implement the European Security Strategy, which covers anti-terrorism, nonproliferation, disarmament, arms control, conflict prevention, and crisis management, in a host of pragmatic steps and projects and to continue to put life into it. We must expand civil-military cooperation with the EU and the EU must shoulder more responsibility in Kosovo. It is also important to me that the EU work to enhance the transatlantic relationship as well as expand the ESDP. It is of the utmost importance that it also moves ahead in its strategic cooperation with NATO and the U.N. While security may not be the most prominent part of the extensive programs Germany will undertake during its EU presidency, it will certainly be a key one.

## CHANGES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

It is obvious to me that the U.N. must regularly submit more requests for military support during prevention and crisis-management operations. We see this now in the Congo, where the EU has been asked to assist the MONUC by providing military forces to facilitate elections. There has been a fundamental change in the number and character of U.N. missions since the end of the East-West conflict and the number of deployed service personnel and police officers has risen dramatically. U.N. missions already involve the use of armed forces and the settlement of intra-state conflicts. Experts on international law increasingly acknowledge that averting humanitarian disasters, combating terrorists, and defending human rights may demand the use of coercive measures. Acting legitimately under international law is particularly crucial whenever military force is used and the United Nations is of unique importance in that regard.

## FUTURE SECURITY CHALLENGES

What must we prepare for over the next decade in light of this situation?

The first is that the security situation in the global Information Age poses new and increasingly complex challenges to those responsible for security policy. It will be necessary to confront crises and conflicts at the source to keep their negative impacts as far away as possible from the countries and people in Europe. But single states and single security institutions, such as the army, police, or judiciary, cannot master these challenges in isolation. Effective security can only be provided through efficient and coherent collaboration at the national and international levels.

Second, we must be prepared, either in coalitions in NATO or the EU, to deal with a broadened task spectrum and to conduct a large number of operations that vary in both nature and intensity. At the same time we must be able to cover greater distances and sustain operations for long periods. The operations envisioned will probably increase in numbers but decrease in size. They will also be more multinational. Highly developed forces will probably be called upon to provide expensive and scarce critical assets and enabling capability in areas such as strategic lift, reconnaissance, command, control, communication, engineering support, and medical support. The large number of small operations that will need to be sustained for lengthy periods will stretch us to our collective limits much more than the medium-sized operations that the EU has conducted so far in ISAF, KFOR, and IFOR/SFOR/EUFOR.

Virtually all defense ministers may see themselves facing greater problems in the future. For most of us, having to ensure that our forces can do two things at once—namely, mount and sustain a host of operations increasingly distant from their bases and transform their structures to meet entirely different demands in the future—has been enough of a challenge and effort over the last few years.

## NECESSARY STEPS

As Germany's defense minister I know exactly what I am talking about. Only a few other nations have had to come as long a way as Germany, from maintaining a deterrence and defense posture in its own country to participating in operations in far-off lands as well as turning its forces so radically into expeditionary forces and then providing them with the capabilities they need. But if our projections are correct and we have to contend in the future with more complex civil-military–style operations that are smaller in size but greater in number and that cannot be carried out one after another by quickly sending in forces and just as quickly pulling them out, then two fundamental conclusions must be drawn:

Our nations' forces must adapt to the new challenges and, through transformation, work hard to develop or enhance the capabilities needed across the broad spectrum. In doing so they must bear in mind the increase in multinationality and preserve and improve the required military interoperability par-

ticularly with U.S. forces because of their unique strategic capabilities but also with European armies and with new countries around the globe with whom we intend to engage in strategic partnerships. Above and beyond this our complex civil-military commitments demand civil-military interoperability, especially in information sharing and communication, between military staffs and forces and civil authorities. This will ensure closer and more effective cooperation during operation planning, preparation, and execution.

In future military crisis prevention, conflict management, and humanitarian relief operations, a decade-long military presence, such as IFOR, SFOR, EUFOR, and KFOR have been in the Balkans and Afghanistan, must not be required to establish and maintain stability. Military goals are accomplished in a few weeks or months but large military forces are then committed for years, because civil stabilization and reconstruction, which the military helps to enable by guaranteeing a safe and secure environment, progress too slowly because of insufficient planning and coordination. We will not be able to afford such states of affairs in the future and will need to be much quicker establishing self-supporting civil stability that allows forces to be downsized earlier than they have been in the past. In the future I assume we will require our forces and their critical assets and capabilities to be quickly available after military goals have been reached for other urgent operations in crisis areas. If they are not, on no account will we commit additional forces that are needed to support the U.N. or other organizations in stabilizing failing states

Therefore the key to success lies in mastering the challenges of the early 21st century by ensuring substantially closer cooperation between key international organizations and non-governmental organizations that are willing to join in not only strategic planning of operations but tactical execution in the field. Defense ministers who must be careful in how they handle their forces and economical in using scarce resources will be especially eager to see this type of concerted civil and military planning and action come about.

I am pleased to see that the comprehensive approach to security that Germany has adopted is growing in fertile ground in the Alliance as well as reflected in the concepts of transformation: the Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), the Concepts for Alliance Future Joint Operations (CAFJO), and Denmark's commendable Concerted Planning and Action (CPA) initiative. I am also pleased that the approach puts the work we are doing in our PRT in Afghanistan into a conceptual framework within NATO.

I am convinced that we are realizing at an international level that international inter-agency cooperation—well-orchestrated cooperation between international organizations, governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations—is the way to move forward. The strategic commanders have realized this as well and have begun to draw the right military conclusions. We must now adapt and further develop our capabilities across the spectrum with this approach, without duplication and in a complementary manner. The civil capabilities we can provide in the EU are not needed and should not be provided in NATO, and the military capabilities we can provide in NATO are not needed and should not be built up in the EU.

Well-planned and pragmatic cooperation facilitates effective commitment without demanding too great a share of scarce resources, even if the challenges continue to increase. If we do not cooperate in this way, we will not be in a position to collectively shoulder more operations and will lose popular support. So there is no alternative.

## IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Much closer cooperation, especially between NATO and the EU, is extremely important for success. We must overcome deadlocks and encourage practical cooperation wherever possible. Just as NATO will

be crucial for the military component of complex commitments, in most cases, particularly the difficult ones that demand robust strategic capabilities, the EU will be vital for the civil components. This is why I would like to emphasize that NATO and the EU are equally essential for the security of Europe and its member-states. The two organizations have different profiles and areas of expertise and both have strengths and weaknesses. They must therefore not compete with each other but complement one another.

For us, NATO remains the foundation for the collective defense of Europe and for our joint security. No other organization will be able to perform this core task in the foreseeable future. NATO is the transatlantic forum for consultation and offers the instruments needed for all military operations involving European and American allies.

Complex military crisis-prevention operations demand robust and proven political and military structures, procedures, forces, and capabilities for combat and stabilization roles to be assumed. It is in this area that NATO has singular political and military assets, especially given the strategic capabilities and force potentials of the United States. The EU will therefore remain unable to take military action at the same level for some time to come, even after full implementation of the Headline Goal. On the other hand, the EU has a much broader range of non-military instruments, assets, and capabilities than NATO. It can draw on steadily increasing experience, particularly in the areas of prevention, long-term stabilization, reconstruction aid, and humanitarian operations. It should also become capable of autonomously planning and commanding ESDP operations. However, because resources are extremely scarce in all member-states, we must be careful not to be tempted to duplicate structures instead of closing Europe's already long-standing capability gaps.

It is therefore important to use the different forms of expertise and the different strengths of NATO and the EU as efficiently as possible. This requires that the two organizations reach agreement on the roles they will play within the transatlantic security architecture. Germany will do what it can to improve the organizations' relationship in order to achieve closer cooperation and greater efficiency as well as strengthen European and transatlantic security as a whole. We will work to intensify cooperation in:

- Early political consultation on crisis management
- International terrorism
- Civil defense
- Prevention of proliferation
- Civil-military cooperation
- Extending the Berlin Plus instrument package
- Capability development and force planning
- Training exercises and certification
- Identical military standards

We believe that the dialogue between the EU and NATO must be improved at all levels. This will involve working to render cooperation between the established joint bodies more effective, giving them the necessary restricted decision-making authority, and eliminating existing deadlocks in practical cooperation. Attendance of the respective council meetings by both the High Representative of the EU and the NATO Secretary General should also be institutionalized, as should corresponding possibilities for the two military committees or representatives.

Nineteen states are already members of both organizations, a number that is set to increase over the years to come. But increasing that number also involves close coordination and pragmatic cooperation in

the interest of both sides. The idea of a Strategic Partnership between the EU and NATO, formed at the Istanbul Summit in 2004, also needs to be developed further.

## FURTHERING TRANSFORMATION

It is a fundamental fact that a strong EU is good for the Alliance and a strong NATO guarantees Europe's security and best serves European unification. So what firm action do the two organizations need to take?

When I look at NATO, I see that its military transformation has greatly advanced: there is a new command structure, a new force structure that includes the NRF, and systematic capabilities development to match a broad spectrum of tasks. The goal and conceptual thinking are leading us in the right direction—toward faster decision-making processes, information superiority through network-enabled capabilities, coherent effects, reorganized logistical capabilities, and the fastest possible application of lessons learned and new concepts to ongoing operations. I greatly appreciate the good pioneering work that has been done in this regard by the attending strategic and operational commanders at ACO, ACT, and NATO headquarters over the last few years.

The necessary political transformation is also progressing well, with continued openness regarding enlargement and global partnerships. Still, three things remain to be done:

- The strategic dialogue within the Alliance must be improved. All important issues relating to transatlantic security should be discussed more frequently within the Alliance bodies, including such thorny issues as Iran. There must be no taboos. The Alliance can retain its relevance in the long term only if its members have the political will to analyze security problems jointly, make decisions by consensus after joint analysis and consultation, and then take joint action.
- NATO must integrate all the political, diplomatic, military, and civil instruments at its disposal to coordinate their use.
- NATO must enhance its willingness and ability to work more closely and complementarily with other international organizations, particularly the U.N. and the EU.

The EU must then assimilate the progress that NATO achieves in developing conceptual capabilities to eliminate existing gaps and to closely correlate defense planning processes. The ILA Air Show in Berlin highlights the fact that the European defense industry has been striving for years, with growing success, to pool Europe's capabilities to become better and more efficient on its side of the Atlantic. Cooperation in the field of armaments can both further strengthen NATO as an institution of transatlantic security as well as further develop the EU's capability to take military action. The European Defense Agency has a highly important role in bringing about more joint projects.

Regarding the United Nations, it is important for that organization to adapt its structures to current challenges, in particular to the drastic increase in the number of U.N. missions. These include the recent establishment of a permanent Human Rights Committee, the adoption of an after-terror convention, and the implementation of comprehensive reform.

## GERMANY'S ROLE

What can Germany do to help? We would prefer to continue working within international organizations to contribute to collective security. We are making great efforts to keep these institutions politically relevant and effective. We are also contributing force contingents, capabilities, and financial resources, mostly as part of NATO and the EU on the basis of U.N. mandates. At present Germany has over 7,000 military personnel taking part in international operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Africa and is

making considerable financial contributions—Germany is the largest contributor in the EU, the second largest in NATO, and the third largest in the United Nations. This will continue.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

I would like to conclude by summarizing my key points:

- All those who bear political or military responsibility must be increasingly aware that security policy has become a general responsibility that cuts across every ministry and agency.
- Both at home and abroad we must improve cooperation between the various players and instruments and make more efficient use of them. Distinguishing between external and internal security is no longer justified.

In other words, we need a networked security policy. This requires reviewing and adapting existing structures, processes, and instruments in keeping with a comprehensive national and global security concept. That is the real challenge facing those responsible for security policy, both nationally and internationally, at the present time.

# Chapter 2

## Georgia and the New Dimensions of European Security

His Excellency Zurab Nogaideli[1]

### OPENING REMARKS

Throughout Europe, a crucial debate is taking place about what security means in today's world. Certainly security in its military sense is still at the heart of our considerations. And certainly, by strengthening and expanding NATO—by bringing willing and capable nations such as Georgia and Ukraine closer to the Alliance—we are moving ever nearer to our collective vision of lasting Euro-Atlantic security in the traditional meaning of this term.

But when we talk about security at this time, we are also talking about other profound concerns that are integral components of today's security architecture. These are economic security, energy security, border security, and, perhaps most importantly, the security of our common values. But, now and in the future, we must move beyond simply agreeing on a definition of what security is in the 21st century and develop a strategy for ensuring our security in all of its dimensions. This, perhaps, is the most important challenge we face in building a safe future for our children and grandchildren. It is also why, now more than ever, our partnership, our cooperation, our joint efforts are so vital.

It is a special pleasure for me to be addressing you in Berlin, one of the great symbols of freedom for all Europeans and for people around the world. It was in this majestic city just 17 years ago that the history of the 20th century took its most promising turn. When the Berlin Wall collapsed over night, freedom came to millions of people who had been trapped by terror and impoverishment for generations.

Looking at the Reichstag today, I am reminded of a part of the Berlin Wall that is preserved there, together with the graffiti scribbled on it by Soviet soldiers. It is a deeply moving witness not only to history but also to the ongoing threats we all face together. Let me be clear about this last point: Freedom is still being threatened in parts of Europe, both in Belarus and other areas of Europe. When the Wall fell in November of 1989, it created echoes that still resonate today. Three years ago, that echo reached Tbilisi. The Rose Revolution—during which not a single life was lost, not a single building burned—swept away a deeply corrupt regime. I would like to talk for a few minutes about what has changed in Georgia since

1 His Excellency Zurab Nogaideli is the Prime Minister of Georgia.

then. I would also like to explore what it means for Europe, especially as we consider together how a larger European neighborhood can contribute to our collective security.

## GEORGIA'S BASIS IN DEMOCRACY

After more than two and a half years of reform and steady reconstruction, Georgia has established herself today as a sound, legitimate, and open democracy, nearly indistinguishable in many ways from her EU neighbors. While Georgia is certainly a country of the South Caucasus, and a Black Sea nation, we are also a nation with a deeply entrenched European identity. We are, after all, not only the home of wine, but also of numerous Greek mythological figures whose stories are part of our shared consciousness and help form our common European perspective and culture.

I believe our commonality of values and outlook is one of the principal reasons our reforms and institutions are functioning today and why we are so resolute about transforming our nation—and why we are so hopeful about the future. Indeed, this is why, when we vote in November 2006 in our first real local elections, no one will dispute the validity of the process or the legitimacy of the outcome.

Our basis in democratic values is also why our economy is one of the most open, and therefore fastest growing, in Europe; our GDP has expanded at a rate of more than 9% in 2005. It is also why our civil society—the same one that helped power our revolution—thrives today.

## GEORGIA'S ESSENTIAL ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

What does all of what I have just talked about have to do with security?

The answer to that question is clear to all who survey geopolitics—so many challenges of our time come from the East, and when we make the East more secure, we make all of us more secure. Thus we believe that Georgia is an essential component of the European security challenge and that when Georgia's democracy succeeds—when the community of like-minded democracies expands and when stability is ensured through legitimacy, the rule of law, transparency, and accountability—we all will become more secure. It is difficult, in fact, to imagine a Europe in which Georgia is not a security ally, imposing order in areas that are so sensitive to long-term European security.

The bedrock of our integration into the Western security system remains our commitment to NATO. Our progress in boosting defense capabilities and preparedness is a story of hard work, strong and fruitful international partnerships, and tangible results. We continue to look forward to building that partnership and strengthening the institutional ties that make Georgia an ally and a contributor to European and Euro-Atlantic security by further integration with NATO—step by step and based on results and performance together with Ukraine.

As partners, we can overcome the scourges of our times: from terrorism and human trafficking to trading in illegal drugs to weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps, most importantly, we can also do more to address the specter of energy dependence and the lasting stability that secure energy provides. As the price of oil and gas skyrocket, it is worth pausing on this point.

Georgia is not only a democratic bridge to Central Asia and the Greater Middle East; it is also at the heart of the circulatory system that brings energy to Europe. In the short term, the energy security of Europe and of Georgia is contingent on diversifying the sources of supply. Georgia is already an energy transit nation, bringing more than one million barrels of oil a day to world markets and soon very substantial amounts of natural gas. Together with our regional partners, we are proposing a further expansion of this role so that markets will be more competitive and supplies more reliable and secure. In the competition for resources, we intend to be a secure option for diversified energy. This is good for those neighbors who produce energy and vital for the long-term security of European economies.

Just as we intend to be part of Europe's diversified energy supply, we also intend to contribute to Europe's security by cutting off illegal human trafficking, illegal trading in weapons, and smuggling. The exponential rise of globalized criminal activity targeting European markets is a major threat to Europe's security. We must—and we can—do our part in averting this threat.

That is why my government is launching new proposals to develop enhanced and intense cooperation in this field with member-states and the institutions of the European Union. I believe there is a great deal we can accomplish. While Europe debates the scope and structure of its own future, we must continue the work of building European security.

## PARTNERING WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

Some of the countries that comprise the essential fabric of Europe's security infrastructure are members of the European Union; others, like Romania and Bulgaria, will join one day soon. Others like my own country, do not expect to become a Union member in the foreseeable future. Yet this makes Georgia no less of a European country, and perhaps makes us an even more indispensable one.

As we move forward, the European Union will be our model and our invaluable partner. Currently we host the EU's largest rule of law mission; our cooperation with this mission has been praised by Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group, to name a few. We also plan to do much more with the EU in the context of the Neighborhood Policy Action Plan, from reforming our courts and patrolling our borders against smugglers and traffickers to further strengthening our civil society. In fact, our vision is to become the model for how Europe can forge partnerships in its neighborhood with partners who do not have the immediate prospect of EU membership. And while we will continue to rely with gratitude on the EU in solidifying our democratic institutions, we are also intent on repaying this generosity—a profound partnership must bring benefits to both parties, and we believe this one does.

## OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS

Looking to the future, it is clear that there are obstacles to our collective progress in the Black Sea/Caucasus region. Russia does not always seem enchanted by Georgia's democratic transformation but democracy is not a zero-sum game. In the face of threats and dangers, we will look forward, not backward. Embargoes and economic subversion are tools of the past, to which, unfortunately, Georgia is subjected on a regular basis. But our resolve cannot be shaken. In fact, the trials we have been facing—from artificial energy shortages to wine embargoes—have only made us stronger.

I believe that our path can make Russia, Georgia, and all who call Europe their home winners in the global security challenge. Moscow's cooperation in strategies that diversify energy, choke off criminals, eliminate terrorism, and build stable societies is central to all our efforts. Bringing stability to our region is a vital part of the European security project and together we must replace the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with durable solutions. It is in our collective interests to do so because the threats that emerge from these regions are no longer isolated and limited to only undermining Georgia's security. When we interdict counterfeit U.S. dollars that travel through South Ossetia and when we interdict highly enriched uranium coming across the same region we are stopping these threats from entering Europe.

But we must not just put a band-aid on these problems. We must look at the root causes, address their sources, and solve them peacefully and fully. The rest of Europe should not shrink from working with Georgia to peacefully resolve these problems. These issues are our collective challenge and, by pursuing a dignified solution, they are within our collective grasp to resolve.

It is in this context that I tell you that I expect Georgia will peacefully solve the frozen conflicts with Europe's continued and, I hope, more intense involvement in the process. We need to bring peace and stability to the entire South Caucasus if for no other reason than to reach across the Caspian Sea to Kazakhstan and Europe's partners in Central Asia who are watching closely, eager to see if democracy can succeed.

## CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY OUTSIDE THE EU BORDERS

Just 15 years ago, many people believed that democracy was only for Western Europeans living in Germany, France, or Italy. Then, after the liberation of Eastern Europe, democracy was thought to be possible for Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Baltics—but certainly not for Ukraine or Georgia. After our Rose Revolution and the Orange Revolution, however, things changed. And today democracy is being debated ever more rigorously in Central Asia and across the former Soviet Union.

I believe democracy can and will succeed. And by drawing Georgia closer and closer into the Euro-Atlantic security framework, the transatlantic community is ensuring and institutionalizing a framework for lasting peace and stability. Rather than importing problems, we are creating mechanisms to strengthen Europe's long-term security—through engagement and the expansion of our community of shared values.

In short, we in Georgia see our role as helping to consolidate European democracy outside the borders of the European Union. Our success in building democracy is therefore not just good for Georgia, it is good for the region and good for Europe. Together, we are building a common framework for freedom, liberty, and security that will embrace all of historical Europe, from the Atlantic to the shores of the Black Sea and the Baltics. This investment in democracy will make all of our countries safer and more secure, because now, more than ever, our security is your security. Therefore our common goals—and our common objective—must succeed.

# Chapter 3

## Security Challenges in the Balkans and the Black Sea Region: An Ukrainian Perspective

His Excellency Borys Tarasyuk[1]

### OPENING REMARKS

I am honored to participate in yet another outstanding event in the Euro-Atlantic area, the International Workshop series on global security. This is probably the 14th workshop in a row that I have attended—outstanding activities initiated and founded by our friend Roger Weissinger-Baylon that are unique opportunities for decision makers in the Euro-Atlantic area to exchange their views. They are also a kind of catalyst as well as a very good think tank for those working in practical diplomacy or in governmental jobs that involve security-related issues. In my previous capacity as foreign minister and as a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official, participation and discussions in this workshop series were for me a very stimulating event for applying new ideas to my work.

Our chairman, Minister Mediu, brought up some of the challenges that the Balkans and the Black Sea region are facing. I am going to dwell on some of the challenges that are closely related to security issues. From my point of view, this region is the only area of instability and challenge to European security as such.

### THE ROOT CAUSES OF INSTABILITY

What are the major challenges facing this region and what are the origins of these instabilities? The destruction by the imperial entities—the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia—which were based on totalitarian ideologies and aggressive, ruthless foreign policies, is one of the root causes of the current instabilities. Another cause is that the outgoing empires used the usual policy employed by all empires: divide and rule. As a result, we have the same product with two different stories: the Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo on the one hand and the protracted conflicts in such areas as Trans-Dnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and southern Ossetia in Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan on the other hand.

---

1 His Excellency Borys Tarasyuk was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine at the time this paper was presented.

If one compares these two different subregions, one may easily find that the attention given to them has been different from the start—one has been treated as a first-class issue and one as a second-class situation. The first-class issue, the Balkans, has been given massive and robust attention from the very beginning from the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, the OSCE, and even the Council of Europe. Just recently, for example, there was an informal meeting of the foreign ministers of the Council of Europe in which we discussed with Marti Ahtisaari the current situation and the future prospects for Kosovo—which may become an international-community success or a failure.

But the second-class area has been left on its own. From the very beginning of the conflicts there, from the beginning of the 1990s, this conflict area was referred to as a Russian responsibility or as a sphere of Russian domination. International attention has been inadequate and there have been no comparable efforts to those paid to the conflict in the Balkans.

What resulted from this inequality? Different European and Euro-Atlantic community attitudes toward the two areas. The Black Sea region has had the prospect of European and Euro-Atlantic integration but the second-class area has had no such prospect.

I think this was and still is a mistake. Why? Because we are talking about inseparable parts of Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community and because these areas make up a strategically important region, especially during this time of energy security crises. A very important alternative energy-supply route goes through Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Moldova and if you look at a map you will find that much will depend on whether this area of instability becomes an alternative route of secure energy supply from Central Asia to Europe. Much will also depend on whether we succeed in reaching a settlement there.

## WORKING TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS IN BOTH SUBREGIONS OF THE BLACK SEA AREA

What should be done? What can we do together? I believe that we need to pay adequate attention to the protracted conflict in what I am calling the second-class area as we did last year in the case of Trans-Dnistria, when the European Union and the United States entered the process of peacefully settling the Trans-Dnistrian conflict. This effort added new value to the peace process in Trans-Dnistria, which I believe should be a priority of the international community.

However, the wrong solution to the Black Sea region conflicts may have negative, destructive effects not only on that area but on the Georgia-Moldova-Azerbaijan area as well. A mistake made regarding Kosovo's status could open a Pandora's box of issues or instigate a domino effect on other regions. So it is extremely important that the international community act cautiously and within the framework of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244.

What else can we do to bring stability to both problematic subregions of the Balkans and the Black Sea? In addition to efforts to stabilize these conflicts, we need to introduce a very positive incentive for greater stability—the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration.

## UKRAINE'S CONTRIBUTION TO BLACK SEA REGIONAL STABILITY

Ukraine remains the number one European nation in terms of contributions to the peacekeeping operations. Since the very beginning, Ukraine has participated in all peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts in this area—in Croatia, then in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and now in Kosovo. As one of the guarantors of a peaceful settlement in Trans-Dnistria, Ukraine made a special contribution at the beginning of 2005, and as a result of these efforts the new Ushenko plan emerged, which was accepted by all relevant

parties and remains the only basis for settlement. In addition, because of the Ukrainian initiative, the United States and the European Union were invited to participate in the Trans-Dnistria settlement.

At the beginning of 2005, Ukraine also started to cooperate much more closely with the European Union and NATO, especially in the area of security. And with its invitation to participate in a Membership Action Plan and the perspective of NATO membership, Ukraine is increasing its contribution to European security.

Ukraine considers the Balkans-Black Sea region as an area of vital interest and will act accordingly. We are making great efforts to bring European values and standards to the area, especially democracy, and to institutionalizing GUUAM as a full-fledged regional international organization with its secretariat in Kiev. Ukraine, with Georgia, also initiated a unique regional initiative, the Community of Democratic Choice, to bring greater security, prosperity, and democracy to the area that extends from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea.

However, the future of a united, stable, prosperous, and democratic Europe depends on all of us making concerted efforts to meet the security challenges of this region.

# Chapter 4

## Security and Cooperation in Southeastern Europe: The Objectives of Greece

His Excellency Evangelos Vasileios I. Meimarakis[1]

I feel particularly happy to be with you today in this beautiful city of Berlin and my participation in the effort to foster a fertile dialogue on promoting cooperation, trust, and security makes me feel especially pleased and responsible. There is no doubt that the path toward achieving extensive cooperation and developing common strategies and doctrines is still long and especially laborious. There is also no doubt that numerous problems will arise during the process of reform and adaptation to new and often uncertain situations. However, it is our job to move forward and undertake responsibilities, especially our responsibility to deliver stability and prosperity for all our citizens.

### AN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN TRANSITION

The international environment is changing rapidly. Worldwide, we see hope alternating with disappointment. We are going through a transitional period, which is characterized by insecurity and deep concern:

- Concern expressed in different forms, as a result of rapid changes or violence and terrorism
- Concern over the ability of defense tools to effectively counter asymmetric threats
- Concern over the control of nuclear energy, which should be used solely for peaceful purposes
- Concern over issues pertaining to pandemic diseases and the scarcity of energy and natural resources
- Concern over the issues of human trafficking and organized crime
- Concern over the effects of climate changes and how to protect the environment

Today, insecurity, instability, and uncertainty prevail worldwide. They derive from multiple sources, creating tension and unrest in many parts of the planet. Although we can identify potential trends, we are unable to foresee specific future developments. However, we have become gradually aware that uncer-

1 His Excellency Evangelos Meimarakis is the Minister of National Defense of Greece.

tainty and new threats may be vehicles for a number of greater risks and constitute an impediment to the efforts of the international community to progress and create prosperity.

During this period of time, the essential link between the international community and our democratic countries, based on the rule of law, individual freedoms, and social peace, represents both the goal and the means of countering asymmetric threats, including the predominant terrorist threat. We are all aware that the war against terrorism will not be short, and we also know that successfully countering terrorism will be a hard task, since terrorism is not purely a military threat against the security of the state and society.

We must make every possible effort to protect our citizens from abominable terrorist attacks, fanaticism, irrationality, and hatred, no matter what their source. It is of vital importance to understand that in today's interdependent world, threats against each one of us are actually threats against all of us. Security for each one of us separately is security for all of us collectively. Thus the issue of defense and security extends beyond the adaptation of strategic doctrines and the development of new national military strategies.

Nevertheless, radical reforms in the defense and security sectors as well as adaptation to new approaches, strategies, and policies have evolved into high-priority issues for modern states and for defense, security, and international cooperation organizations. The successful countering of traditional or new forms of threats necessitates the radical modernization and reconstruction of the AF in terms of strategic concept and its consequent operational application. We must aim for full adaptation to new technologic developments.

Southeastern Europe still has a number of destabilizing sources, but fortunately we are not encountering the tension of past crises. The Balkans and Europe have freed themselves from the weighty legacy of the past. The logic of confrontation has been greatly curtailed, albeit not completely eliminated. Nonetheless, today there are many causes for optimism:

- Since 2003, the Association and Stabilization Strategy has developed into to a "pre-accession process" and many states have signed Stabilization Agreements with the EU.
- Balkan Cooperation has brought the leaders of Serbia and Albania to the table after 50 years.
- Bulgaria and Romania are firmly moving toward integration into Europe, and soon will become members of the Union.
- Cyprus is an EU member-state.
- Turkey is an EU candidate country.

Moreover, the economic landscape of the region reflects a gradual growth of entrepreneurism, tourism, and development.

Greece, the most developed country in the region, recently reshaped its foreign policy as well as its role in the wider area of southeastern Europe. Long ago Greece stopped being a passive recipient of developments and stopped confining itself to reflexive management of national issues. By developing strategic objectives and creating a vision and a goal, Greece has made remarkable progress and will continue to develop.

By following a specific plan, sharing views with a wide range of political forces, programming rigorously, and implementing our policies, today Greece is also actively involved in the developments in the region. Greece plays a fundamental role in and is a strategic partner of the international community as it strives to resolve serious regional problems through a series of EU and other international initiatives as well as through an agenda that includes a multitude of proposals and international interests. Our involvement in the region stems not only from our foreign policy but from our geostrategic and geopolitical

position. It is also a result of our country's contribution to world peace, security, and stability, which are essential in the contemporary landscape, and because of our strong and unfailing devotion to the values of democracy and peace.

Greece has always been at a crossroads of cultures and religions. Our history and culture have taught us that diversity is a treasure that must be preserved. We therefore do not wish to pursue or impose uniformity. While we line up with those who have common values and principles, we see our region's diversity as a source of creativity rather than a source of disputes.

Greece has worked responsibly and persistently to carry out its objective and to consolidate peace, stability, and security in our border areas. The Euro-Atlantic Alliance and the European Union have recognized our efforts by naming Greece a "pillar state" that supports security, stability, and development in the region. Konstantinos Karamanlis, the pioneer of the Balkan Cooperation, played a particularly important role in changing the atmosphere in southeastern Europe, creating priceless cooperation and promotion strong relationships.

The Hellenic chairmanship of the South Eastern European Cooperation Process (SEECP) will soon expire, and during the ninth summit of the SEECP leaders of states and governments in Thessaloniki we had the opportunity to assess the progress we have made. The results were extremely encouraging. During the Hellenic chairmanship, there has been tangible progress on cooperation and we have achieved great success. Several high spots are the institutional enhancement of the Cooperation Process, the development of infrastructures in the region, and the work to fight organized crime and eradicate corruption in our region.

The approval of the text prepared by the Hellenic presidency, "Appraisal of the perspectives of the Thessaloniki Agenda in relation to the European integration of the Western Balkans," is another achievement. This text underlines the shared conviction of the countries in our region about what needs to be done in the future to implement the Thessaloniki Agenda. We are continuing to work to create an atmosphere of enhanced trust, mutual understanding, and cooperation in order to ensure our countries' and our people's progress and prosperity. We will not allow this work to regress nor tolerate situations that could impede our progress toward a better future through dialogue, joint efforts, and good neighborly relations.

Now that the procedure for determining the final status of Kosovo has entered a crucial phase, the aforementioned parameters are of vital importance. Kosovo is a priority issue that must be handled with caution and prudence. A viable and realistic solution should be sought exclusively through dialogue and emerge through careful and substantial negotiations with all parties, taking into consideration the resolutions of the Security Council and the principles and values of the European Union.

Within this context, Greece supports the Euro-Atlantic perspective regarding the southeastern European countries and encourages their participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP). We also fully support the European vision of all of our neighboring countries. We have committed a significant portion of our political-diplomatic efforts to enhancing and facilitating the process for enabling the Balkan nations to become equal members of a dynamic European Union.

We are also working to improve Greek-Turkish relations in order to eliminate tension in the region. We are promoting bilateral cooperation in fields of mutual interest but further development of our relationship will depend mainly on the behavior of our neighboring country. Turkey should bear in mind that it must fully comply with the criteria and principles necessary for accession, an important one of which is participating in good neighborly relations. All candidate countries and potential candidates for accession must understand that achieving their goal depends primarily on how rapidly they promote the necessary reforms and how effective their participation is in initiatives that strengthen regional cooperation, stability, and good relations with all neighboring countries.

Today, foreign policy and national defense are so closely linked that it is inconceivable to have a national defense policy that neither serves nor is based on foreign policy. Thus, our Ministry of National Defense works to prevent conflicts by reducing tensions and contributing to mutual understanding and trust. It is commonly known that the Greek defense policy provides for the safeguarding of its territorial integrity and security and respects international law.

By cooperating with the Southeastern European Countries Defense Ministries (SEDM) as well as with a series of initiatives and activities, we have established a regional security system that is being enhanced day by day. Greece plays a vital role in this system and, because we believe in deepening and broadening cooperation among the SEDM ministers, we support the participation of the defense ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro in our ministerial meetings as observers.

The agreement that was signed during the EU General Affairs and External Relations Summit in November 2005 on the formation of a Battle Group, which made Greece a "Frame-Nation" and included participation by Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Romania, was welcomed by all European member-states and gave Greece the opportunity to continue its active and vital role in the Balkans. We also observe with interest the progress made by the armed forces of the countries of the region that have recently joined with NATO structures and assist them whenever required.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Now is a critical time for us. For historical, political, economic, and social reasons we cannot afford to be complacent or arrogant. To the contrary, we need to consult with other nations to develop peaceful solutions to the problems that are emerging on the international political stage to strengthen democracy, freedom, and progress. Only in this way can we assure the peace, security, primacy of international law, multilateral international action, full employment, social solidarity, justice, equality, and elimination of discrimination that our citizens are demanding and that all citizens deserve. As an international community that wishes to provide fundamental freedoms, encourage our people's participation in political activity, promote economic reforms, and improve socioeconomic conditions for our citizens, we must combine freedom with order and social justice. We must also act on our people's irreversible decision to participate in a collective security system that will constitute the cornerstone for reaching our vision of world peace.

# Chapter 5

## The Balkans and Black Sea Region: An Albanian Perspective

His Excellency Fatmir Mediu[1]

We have had quite a number of interesting discussions during this workshop, covering problems involved with NATO operations, integrated systems, NATO's expansion of missions, transforming its structures, NATO-EU relations, southeastern Europe, enlargement, and the security challenges in the Balkans and the Black Sea region. This last topic is a significant challenge because it combines a great deal of history, recent positive developments, unsolved issues, pending issues, and even religious problems. It also involves many threats, including organized crime, weak institutions, and undefined status, particularly that of Kosovo and the new republic of Montenegro. Energy threats exist as well, which makes it necessary, as General Jones discussed, for NATO to move from a reactive to a proactive stance.

NATO is present in the Balkans, ensuring security in Kosovo and assisting countries of the Adriatic Charter in making defense reforms. Some of the countries in the region are part of NATO and are contributing to NATO-led operations and the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Some of the countries are willing to be part of Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean Sea and are contributing to moving the area from a stabilization to a normalization phase. There are some very sad stories from that part of the world but there are also some success stories, one of which is that two countries from the area are here at the table as NATO members, two others wish to become NATO members, and the others are building their own security system. We still need to answer a lot of questions about the region but our distinguished panelists will address them as will Boris Tarasyuk, the Ukrainian minister of foreign affairs.

The Balkans and the Black Sea region are both very interesting though they have different problems, different ideas, and are proposing different solutions. But because I am close to Kosovo and to Serbia I would like to say that we do not have to stick only to formal papers—we also must see the reality of how things are and what the solutions must be. Otherwise, I think we will remain lost and the status quo will produce a lot of problems and even tensions. So we should not just wait for what has been agreed on but should also try to interact in order to provide solutions for the final status of Kosovo. You might disagree, but if we do not continue to act and Montenegro wins the referendum, then what is the sense of a Serbia-Montenegro union, because Montenegro will no longer exist.

---

1 His Excellency Fatmir Mediu is the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Albania.

There are many questions that will continue on because we cannot solve them now, but I can say that everyone on my panel agrees that a clear EU-NATO perspective on the Black Sea region and the Balkans is the only way to ensure stability and security. I hope that those at the Riga summit will not simply say words of appreciation for progress but will give a clear signal regarding the future membership of those countries that wish to become NATO members.

# Chapter 6

## Global Security and the Western Balkans

His Excellency Karl Erjavec[1]

Today the international community lives with fewer traditional security challenges but faces untraditional emerging security challenges that extend beyond national borders. Regional points of acute crisis create instability that can have a negative influence on global security. Until recently, the synonyms for security were well- equipped armed forces and geographic position, but today these no longer provide a basic good of modern society, namely, security.

Being able to maintain a secure and stable living environment is directly linked with local and global threats and dangers. When society's stability is destroyed, the civilized environment becomes unstable and crisis points emerge. In such an environment, both economic and social systems become ineffective. The ensuing situation imposes on the international community a need to provide security within the scope of collective security mechanisms or, rather, through direct involvement in regional points of acute crisis. The most effective tools for solving conflicts are collective defense and a joint approach to the solution of global problems.

### INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TOWARD STABILIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION

The international community and many organizations actively participate in stability and security building processes that are taking place at crisis points and assisting the countries involved. The focus of these efforts are stabilization and democratization in addition to political, economic, and social reconstruction; for political, economic, and social reforms to be made, it is of primary importance that safe and stable circumstances be established. Local authorities are incapable of providing such circumstances without the assistance and cooperation of the international community, and both are therefore urgently needed.

A further threat to global security is posed by various forms of terrorism. It is indisputable that terrorism poses the greatest threat to global security and stability. The international community of modern democratic states is aware of the value of security and has started an inexorable fight against all elements that might endanger this common good.

1 His Excellency Karl Erjavec is the Minister of Defense of Slovenia.

Slovenia is aware of the importance of global security and stability, so it maintains a proactive stance within the efforts of the international community to prevent the eruption of new crises and to resolve existing ones. Slovenia is thus participating in peace operations in the Western Balkans area, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq, and a decision on deployment to the Congo and Sudan is currently under review by the government.

Slovenia itself witnessed a crisis that reached an infamous peak in our close vicinity. The security and stability of the Western Balkans and of all of southeastern Europe therefore continue to be of major interest to Slovenia. It is for this very reason that Slovenia decided to send the majority of its forces to operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The international community has succeeded in establishing a balance of forces there, since its activities have produced stabilized conditions and a democratization process. We have also witnessed political, economic, and social reconstruction. The countries of the Western Balkans are well on their way to becoming democratic, free, and modern European states. However, in spite of the progress achieved in the region, each individual state still has a considerable amount of work left to do.

During the process of adjusting to the standards of democratic countries, the region is being assisted by the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance, in addition to bilateral assistance provided by individual states. The European Union has been trying ever harder to ensure peace and stability in the Western Balkans, since this is a prerequisite for fast and efficient implementation of stabilization and association agreements or concluding them as soon as possible.

The basic framework and orientation of the European Union regarding its activities in the region is the stabilization and association process (SAP). Negotiations on stabilization and association agreements (SAAs) between Western Balkan countries and the European Union are still in progress.

The European Union cooperates with Western Balkan countries in various ways. The main aim of the European Union has been to include the Western Balkan states as members of European structures since this is the only guarantee of complete stabilization in the region.

## THE EU-NATO STRATEGIC DOCUMENT

The EU and NATO have jointly prepared a strategy to deal with the Western Balkans. This strategy is based on the idea that the strategic document should define the political and economic role of the European Union and the security role of NATO in the Western Balkans. The document lays out the organizations' joint strategy for the Western Balkans, with the aim of maintaining stability in the region based on democracy, a free market, the rule of law, and the efficient organization of governments.

Regarding security and defense, the document specifies the division of tasks between the European Union and NATO. Security and defense are two key areas in which the countries of the region should come closer to Euro-Atlantic structures. The European Union and NATO support security and defense reforms, including reform of police forces. The European Union could thus provide help and support institutional reforms while NATO could focus on the development of military structures, making them compatible with its own structures and establishing democratic control of the armed forces. Making the armed forces transparent and providing an appropriate defense budget are two other areas that belong within this scope of tasks.

In Slovenia's opinion, it is appropriate for the two Euro-Atlantic structures to have a common approach. The approach reflects the endeavors of the international community to stabilize the situation in the region.

## PROGRESS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Speaking of Bosnia and Herzegovina alone, the progress made in many areas by the country must be underlined. At the start of negotiations on stabilization and accession to the European Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina passed from the post-Dayton phase to the Brussels phase. The reform of the defense system, intelligence services, the system of taxation, and judicial and public services, to mention but a few, has already shown some progress. However, what has been accomplished should not be considered enough, and the reform process must not stop. Bosnia and Herzegovina must continue to follow the guidelines and must create the conditions that allow the adopted legislation to be implemented. This will become the main benchmark for progress and will indicate the success of reforms. Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina must ensure the transparent operation of institutions and complete the reform of the public administration, police, judicial, and public TV systems. Most of all, an atmosphere of trust must be established in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to transcend ethnic tensions and to achieve consensus on essential matters that significantly contribute to the better coexistence of all inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of their ethnic background.

The European Union is not active in Bosnia and Herzegovina only in the political field. It is also active in the military field and within the peacekeeping operation "Althea," which maintains a safe and stable environment by military means. Thirty-three nations are currently participating in this operation, which gives it a multinational character and, moreover, demonstrates the commitment of the entire international community to the stabilization of the country. The international community must maintain its presence in the same numbers until the parliamentary elections in autumn 2006. We believe that the results of these elections and the ensuing situation will dictate the dynamics and course of the withdrawal of international military forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On the basis of the election results and the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, local authorities will gradually acquire the capacity to take over the obligations and responsibilities of the international forces and, consequently, assume control over the situation in the country. Local authorities and local security agencies will gradually take over the initiative in the fight against organized crime, arms collection, and other tasks that are presently carried out by the international community.

## THE KOSOVO ISSUE

However, the Western Balkans is not Bosnia and Herzegovina alone. The efforts of the international community focus also on Kosovo, where the NATO-led operation Kosovo Force is in place. The unresolved status of this region and the slow implementation of standards continue to endanger regional stability. Even though there is a low risk of a new outbreak of ethnic violence, relations between individual ethnic groups are tense.

In further endeavors to solve the Kosovo issue, special attention will have to be given to building a multi-ethnic society, decentralizing power, and furthering Kosovo's economic development. After the two sides presented their views and harmonized specific positions on the decentralization of Kosovo, a standstill developed in the third round of talks because of differing understandings of decentralization. Now both sides have the major responsibility of continuing the re-approchement of their negotiation standpoints. The goal is to form a model of decentralization that can fully guarantee local self-government to the Serbian population in the municipalities in which they have a majority.

Concern exists over the weak economy, corruption, organized crime (trafficking in people and drugs), and an extremely high level of unemployment (from 65% to 70%), all of which puts at risk the stability and the future of the province as well as the wider region. The unclear political future of the region renders foreign investment impossible and thus hinders economic development. The presence of interna-

tional forces in Kosovo will continue to be necessary until the establishment of all mechanisms and standards that empower the local authorities to provide a satisfactory level of security, stability, and general social progress.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

The North-Atlantic Alliance is united in its belief that KFOR still remains the essential element of peace and stability in the province. Among long-term solutions, it should be mentioned that using the model of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the solution applied at the time of handing over the operation to the European Union, may be worth considering for providing security in this province. In assessing the military readiness of units in the province, progress can be seen in the reduced use of the forces for specific tasks (caveats) and in improved intelligence and information coordination.

I am convinced that the countries of the Western Balkans will achieve balance and stability and that they will start the democratization process and political, economic, and social reconstruction. It is indeed necessary that they closely cooperate with the international community and, in the process of accession to Euro-Atlantic structures, break the cycle of political discord.

# Chapter 7

## A Romanian Perspective on the Balkans and the Black Sea Region

Ambassador Bogdan Mazuru[1]

I agree completely with Minister Tarasyuk's statement that it is extremely important that the Black Sea region have a defined relationship with the EU and with NATO. I also believe that not having such a relationship would be a security risk.

Regarding the Balkans, the Albanian Minister of Defense talked very quickly about the risks there, but we know that Kosovo is an extremely important topic and a major element of region-wide security. I also think that the developments regarding Kosovo and what is decided in the fall of 2006 and in Belgrade will be extremely significant. It is also very important that the democratic forces in Belgrade maintain their strength within the internal political stage.

So I would say that we need to take into account the individual performances of the individual nations in the region but that we also need to have a more comprehensive approach to the entire region, because what happens in one part of the western Balkans may affect other parts of the area as well. The Black Sea region, however, is more heterogeneous, with very different nations of different sizes and different interests, but this is actually a positive challenge, not a difficulty.

What I believe we need to do in the Black Sea region is to minimize the risks and maximize the opportunities to find and jointly work on concrete common projects and to attach these projects to the EU and to NATO. In this way, we will be able to develop a regional identity, which is important for dealing with the risks in the area: the frozen conflicts, the terrorism, the organized crime, and the human, arms, and drug trafficking.

---

1 Ambassador Bogdan Mazuru is the Romanian Ambassador to Germany.

# Chapter 8

## Global Security: A Russian Perspective

Colonel-General Anatoly I. Mazurkevich[1]
Russian Federation

First of all, I would like to thank the organizers of this workshop, particularly the chairman and founder, Roger Weissinger-Baylon, who managed to gather so many of the brilliant politicians, military leaders, and professionals who are responsible for the security of the planet.

As you know, this 23rd workshop is dedicated to discussing how to establish global security. In checking the history of this workshop we could notice the transformation of its name from "NATO Workshop on Political-Military Decision Making" to "International Workshop on Global Security." At this 23rd meeting we will be discussing the key issue: how to combine the potentials of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union in order to establish peace and stability around the globe.

The situation in the Balkans remains a sensitive issue for all. Ethnic conflicts in this region will continue to serve as a source of instability. And the same is true for the future status of Kosovo.

As we talk about global security, I ask you to please not forget about such global partners in the Euro-Asiatic area as Russia, where I am from; China; and India. I am confident that the world's nations need just, equal and multi-polar relations without any self-proclaimed hegemony and imposition of democracy. We constantly speak of the necessity to avoid double standards in the assessment of new threats and challenges including connivance with terrorists, their accomplices and sponsors. Nevertheless, we sometimes witness the fact that this continues.

### RUSSIA'S GLOBAL EFFORTS

In the Black Sea region, Russia is working to solve some of problems there. We have some issues with Georgia, which we recently discussed with several distinguished Georgians. On June 15 of this year, we began withdrawing our forces from Georgia, according to the agreement between Georgia and Russia that was signed on May 31, 2006. Russia is fulfilling its obligations and will complete them as it was agreed.

1 Colonel-General Anatoly I. Mazurkevich is Chief of the Main Directorate for Military Cooperation in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense.

Regarding Armenia and Azerbaijan, we have had great difficulty attempting to minimize the risks of the conflict between the two nations. Finally people from both sides are talking about how to sit down at the table and talk rather than fight..

Minister Tarasyuk has confirmed that there will be a new round of negotiations concerning the Black Sea fleet at the naval base in Sebastopol. Though we are at the beginning of this process, both sides are ready to solve the problems diplomatically and as quickly as possible.

Russia looks at the problems of global security somewhat differently from other countries. The changes that have taken place for at least the last 10 years, which have reshaped not only the nature of Russia but the global system, make us think that the only right way ahead is to create a collective security system, whether a new one or a modification of the present one. Such a system will require real cooperation to minimize threats while preserving the legitimate rights of all nations and all peoples. And it will need to be broad based, involving not only Europe but beyond.

Currently drug trafficking is spreading from Afghanistan through Tajikistan. Part of the dangerous cargo is going to Europe and causes fatal consequences there. The Soviet Union has been trying for 10 years to stop this danger, but unfortunately it was not supported by the international community. Currently Russia continues its cooperation with international organizations on the creation of the Afghan belt of security. Please be assured that Russia is a reliable partner who is cooperating to strengthen international security.

# Part Two

# Chapter 9

## NATO's Transformation for the 21st Century

General James L. Jones, USMC[1]
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)

With three and a half years of this wonderful assignment under my belt, I would like to reflect on how far we have come in the last few years. I will use the Prague Summit in 2002 as a benchmark, since it was just after that Summit that I started to really focus on this job, which Secretary Rumsfeld asked me to take on.

### THE REALITY OF TRANSFORMATION

We all know about transformation—what it means or what we think it means—and we know it is a good thing. But in NATO, transformation is something that is done to somebody else. While that may be a little sarcastic, I think most of us would agree that change is easy only when you are telling other people to do the changing. To date, most of the transformation in NATO has been done to the military, to SHAPE. I accept that, and in fact, think it is a fantastic thing. I am very proud of what Allied Command Operation and Allied Command Transformation, in other words the military, have been able to accomplish since 2002 to bring to reality the vision of the Prague Summit. And in many respects, the Prague Summit made my task to transform easier. Whenever I encountered obstacles along the path to creating change, I was able to say "We are just doing what we were told to do and if you don't like it, change it. This is the guidance we received from the 19 sovereign nations, which had the wisdom to expand NATO to include seven more nations." As I look back over the past several years, I think we have done everything the Prague Summit directed us to do and I think we have done it quite well.

But transformation, in an organization such as NATO, must be done in total. Change is important for every organization, but not just for a portion of it. We must understand that transformation of just the military component of NATO is not a complete transformation. With the Prague capability commitments, we know what our shortfalls are throughout the Alliance. We have already reformed the NATO command structure by closing many unneeded headquarters. We have worked hard to establish the NATO Response Force and we hope that it will reach full operational capability by October 1, 2006. We witnessed, in 2004, the fantastic addition of seven new member-nations to the Alliance. We replaced the

1 General James L. Jones, USMC is Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Supreme Allied Command Atlantic with the Allied Command Transformation. And we embarked on a very, very painful mandated 30% reduction in our personnel. Although we did not achieve it, we have reduced our manning to the point which I believe is the minimum we can accept without damaging our capabilities at a time when our operational commitments are increasing exponentially throughout the world.

All of these changes are not only part of a physical transformation, they are also the beginnings of what I think of as a cultural transformation of the Alliance—what it is, what it does, where it does it, and why it does it. This transformation will continue as NATO goes from its 20th -century charter, which was to be a capable and reactive alliance, to its 21st -century requirement, which is to be a more proactive alliance at great strategic distances. The term "out of area," which we used not too many years ago, is no longer relevant—not when NATO is involved in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and Iraq. There is no such thing as being out of area in the new NATO because the new NATO has the political will to do more. However, we also have the political will to resource less, a point I hit upon when I appeared before this group two years ago. Since then, for all the good things we have done, I can tell you that on this score we have lost ground. There are now only seven members of the Alliance that have chosen to invest 2% or more of their gross domestic product in national security, and that is certainly worrisome at a time when the number of our operations is multiplying.

Despite the challenges that face us—and there are many—we are making the transition from the 20th to the 21st century, and that is to be celebrated. And the Riga Summit, which will take place in November 2006, will, I believe, tell us much about ourselves. Not to over hype it, I believe it will be at least as important as the Prague Summit of 2002 in answering the questions that are fundamental to the future health and vitality of the Alliance and to our raison d'être. That includes finding those things that will keep us focused as an alliance of 26, or 28, or 30 or 35 or 37. Who knows? Despite the challenges we face, I think there is much to be optimistic about concerning the future of the Alliance.

## CAUSES FOR OPTIMISM

One of the most significant characteristics of a healthy organization is that more people are trying to join it than are trying to leave it. I know of no nation that is thinking of leaving the Alliance and I know of quite a few that are seeking to become members. Additionally, there are several nations that are seeking to have a non-traditional relationship—nations that may surprise you as they have previous SACEURs. For example, Australia, South Korea, Japan, and New Zealand all wish to have a security relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. So, we have no one wishing to leave, we have candidates for new membership, and we have candidates who wish to have a special relationship with the Alliance.

Right now a very exciting dialogue is taking place among these many countries that can best be described as a convergence of common ideas relating to the collective security of our friends, our allies, our members, and our partners—not just regionally or just in Europe but throughout the world. This dialogue is covering topics such as the role of the Alliance regarding energy security, our critical infrastructures, and weapons of mass destruction. Particularly, WMDs that might fall into the hands of asymmetric actors, including the radical fundamentalists and narco-terrorists, on whom much of Afghanistan's GDP depends and 90% of whose products are sold in European capitals, financing God knows what kinds of terrorist activities around the world. Such subjects are geostrategic in nature and affect our collective security, as do uncontrolled immigration and its impact on our societies.

The Iranian question and nuclear weapons also affect our collective security and they also remind us that while we focus on the asymmetric nature of the world, we should never, never forget that conventional wars are still possible and that wars certainly have been started over issues such as energy. During

the Cold War, when I was coming up through the ranks, we used to talk a lot about sea lines of communications and choke points for the Navy. We fixated on those ideas and became convinced that a critical part of our naval strategy was to make sure that those sea lines and choke points were always open for our fleets—open for both commerce and military movement. Interestingly, in today's asymmetric world revolving around energy, in a strategic sense, it is equally important that our sea lines of communications and our choke points remain open.

Today, after three and a half years in this wonderful assignment, I think NATO is not only alive but well, and, it is poised to do things in the future that we can only imagine today. Presently, nearly 30,000 NATO troops are deployed on three different continents. They are about to take on one of the most ambitious challenge in the history of the Alliance—Afghanistan. We are also about to complete NATO's most transformational objective, the creation of the NATO Response Force. But for all these good things that are happening, things that were unimaginable and unattainable just three or four years ago, several key pieces are not yet in place, pieces that are essential not only to an understanding but to an agreement of what NATO's 21st-century potential really is. This is why I think the road to Riga is both a challenge and a great opportunity.

## THE MISSING PIECES

What key transformation pieces are not yet in place? I think the first is that NATO—and I do not mean this critically but more as a fact—does not do a good job of talking to our publics on either side of the Atlantic. I think there is a very worrisome void in our publics' understanding of what NATO is in the century or even why it exists. Most people can tell you, with great clarity, why it existed in the 20th century, but I think very few people can tell you what NATO is today. It seems to me that we need to collectively do something about that. We need to think about how we put the word NATO into the public consciousness again. Our citizens deserve to have the answer to the questions: "What is NATO? Why does it exist? What does it do? And why should I care as a taxpayer or as a member of society?" We have not gotten very clear answers to these questions out there, but we must. Every time I give a briefing to visiting officials from different countries on what NATO is doing, they are amazed and always say the same thing: "We had no idea. Why is it that we never hear about this? What is it that we can do to help get the message out?" At the Riga Summit, if the 26 heads of state desire to do so, we could make a strong statement about what NATO is in the 21st century as well as what it does and why people should care about it.

The second missing piece is that we do not yet really understand that our transformation is incomplete. Transformation cannot stop; by definition it is an everlasting process and if you avoid some of the real issues you cannot call it transformation. You cannot say to a significant element of an organization that "everybody else is changing but you don't have to, you are okay." That is the worst of all worlds.

So we cannot simply focus on the military; there is much more that needs to be done. Our 20th century supports structures, created with such familiar phrases as "costs fall where they lie" were built to support a defensive alliance that was to absorb the first blow and then counter-attack with mutually assured destruction. These structures were created when NATO' armies were static, moving at most several hundred kilometers for annual operations. This approach worked fantastically, it was a great success. But, the underpinnings of the support structure for a static, linear, massive, reactive, defensive force do not lend themselves well, in my view, to expeditionary, rapid, agile operations conducted at strategic distances in different parts of the globe. So the second part of our transformation must involve changing our underpinnings of our support structures to enable the new NATO as it accepts more and more operations, in Africa, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and other parts of the world. We must also be ready to take on such responsibilities as acting as the executive agent for the United Nations in Darfur, something that is now

being talked about. If we are serious about staying relevant and being successful, we must support the mechanisms that allow us to be successful and dedicate ourselves to supporting the new types of operations.

The Secretary General has bravely challenged us to look at some of our structures not only in the military but in other parts of NATO. It is not surprising that he has found that getting consensus to change even the slightest thing is very difficult. Is this acceptable? Are we going to tiptoe into the 21st century in this way or are we going to swing into it full speed ahead with a full wind behind our sails? I find our NATO financial system to be opaque, incomprehensible and certainly not agile enough to support NATO operations of the 21st century. I believe a complete overhaul of our financial system, with renewed transparency, is appropriate and I think it should be done before we ask any country to increase its fair share of financial support to the Alliance. The members of the Alliance must be able to see what we are doing, how we are doing it, and where the money is being spent. And if anyone can tell me how those things are being done right now, I would like to have 10 minutes of your time because I will learn what I have been unable to learn in three and a half years of trying!

Another issue is that our acquisition methods are much too slow and not responsive to the operational needs of our commanders in the field. If you want examples of this, they abound—I will cite just one now. In 2004, in the aftermath of the riots in Kosovo, an emergency request was made from our commander in the field to obtain a friendly force tracking system, estimated to cost 5 million Euros. Rather than meet the urgent need of our forces in the field, the request resulted in a 26-nation industrial-based competition between North America and Europe which took two years to deliver the product. This is simply unacceptable in this day and age. When commanders need things in Afghanistan and other areas of risk, we cannot subject them to a 26-nation industrial-based debate that may result in an emergency acquisition authorization two or three years later. Whether it is for a 5 million Euro friendly force tracking system or something else, there needs to be more clarity, more honesty, and more responsiveness in our acquisition methods. These methods need to appreciate that we have people at risk, people doing very dangerous things in places such as Afghanistan, the most dangerous operation NATO has taken on. Our commanders need the items they request and they need an acquisition system that is agile enough to provide it to them. The matter of who wins the industrial-based competition must be secondary to the commanders' needs.

Military advice has got to be pure and unencumbered by political influence for as long as it can be. Too often debates that take place in NATO military committees come already infused with national political guidance so the resulting military advice is sometimes not free of political influence. I think this is something we should watch very carefully in the future. The Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) is a step in the right direction but it does not take into account the significant paradox that exists between NATO's ambition to be able to conduct three major joint operations plus a number of lesser operations nearly simultaneously versus the reality that this is probably not the threat we will face. So we have the dichotomy of being told to build what is necessary to meet a threat that we do not think we will ever face and a guidance document that orients us in the other direction. Clearly there is tension there that must be resolved and I believe it can be resolved in the coming year. We need to affirm whether we are principally a reactive alliance or whether we are really willing to bite the bullet to take on a proactive engagement strategy, especially with regard to the most probable threats to our collective security. I believe that Riga can answer a lot of these questions and show us the way ahead.

Everyone knew that the anchor point of the Alliance in the 20th century was the Soviet Union. It was clear: we had a border, we had an opposing army, we had a very understandable construct that we could put on a slide and show everybody what we were doing and why we were doing it. But what is the anchor point that binds the transatlantic community in this century? I suggest that there is more than one and

that we should announce them to our citizens and stimulate discussions through such workshops as this one. Furthermore, we should task our military authorities to develop concepts for ways in which NATO can add value by addressing the security threats on both sides of the Atlantic—including energy security, the defense of critical infrastructure, weapons of mass destruction, narco-trafficking, stability, security and reconstruction missions, and terrorism. I think we should explore possibilities with other international agencies with which we have relationships, from the U.N. to the EU to the African Union to the Red Cross, and with national agencies in countries including Pakistan, Australia, South Korea, and Japan.

Transformation must continue and it must continue in depth, with no rock—not a stone—left unturned. Concepts and common funding approaches are well worth discussing, particularly if one wishes to have a NATO Response Force that means anything. When you create a NATO Response Force, you are also hanging a sign under it that says, "use it or lose it." To use it, you have to enable it to be successful, and part of that is having agile funding. Today, there are too many disincentives in the Alliance for countries to step forward willingly and offer forces for the NATO Response Force. The primary disincentive, in my view, is not capacity—the capacity is there—but economics. Some nations fear that if they offer forces to the NRF, by God, NATO might actually use them and then they would have to pay for it. This is a legitimate concern. So we need to build agility into our system to empower the NATO Response Force in order to realize the full potential of our transformational response.

Strategic lift is another critical shortfall in the Prague capability commitments. Happily, discussions are ongoing about how to remedy this. I really could care less about which solution is found as long as NATO finally gets some organic capability to transport troops to the great strategic distances we face.

We should also celebrate the arrival of the NATO Response Force, NATO's single most visible example of operational transformation. We should also celebrate the arrival of new enablers such as strategic lift and AGS, which are essential to our success, especially in a country the size of Afghanistan. Additionally, we should endorse NATO's willingness to be more proactive by taking on new training missions and expanded security sector reform programs. We should announce NATO's willingness and intent to establish a Special Operations capability within the operational world of NATO. Finally, we should endorse the creation of the Intelligence Fusion Center that recently was opened in Molesworth in the United Kingdom, a center that will for the first time provide organic intelligence to such concepts as the NRF and to our commanders in the field.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

All of this is to say that 2006 is a big year in NATO. We have the opportunity to explain who we are, what we do, and why it is important to our people. We have the opportunity to take the Prague Summit's direction on transformation and enlargement to levels that may not even have been visualized by the conferees in 2002. We have the opportunity to consider NATO's potential roles in a world of asymmetric threats without taking our eye off the ball regarding conventional threat realities. And for all of us who care deeply about the Alliance's brilliant past and challenging present, we have the opportunity to make NATO's most important contributions to global collective peace and security in the times ahead.

## Questions and Answers following General Jones's Address

**Question (unidentified ):** First, within NATO, is there a sort of conceptual boundary for the application of the new NATO? Where do you stop or where do you go? What if something were to happen in Burma? What about if Al Qaeda relocated its headquarters to Indonesia? What about the Falkland Islands? A NATO boundary may be obvious to you but looking from our side it is not so clear.

Second, transformation is of course mission driven. But while we are transforming there are lots of complaints from the locals who harbor American bases—for example, 75% of the military bases are clustered in Okinawa. How can the burden of transformation on local communities be reduced?

**General Jones:** The answer to your first question is rooted in the politics of the Alliance, in what it is that the Alliance wishes to do. From an operational command viewpoint, as the one who takes the assets that nations provide to the Alliance and employs them at increasingly greater distances, I believe we will come to a point at which we simply cannot do more without taking on risk that is unacceptable. While we are expanding in terms of missions and political will, we are also facing diminished resources and I do not see that changing. I must tell you that I am not an optimist here and you cannot do everything with increasingly fewer resources. So there will be a moment in time when, if political guidance asks NATO and SHAPE to provide military advice on how we would handle a certain operation somewhere in the world, we might say, or my successor might say, "We cannot do this; we don't have enough people, they are not trained, or we don't have the resources." There definitely are limits, but what they are, I will leave up to my political masters and to the realities of physics. My sense is that we are approaching the wall very quickly.

To answer your second point, I am very sensitive to local issues by virtue of my own career in the Marine Corps and my many visits to Okinawa. I understand that problem very well. As far as NATO goes, the Alliance probably will not go anywhere it is not invited by local authorities and representatives of the local community. NATO will always look for a broad international agreement that says we would like NATO to go here. The Alliance will not impose itself on anyone without some dialogue that says there is a will for NATO to come. That is generally the way the Alliance works—it takes 26 nations to agree on any one operation or any one movement toward international activity. From a national viewpoint, I would say that part of U.S. transformation is to reduce the massive Cold War buildup and to make our forces acceptable to the countries in which that buildup took place. We are fortunate in Europe to have a welcoming environment in Germany, Italy, the U.K., and other places, but we are dramatically downsizing those forces to the tune of about 35%. However, I believe the way we are reducing our forces will make us strategically more agile to do the things that should be done in the area of operation in which we are privileged to work.

**Question from Ambassador Adamia, Georgian Ambassador to the U.N.:** The previous question put my thoughts in a little bit different light. I would say that the expansion of NATO is not geographical. It is not the Falkland Islands or Thailand or whatever that is key. The expansion of NATO is for security, security of the nation-states and the values shared by them. You touched on that question, General, when you said that some nations are willing to enter NATO and that no nations want to leave NATO. But there are nations that do not want to enter NATO because they have slightly different security values. The key is who is willing to enter the camp of nations that share the common values of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights *and* share common security values. This is the main issue to me and I want to hear your opinion on that. It may be a little exaggerated but the situation we face is like that in the co-ops in Manhattan—space is limited, so admittance is on a first-come, first-served basis. I do not think that this is wise. And I can see that there are some countries that express their aspirations but have a lot of conditions, similar to my wanting to enter a university and having to pass exams and meet other requirements. Yes, exams are needed but they should not be the key. The key should be the values, but if the values are there you said the capability is limited. Do you see some changes in the rules of transformation that will allow nation-states that are willing to enter the Alliance to actually enter the Alliance?

**General Jones:** On the question of common values, I could not agree with you more. I think that the global community is being constructed by virtue of the approaches of the countries that are great distances apart, including Australia, South Korea, and Japan. Real overtures are being made to the Alliance as a result of common values and because of common security concerns. So it seems to me that the global community is coming together based on common threats to our futures, and that's a good thing.

With regard to future membership and future expansion, those are really political questions and good ones. But if I may refer to the recent NATO enlargement, I can tell you that one of the things that impressed me about the seven new members is not only their enthusiasm for being in the Alliance but the value they add to the Alliance. So as somebody who deeply cares about NATO, I answer the question "What do you think about the future members of NATO?" by saying that future members will have to bring value to the Alliance and that we should not go too fast to appease political expediency. Countries that wish to be members must meet the test and the Alliance must wish to expand.

In NATO we have what we call the Mediterranean Dialogue. It has existed for a number of years. Its defining characteristic until about two years ago was that it was a political dialogue and to say that it was surviving would be a stretch. Then NATO agreed to infuse the Mediterranean Dialogue with a military context and the Dialogue immediately changed. Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, the seven members of the Mediterranean Dialogue, now regularly come to Brussels and to SHAPE and are considering new ways in which they can add to the security of the Mediterranean, both on the issue of collective security and what is going on at their borders. This is just one example of what I mean when I say that NATO is moving in directions that we could only have imagined just a few years ago. And it is healthy, it is good. It is great to see the enthusiasm of these seven countries as they sit with and talk to the 26 members of NATO and discuss the issues that are of concern to us all.

When and how NATO expands in the future is certainly beyond my purview—that is for the Alliance to discuss. But I can say that I think the future value of members is important. Future members must bring value to the Alliance, and that will happen.

**Question from Dr. Fasslabend, former Austrian Defense Minister:** General, I agree with everything you said, one point being that there must be clarity. But this is an area in which we need to work quite a bit. For example, regarding the war against terrorism, we do not even define our enemy and you cannot defeat an enemy if you don't define it. So what I want to ask you is, "What can we do in order to better define the military world for the future?" We need to define not only the enemy but also the tasks for the military— who is a prisoner, who is not. Soldiers need clarity and without it we will have problems.

I also want to ask a second question. Right now we have a worldwide intelligence crisis, not only in the United States but in France, Germany, and many other states. As we think about the future, what can we do about this?

**General Jones:** On the issue of clarity, I completely agree. I think that there are several aspects of clarity. One, of course, is that we must be clear with our people as to what it is NATO does, why it does it, and why we think it is important to them. But we also need clarity in terms of NATO's mission. What is NATO's level of ambition? And how are we organizing ourselves, and against what family of threats? Do we follow clear values that service the anchor points of the transatlantic community and that say we are determined, we are united, and that we can do this? I don't think we do yet, though I think we are getting there if you look at Afghanistan, Iraq, and Darfur and at some of the things we are doing. You can see that the institution is capable of moving in the right direction, which is something to be celebrated but something we must articulate to give us clarity.

**Question from Ambassador Novotny, Czech Ambassador to Japan:** You gave us a very impressive list of transformation activities on the military side of NATO, but I have a very strong feeling that the political decision-making process has not changed. I believe you can send NATO forces within 72 hours or even 48 hours, but is NATO capable of making decisions within 48 hours? I am afraid that NATO's political decision-making process is the same as it was in the Cold War but that the military side is in the 21st century. Am I right or am I wrong?

**General Jones:** This is a very interesting question. What I can tell you is that there have been demonstrations of rapid decision making in the Alliance in the near past. For example, the decision to embark on a humanitarian mission in Pakistan was made very quickly by the North Atlantic Council. So it is not quite a black and white scenario. However, the decision to go to Iraq was a very agonizing one: the Alliance was split and it took a number of months to arrive at a consensus through which NATO would start a three-phased mission in Iraq. But it is hard to say in general that NATO's decision making is too slow; that is unfair to the process and it is not always true. But neither can you say that it is always too fast. I think your point is correct, that as you transform the operational arm you gain the ability to react to external stimuli and do things quickly. The NATO Response Force, for example, was conceived as a force that can move its elements within five days after receipt of its mission. But the question is, "Why do you have a force like that if the decision to use it takes six months?" However, my point was not to criticize the decision making process but to say that one of NATO's most cherished values is the principle of consensus.

So my question to reformers is, "Why is it that at the committee level—I think at the last count there were 350 committees in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—that we can't we move issues through the system faster? If you have to have consensus, why can't you do it in the one place that you really need it, perhaps the Military Committee or the North Atlantic Council? While I haven't been particularly victimized by slow political decisions once they got to the North Atlantic Council—though getting them there, especially if they are financial in nature, can be very painful—I do think you can make some reforms that would generally speed up the process.

**Question from Ambassador Nowak, Polish Ambassador to NATO**: I agree with your argument that we must be proactive, not reactive, because doing so goes with the challenges we face in the 21st century. However, I would argue that we should not completely leave out the reactive attitude as well. What do I have in mind? In Poland, when I meet with the Polish electorate or when our defense or foreign ministers have to explain to the population, "Why NATO?", the main question that people have is, "Will NATO protect us?" There is no danger to us at the moment but we are a historically minded nation and we know that things can change in seven or ten years. What is ten years? It is not much. So my question is, "With the expeditionary character of missions evolving, will we continue to have capability?"

**General Jones:** I very much appreciate the ambassador's intervention and I would say that he has a very legitimate question. I tried to address it in my presentation by saying that we must be careful—that while we are pushing to respond to the asymmetric nature of the present world we cannot forget that the future may also require conventional reactive capabilities that we must have in order to execute Article 5 of our NATO charter. I also postulated that wars have been started over the issue of energy, and while I am not predicting it, I am saying that if you look at whose hands are on the tiller of the world's energy now, there is reason for concern because nations are starting to use energy and their ability to produce energy as an instrument of national power. Where that leads, I have no idea, but I do absolutely insist that the Alliance has to be true to its nature, which means that, reactively or proactively, we have to be ready to go in either direction.

Clearly no one can predict with accuracy a humanitarian catastrophe, an earthquake, or the like. So we need to be able to react to certain stimuli, and that has to be built into our system. We also need to be reactive to unforeseen events that cause some nations to fear for their internal security or their security overall, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has to be true to its fundamental charter. I do think we are doing that, but at the same time it is fair to say that we cannot only be a reactive alliance. In the 21st century, we may need to be reactive only a small part of the time but we should always be able to react.

**Question from General Joulwan, former SACEUR:** Because you have in the audience not only ambassadors and politicians but also Chiefs of Defense, defense contractors from both Europe and the United States, as you get ready to deploy, I would like to ask what is it this group can help you with in terms of what you need for what I would call conditions for success. What do you need in the way of capability that you don't have? What do you need that perhaps the political, the military, and the defense community here can help you with? What do you need as you get ready to deploy?

**General Jones:** This is a very important question that lends itself both to lists of things and to reform. If I had my druthers I think complete reform would be the most beneficial. We need to better understand that the systems we created were very successful in the last century against a static, unformed enemy operating on a clear boundary, but that at least in the short term we now face an enemy that transcends nation-state actors and borders. So we need to have instruments and abilities to respond quickly to these challenges.

First, though, we need to accept the fact that we wish to take these challenges on, and that has not been done. We are talking about it. In fact, we just had an interesting breakfast with the permanent representatives on the subject of energy and security and the role that NATO could play in energy and security issues in the defense of critical infrastructures. We have many vulnerabilities there, and we don't know if it is a national issue. So we need more agile instruments of support for our expeditionary and rapid capabilities, common logistics, common intelligence, deployable CIS, AGS, all of those things that are very important but that cost money and generally are slow in arriving. I also think we have to figure out better and more agile ways in which to account for the money that we get and ask ourselves, "Are we really spending our money wisely? because only 10% of NATO's budget actually goes to operations.

**General Joulwan:** In the light of what you just said, what risks do you incur in deploying 25,000 troops to Afghanistan?

**General Jones:** The risks depend on where you are in the country, because it is a big country. But I would say in general that the hardest thing to generate in the Alliance is helicopters. If I could solve the military problems of the Alliance using jet fighters, we would have no problem. Everybody is very happy to give us fighters—I think we have 2,700 fighters. If you want to deploy fighters to defend the Baltics, no problem. If you want to send fighters to do air shows, no problem. If you want to send fighters to Afghanistan, no problem. But if you want to get helicopters to send to Afghanistan, big problem. The fact is, the environment in Afghanistan is very tough on helicopters and maintaining helicopters is expensive. If nations don't have the money, they are going to sit on their hands when you say we need helicopters. So to answer your question, in Afghanistan the most critical problem is a lack of helicopters.

Slightly behind that but not quite as bad is fixed-wing transportation, which along with helicopters is very important to our ability to move a 25,000-man force in a very big country and enable that force to get to where you need them when you need them. I must say that we have been lucky in Afghanistan. Even though NATO has been in the northern half of Afghanistan, from July on we will be in the southern

region and I think, very quickly after that, NATO will have the entire country. Then the metrics will change. We will have to be able to reinforce our 23 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which are 100-man teams that are all over the country. We will also have to be able to satisfy our nations that we can come to their rescue quickly if they need it. Right now the PRT is the most visible symbol of international commitment to the people of Afghanistan, and we have never had a PRT overrun. If that happens it will be a serious psychological blow not only to the reconstruction of Afghanistan but to our own mission. So to make sure that doesn't happen, we need to have rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft that can deploy to reinforce any of our PRTs in time of need. Right now we don't have that, and it's one of the things that keeps me awake at night.

Having the right command and control system would also be extremely helpful in Afghanistan—friendly force tracking systems so that commanders can know where their people are and how effective the PRTs are as they go into the countryside and do great things. I also think that equipping the Afghan army is a high priority. We have decided to equip them with Russian-type weapon systems because that is what they are familiar with. But we need a lot more of them. The Afghan army is willing to fight and the people are proud of them, but they are under equipped and we cannot send them out there with AK47s and very little else. We need more equipment to enable the rapidly emerging Afghan army to take over some of the things that our coalition forces are doing right now.

**Question from Dr. Linton Wells:** Are network-enabled capabilities something of importance to the ministers and other senior officers here or is it something that can be dealt with at lower levels?

**General Jones:** I think this is a senior-level issue and that part of the problem is that we must do more educating to explain exactly what network-enabled capability is and the power behind the concept. If the concept stays submerged, it will not go anywhere. So it must be driven from the top down. It is a fundamental part of transformation and where we are going to be in the future.

**Question from David Swindle, IAP Worldwide Services:** General, I would appreciate your perspective on NATO's state of preparedness for being able to respond to future disasters, whether they are man-made or caused by terrorists.

**General Jones:** One of the great strengths of the countries that belong to NATO is that they bring to the Alliance an intuitive predilection towards those kinds of missions and there is a lot of satisfaction in being able to handle that kind of work. I think it is very important that NATO not be seen as just an instrument of war-fighting. One of the interesting things about our missions to Afghanistan and Africa is that both the Pakistanis and the members of the African Union asked, "What is NATO doing here?" They thought that NATO was a war-fighting organization that only knew how to drop bombs, launch rockets, and destroy things. They didn't understand what we were doing there. But in just a few months good will built up in both of those areas, especially in Pakistan, when the people saw that the Alliance had the capability to bring in mobile hospitals to treat thousands of people, to build roads, to restore electricity, to dig wells, to make a difference in their lives. I believe in the future that NATO will have the capacity to handle more of those types of missions. Being able to do both is really something we should celebrate and be very proud of, because now, in Pakistan and in the countries of the African Union, the people have a better understanding of just what NATO is.

# Chapter 10

## NATO Operations and Capabilities: Where We Stand And Where We Are Heading

General Rainer Schuwirth[1]

### THE COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL GUIDANCE

I would like to begin by mentioning a particular document that is relevant to today's NATO as well as the NATO of the future that was not yet available during the 2005 International Workshop. This document, the Comprehensive Political Guidance, while not replacing the Strategic Concept, which remains valid, is a very important political document that provides guidance for future NATO development. The document was approved by the North Atlantic Council in November 2005 and is expected to be endorsed at the Riga summit by heads of state and government.

What is important about this document is that it recognizes that crisis response operations are NATO's main effort although the Alliance is not giving up collective defense. It points to the current multiplicity of operations, which may increase further, and talks about the requirements of an effects-based approach: better coordination and cooperation of all instruments of power to achieve the desired effects. It also talks about the capabilities that are necessary: the ability to launch and conduct joint and multinational expeditionary operations rapidly and effectively; to deter, disrupt, defend, or protect against terrorism; to contribute to the protection of Alliance territory and its members' populations; to protect against critical infrastructure, a point that was expanded on by SACEUR; and to support consequence management, stabilization, and all forms of reconstruction effort.

The top priority, however, is the necessity for joint expeditionary forces to be ready to be deployed, be sustained, and be able to deal with all kinds of asymmetric threats—forces that have clear information superiority and that draw together both military and civilian instruments. A fundamental tool for achieving this capability is the NATO Response Force, particularly its transformational dimension, which can assist member-states to improve their own capabilities.

---

[1] General Rainer Schuwirth is Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

## OPERATIONS AND CAPABILITIES

Against the backdrop of the Comprehensive Political Guidance, I would now like to talk about operations and capabilities—where we stand and where we are heading.

Firstly ISAF is our most important and demanding operation. General Back will address it after my presentation.

### In the Balkans

Regarding the Balkans, the status talks are in a very decisive period at present and it is difficult to foresee the outcome. So far, however, the situation is stable and calm, but we know that in this part of Europe strange and even evil spirits exist that could create uproar—not war but turbulence—if they do not like the outcome of the status talks. So KFOR is being vigilant and prudent.

In order to be more capable of coping with whatever the future may bring in Kosovo, however, we are completing the restructuring of KFOR, making it a leaner task force by cutting out one level of command. In that way, and by turning the former multinational brigades into multinational task forces, KFOR will be sufficiently flexible to be employed everywhere in Kosovo. We are confident that we will have the capability and the flexibility to cope with whatever the future brings.

You already know that we are cooperating with and also supporting the European Union-led operation Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina very successfully, and you will hear more about this from the representatives of this organization. This support has recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, particularly the operational headquarters at SHAPE and the Deputy SACEUR, who is the operational commander. NATO also remains engaged in Tirana, Sarajevo, and Skopje to assist those countries in their ongoing defense review efforts, and the small advisory teams have been quite successful so far. Close to the Balkans, we run Operation Active Endeavor, the only Article 5 operation in the Mediterranean, the aim of which is to deter and disrupt the abuse of the Mediterranean sea area by terrorist groups. This operation has been very successful and we see merit in expanding it, from the military point of view at least, into other areas such as the Black Sea. Surveilling these ungoverned spaces outside our nations' territories, both on the sea and in the air, will add to the security of all, over time.

### In Iraq

We continue to support the Iraqi authorities by training officers in Baghdad. In September of 2005, NATO, together with the Iraqis, opened the National Defense University where courses are now being conducted. Whether or not to further expand this support will be decided this year or early next year, and also whether or not to include training of noncommissioned officers. Iraq is also being supported directly by equipment donations from a variety of NATO nations and by out-of country training both at NATO and national training facilities. A significant number of Iraqi officers have been trained so far and we have also assisted in rebuilding organic security forces for Iraq, which we hope in a couple of years will allow NATO to disengage from this particular theater.

### In Africa

In Africa, we have been working with the European Union to assist the African Union in training staff members—an effort which we refer to as "capacity building" —to help them be better at military planning and in their military operations in Darfur. We have facilitated, and continue to facilitate, the troop rotations of African Union peacekeeping battalions to Darfur, and discussions are now being held at NATO headquarters about the proper way, should the African Union wish it, to expand this kind of support. In particular they may benefit from capacity building as considerable shortfalls have been identified

in such things as organic working capabilities and knowledge concerning procedures. NATO and the EU certainly could provide additional value in these areas, including monitoring or embedding training teams down to the level of African Union peacekeeping battalions.

### In Pakistan

I think it is well known that NATO is supporting the Baltic States in air policing. Recently we also assisted Pakistan after the tremendous earthquake there with elements of the NATO Response Force. The support comprised a considerable number of airlifts to transport United Nations humanitarian goods from their depots in Europe, in particular in Turkey, to Pakistan, and to distribute this humanitarian assistance; three engineering battalions conducted operations there to clear roads and rebuild schools, medical facilities, and other infrastructure; and considerable medical support was given to the people who suffered, as we all know, quite considerably in this tragic catastrophe. While we never wanted to have the earthquake in Pakistan occur, it did happen, and through deployment of elements of the NATO Response Force we learned a considerable number of lessons that will assist us in reaching Alliance goals.

### With High-Visibility Events

NATO has and will continue to support host nations in all kinds of so-called high-visibility events. This started, as you may recall, with our support to the Olympic Games in Greece. Since then, our AWACS fleet flies above many other important events, including the 2006 Winter Olympic Games and the World Soccer Championship. The Latvian authorities have also asked NATO for assistance providing security for the Riga summit, which is a mission the Brunssum headquarters will have to shoulder.

## THE NATO RESPONSE FORCE

Regarding the NATO Response Force, which SACEUR talked about, there has been progress since the decision was made to establish the NRF in 2002. Initial operational capability was declared in 2004 and an entire set of procedures, training, and doctrines has been developed. The force and headquarters packages, which rotate every six months, have been continuously trained and certified, making the NATO Response Force quite a success story. Soon we will hold a life exercise on the Cape Verde Islands to validate the concept. Because the islands are at a strategic distance from Europe, about 5,000 km, we will be able to demonstrate the NRF's capability in terms of planning and conducting long-range deployments of considerable joint force packages and to train and exercise the NATO Response Force at such a distance. The endeavor has so far been given tremendous support by the Cape Verde authorities.

Still, there remain shortfalls in the NATO Response Force packages. While additional offers were made during the recent Military Committee meeting in a Chief of Staff session, the package for the second half of 2006 is still only 86% filled and the package for the first half of 2007 is still only around 65% filled. It remains to be seen if we will be able to declare the NATO Response Force at full operational capability by the fall of 2006.

There is also a question mark over the area of the permanent NATO integrated command structure—our 10 integrated headquarters in Europe. We had expected that in the summer of 2006 the revised command structure, which we have been implementing for about two years, would become fully operational. However, nations of this great Alliance have been able or willing to man those headquarters at only about 80% of capacity and we are still missing some decisive infrastructure projects to give our headquarters the proper working facilities; the same is true in a couple of CIS-related areas. You should however, not take this to mean that we are unable to do what we have to do; it just means that there are

shortfalls and that, as it stands right now, we will be very hesitant, to put it mildly, to report that the NATO command structure is at full operational capability this year.

## COOPERATING TO PREVENT CRISES

Cooperating widely, I believe, is the best kind of crisis prevention that international organizations can do. This area, which has expanded considerably, no longer only encompasses Partnership for Peace or cooperation between NATO and Russia or Ukraine but engagement with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries and increasingly with the countries of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. From the military point of view, we are continuing to focus on interoperability issues that allow forces of these respective countries to join us if they decide to.

Considerable progress has been made on the military side on interoperability cooperation with Russia. Several NATO-led or NATO/Russia-led exercises are being sponsored in 2006 in the areas of communications, special forces, and air transport and during the year Russia will also join us in Operation Active Endeavor. This is quite a significant development—Russia is joining a collective defense operation with naval warships to assist NATO nations in deterring and disrupting any misuse by terrorist organizations.

All the things I have talked about will be of continuing importance at the Riga summit. We can also certainly expect additional direction on the future purpose of the Alliance. One point in this regard, that General Jones mentioned in his presentation, is the future contribution to energy security. We need to discuss surveillance and if necessary protection of ungoverned spaces and assistance to countries with consequence management should anything happen.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

I would like to conclude by reiterating that quite a lot has been achieved by NATO. There continues to be progress although we are not yet where we would like to be in the development of capabilities. Some promising points are that several member-states recently concluded the so-called Strategic Airlift Interim Solution Agreement, arrangements that give those nations the ability to use airlift capability on a leasing basis. There is also discussion underway concerning whether a number of NATO members may wish to lease or procure several wide-body aircraft so that strategic deployment will be better facilitated. General Wolf, the director of NCSA, will talk about where we stand in terms of communication means. We are also working to improve Special Forces capabilities in NATO and, though there has not been a breakthrough in terms of better common funding, there has been progress. We now have wider possibilities for common funding for crisis response operations and, as an experiment, the deployment of the NATO Response Force for the LIVEX will be subsidized from common funds. In both today's and tomorrow's world, we will have to rely on NATO and thus it must be in our interest to further develop its capabilities.

# Chapter 11

## Kabul and Beyond: NATO's Challenge In Afghanistan

General Gerhard W. Back[1]

I very much welcome the opportunity to speak at this prestigious gathering and to explore with you the important issues raised by this workshop. As the NATO Operational Commander for Afghanistan, I want to look at how the ISAF mission is developing and how the changes underway in the mission will affect the Alliance.

### SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is most often referred to at events such as this as NATO's highest priority. The Alliance has been in the country since August 2003, progressing from the capital to having forces in the north of the country in July 2004 and to the west in May 2005. Throughout, the Headline mission has remained the same: to assist the government of Afghanistan in extending and maintaining its authority and fostering greater stability and security. From a military standpoint this mission has been pursued so far with a relatively light footprint. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are the key enablers, backed by maneuver forces that bolster security. Though some question whether this approach is sufficient to accomplish the mission, the methodology is a resource-effective way of pursuing our key military tasks, in addition to supporting reconstruction efforts.

The successes so far have been many. Governance is improving, free elections have been achieved, and reconstruction and security sector reforms are showing progress. ISAF has played a large part in executing the main tenets of the Bonn Agreement, most notably assisting in providing security for the first election of a president in decades and establishing a parliament and provincial councils. But the real test of our success is whether the Afghan people feel safe in their homes and villages, whether they are free of corruption and bribery, and whether they can exercise the rights guaranteed to them in their new Constitution. Measured against those objectives we still have a long way to go.

Insurgents continue to maintain influence in some areas of the country and have adapted their tactics. While they are unable to mass large forces, this can actually work in their favor by making them unpredictable and difficult to confront. Over the last year we have also seen a significant move towards the use of

1 At the time of the Workshop, General Gerhard W. Back was Commander, Allied Joint Force Command, Brunssum.

improvised explosive devices against Coalition and ISAF forces, and more recently a rise in suicide bombers. The older tactics of intimidation and violence against government officials, NGOs, and other "soft" targets have, if anything, increased. In addition, the insurgents are proving adept at capitalizing on links with criminal and narcotics elements to garner support and generate funds.

## NATO EXPANSION IN AFGHANISTAN

The NATO mission will soon encompass the whole of the territory of Afghanistan. Over the next few months ISAF will expand into the south and east of the country. Up to now ISAF has been operating in areas in which the systemic problems of insecurity and violence were present but active fighting with opposing forces was rare; however, current areas of low opposing force activity could rapidly become hot spots as the enemy adapts to the new situation. Whatever the situation, expansion will bring a marked change in NATO's stance. While stabilization remains a priority, NATO has committed to conducting offensive security operations against opposing military forces. This will not include counterterrorism operations, which will remain the responsibility of Coalition Forces under Operation Enduring Freedom. However, there should be no doubt that NATO will have the capability and the will to pursue insurgents who threaten the goals of the ISAF mission.

There is, however, a difficult paradox. In order to achieve stability and security, there is a need to tackle the wider problems of factionalism, power brokers, illegally armed groups, narcotics, and criminality. Employment of NATO military forces must be balanced to ensure that Afghan ownership is maintained and to make sure that PRTs can continue to operate with the consent of the people. If this is lost, then the pivot on which we do all that we do in Afghanistan will become unhinged. ISAF must continue to avoid a fortress mentality and work to develop a bond of trust with the people they are there to help.

This same paradox underscores the fact that providing security against insurgents is not the only requirement for achieving progress. Afghanistan is a country ravaged by years of conflict and one in which every sort of structure, apart from the tribal culture, from the national to the local level, was decimated. While things have improved over the last four years, criminality, corruption, and the narcotics trade remain rife. There has been growing realization that if we are going to make progress towards the goal of having the international community no longer needed, NATO must continue to be involved in achieving tangible results in security sector reform, promoting good governance, and assisting in building the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces.

## THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Ultimately, NATO's goal is to put itself out of business in Afghanistan and to do so before the nations of the Alliance tire of supporting the mission. At the same time we need to appreciate that no military organization has the skills or capacity to guide a nation down the road to rehabilitation. It is therefore important that the international community stays at the forefront of coordinating all the stakeholders to ensure coherent government support—the U.N. should retain its leading role in this effort. I believe that the mutually reinforcing relationship NATO and the U.N. have had over the last few years has set new standards in the way that our two organizations work together.

Of course, one of the toughest impediments to progress in Afghanistan is the role of the illicit trade in narcotics; the country will not be normalized until there is a significant improvement in this area. The government has taken a very courageous stance in combating this evil and, with international assistance, has developed a coordinated program of interdiction, eradication, and prosecution.

But again, balance is important. It is of little use to target the farmers who are merely scratching out a living to support their families and who have few, if any, options. It is the bigger players we need to target.

A comprehensive approach is needed that encourages farmers to turn to alternatives. Until they have choices, eradication alone will not solve the problem. While counter-narcotics efforts are becoming more coordinated and the criminal justice system is gradually growing in capacity, we need to be realistic. This work is going to require a coordinated, focused, long-term effort from all quarters, both at the national and international levels.

## MEETING THE DEMANDS OF EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE

I believe that NATO has a very robust plan for the post-expansion environment, but there are still challenges. From a political point of view I have been very encouraged by the degree of consensus that emerged as the NATO Council considered ISAF expansion. I see this as a positive sign that the Alliance is maturing and that its decision-making structures are changing to be able to meet the demands of expeditionary warfare. However, we must also acknowledge that improvements are still needed to sharpen reactions to meet the pace of operations. How NATO generates forces and funds for such a testing mission are examples of where the Alliance has yet to find truly responsive solutions.

With troop numbers planned to almost double from the present 9,000 in the months ahead, NATO's mechanism for generating forces and maintaining its large commitment will be severely tested. National caveats also continue to limit COMISAF's freedom of maneuverability in his deployment and employment of forces. Every caveat increases risk and is unwelcome, and I continue to work to ensure they are eliminated.

ISAF expansion will be a significant trial for NATO, not only regarding our internal processes but also regarding the political will behind the commitment. I am confident that our actions on the ground to tackle the insurgents and assist the Afghans in providing stability and reconstruction will speak for themselves. But I fully expect that opposing forces will test ISAF's capabilities and resolve over the next few months. While we will be ready, the political will to see this mission through to a reasonable end point is beyond my responsibilities. For that to be realized, I think we need to agree on achievable goals, pursue them vigorously, and then turn the task over to the Afghans before our forces become part of the problem.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Great progress has been made in bringing Afghanistan back from tyranny and a vicious cycle of self-destruction. But there remains a need for pragmatism. Many of the problems Afghanistan faces today gestated over many years. There will be no quick solutions; the partnership between the international community and the Afghan nation will require long-term commitment. But the ISAF mission is a milestone for NATO. The Alliance has made astonishing progress over the last few years in becoming agile enough to deal with the new threats we face, much of it driven by the requirements to meet the challenge in Afghanistan. The fact that NATO nations have faced up to the need for offensive security operations is an indication that the organization is growing into its role as a global force for good.

I cannot pretend that we have it all right as yet, but I am convinced that we are fielding the best prepared and most capable force NATO can muster. The experience of the past year gives me confidence that NATO will continue to evolve and develop to reconfirm that NATO deserves its reputation as the most successful military alliance of all time.

# Chapter 12

## The Impact of the New Revolutionary Scenario on Our Multinational Strategy

Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola[1]

### THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY SCENARIO

The revolution that epitomizes the contemporary security scenario, with medium to long term effects that are difficult to clarify, calls for an open and frank debate and exchange of ideas in order to reach coherent and efficient decisions for a safer, more stable and more peaceful global future.

Today, like every other revolution that has occurred throughout human history, we are forced to face reality with an innovative approach and a quest for new ideas. In a phase of revolution like the current one, experience, recognized as a valuable resource, is no longer sufficient. On the contrary, it can actually hamper our search for solutions because it may suggest that we apply obsolete models. It can obscure our perception of change, thus making our search for more efficient solutions difficult.

I have greatly appreciated General Back's speech. I completely endorse his views and analysis about the situation and the challenges that the Alliance will face in Afghanistan during the coming months. Being the operational commander responsible for the mission, he has clearly articulated the risks involved and has not avoided giving us clear warnings about the problems that will need to be discussed and solved by the member countries of the Alliance.

The Italian position is to continue with our significant contribution to ISAF. We will continue to be in the front line, as we are in so many other places in the world. This commitment underlines our policy to world security in the 21st century. We do not need to be convinced of the need to share the burden of responsibility for security and stability, crucial conditions from any perspective, for free and democratic development. With reference to this I would like to discuss some personal thoughts that I consider relevant for the future.

---

1 Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola is the Chief of Defense of Italy.

## SECURITY AS AN EXTERNAL-INTERNAL CONTINUUM

The mission in Afghanistan clearly shows that the frontiers of stability and security can frequently be located far away from our home countries, where risk factors are originated and whose effects have global consequences even at great distances as it is the case with international terrorism.

At the beginning of this century we moved from a forceful intervention ¾in Kosovo in 1999¾ located close to home on the fringes of the old area of responsibility for the Alliance to the following ones located in Western Asia. Within a very short time the "space" element or better the "projection" of security has grown geometrically, reaching magnitudes not comparable with the past.The absurdity of this growth in the "projection of security" is that the risk or the insecurity factor we perceive inside our own countries has now increased considerably, notwithstanding any consideration for geographical locations.

Any improvements in our ability to project our security apparatus further from home has not diminished our overall perception of insecurity. For this reason security is an external-internal continuum, without borders either at the national level or at the international one. I do believe this is an important element, an element that needs to be moved from the conceptual level to that of elaboration and that of practical implementation, possibly shared.

## IMPACT OF THE REVOLUTION IN THE SECURITY SCENARIO ON THE NATURE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

A second point is the impact of the revolution in the security scenario on the nature of military operations, an impact that is also revolutionary. In almost all the interventions that have supported security and stability¾Afghanistan is a good example about this¾the mission of the military component does not come to an end with the military defeat of the adversary, which thankfully, normally occurs in the initial phases and whose duration normally does not last for a very long time.

The mission continues during the following phases of post-crisis stabilisation and reconstruction, which last for a much longer time, which are more complex and difficult and whose aim is to overcome the destabilisation causes, thus becoming essential for the achievement of the political-strategic goals of the whole mission. During these phases the military component is called upon to achieve and maintain the necessary and essential security conditions for the implementation of the stabilisation and reconstruction initiatives. The military component provides a direct, decisive contribution, interacting in a complex manner with all the elements that are characteristic of these theatre of crises, including the local populations.

Today our interventions are not only "against" opponent forces but also "in support" or "in favour" of someone, but especially we operate "among the people". Often "the enemy" cannot be separated but may actually be inside the social context that needs itself to be stabilised.

All this has a great impact on many aspects of the military operations, starting from the strictly operational ones¾contingent configuration and capabilities, use of force criteria and rules of engagement, operational procedures, force protection and much more¾through those factors that are more akin to the creation of the conditions to overcome the destabilising factors. All of these activities are directly related to supporting any reconstruction effort.

This is what we are doing today in Afghanistan, specifically in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, together with governmental and non-governmental organisations and agencies. PRTs are proving to be quite effective and, with a case by case adaptation, could be exported to other operational theatres, where the stabilisation and reconstruction activity is becoming more and more relevant, like in Iraq.

The action of the military component needs to be considered as a qualifying factor and an integral part of the wider range of tools available in order to support and cooperate with institutions, and to assist with the reconstruction of structures and organisations.

Today the overall achievement of a mission are often measured by the success of the activities that go beyond the military intervention itself but which cannot be set aside.

## A COHERENT AND COORDINATED MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY

There is almost always a requirement to assist with the implementation of a multinational stabilising proactive strategy, which includes a strong synergy between the military component and the political, diplomatic and cooperation ones. Thus, a strategy is developed through a holistic and interdisciplinary approach, coordinated at the international and inter-institutional level.

Military operations, initiatives, intervention tools and related methodologies should be developed with the aim of achieving effects which are coherent with the assigned strategic goals. We need to link together into a net all the tools at our disposal, in order to address and to optimize their considerable potential.

The mission in Afghanistan is a very good example of the nature of new missions and the risks associated with them. Missions where the primary goal is not only the achievement of a military victory, but also the more complex one of contributing in an essential way to the reconstruction process and to the transition towards democracy, contrasting those who are opposing this process by violence and terrorism.

In Afghanistan, NATO has taken on a very important commitment, which I personally consider is critical for its own future as an organization. It is a commitment that requires member countries to provide strong and solid support to the operational effort. In addition it requires members to actively engage with the increasing speed of the transformation process which is coherent with the new NATO vision in order to be capable of producing solutions to the revolution of the security scenario and to the globalisation of the new risks.

ISAF needs to be, at the same time, a "test bed" and an engine for transformation. If the current ISAF mission proves to be confirmation of NATO's ability to adapt itself to the new security needs, it is essential that the success of this mission is used as an opportunity to optimize and accelerate the process of transformation itself.

## AFGHANISTAN AS A CHALLENGE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

I would like to say, with this last personal thought, if Afghanistan is and must be considered a true challenge for the Alliance's future —and facing it NATO needs to undertake its own responsibility—in a similar way it is true that Afghanistan is a challenge for the whole international community.

The ISAF task is to provide stability and a security asset in the country, in addition to supporting the legitimate government in the process of democratic consolidation and territorial expansion. The current expansion in the southern areas of the country is, therefore, a process that is natural, coherent and functional; however it is not without difficulties.

It would be a mistake to consider this expansion as essentially as a military problem. There is no doubt that the military component will provide the leverage and the essential security environment in which to take this important step ahead. All this will require coherent answers for the operational level, for the support of the Afghan Security Forces and for increasing cooperation with the Enduring Freedom forces.

The success of the Alliance through ISAF—whose acronym synthesizes the goals and the expectations of the international community—cannot be set aside as a stand alone action. Countries will need to continue to develop progressively, in a way that is increasingly effective, coherent and coordinated, multinational and multifunctional structures and organisations, in order to support the growth of Afghanistan across the full spectrum of reconstruction.

Should this not be the case, a deterioration of the situation could become a real possibility, with the serious consequence of opening a critical front which would strongly influence our perspectives on the overall security and the stability scenario and challenge our thinking on the action required to combat international terrorism.

## Discussion

I will attempt to put "Kabul and Beyond: NATO's Challenge in Afghanistan" in a wider perspective, which is to try to see why we are in Afghanistan and whether we are following the right path in Afghanistan. I believe that we are in Afghanistan because Afghanistan is a case in point concerning what I would call the "revolution of the international scenario." This revolution of the international scenario, in my view, has been caused by several ongoing trends that are completely transforming the world we live in. One trend is the growing gap between the developed and the underdeveloped, the haves and the have-nots. Another one is globalization, which is really permeating this new security scenario. The third one is the technological explosion which has brought about a new way to communicate, in the same way Gutenberg's invention of the press was a new way to communicate, but also led to a worse divide than before: one is either on the technological connectivity side or is out. The fourth great trend, I believe, is that we are witnessing a loss or diminishing sovereignty with what I would call a plus and a minus. In many parts of the world, this loss of sovereignty has been compensated by a higher level of aggregation, such as the European Union or other forms of association which somehow take responsibility for certain elements of sovereignty. In other parts—Afghanistan is one of those—the lack of sovereignty means complete loss of sovereignty, therefore giving way to what we call failing or failed states, or rogue states depending on the terminology. So on one side, the world is developed, connected, globalized and aggregating in some higher form of association; on the other, the world is underdeveloped, disconnected, out of the globalization process and with a failing sovereignty. This is what I call the revolutionary security scenario.

Confronted with this situation, what can the international community at large do to try to tackle this very huge problem which manifests itself through crises that we are witnessing in many parts of the world, in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Iraq etc? The only possible way to attempt to solve this problem in the longer term is to try to extend the area of connectivity and decrease the area of disconnectedness. Afghanistan was certainly part of this area of disconnectedness and it is the reason why, I think, the international community went into Afghanistan: to try to bring Afghanistan out of this disconnected area and into the connected area of the world. But because of the nature of the situation, there is a strong need for the holistic approach that Rainer Schuwirth referred to in his presentation. This holistic approach would really mean a new way to use all our tools, not only the military ones—military tools are one of them—to make the changes that are necessary to solve the problem.

When we look at what is happening in Afghanistan, there is another very interesting aspect of the operations there: What we, the military part of the tools, are experiencing is no longer a war or a confrontation between people. We are operating our military people with the goal of trying to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan population. At the same time, our adversaries, our opponents are from within this

same population. So the military is no longer really operating to defeat the enemy. The purpose of the military operation and of the use of the force is to create the conditions by which a holistic approach can be brought to bear on finding a solution to the Afghan problem. Therefore, the way the military operates, the way it makes a responsible use of the force becomes very important. If our goal is to create and maintain conditions that will make it possible for the other means of power to solve the Afghan problem—which could take fifteen, twenty years, or more—the issue is not to defeat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, the issue is to win the hearts and minds of the Afghani people so that the Afghan nation can rebuild and come into the connected part of the world. Certainly, defeating the Taliban is instrumental to maintaining conditions that will permit all the other instruments of power to work but it is not the issue. If we take a military approach in Afghanistan in which the main issue is to use the full power of our military forces, we may end up creating more problems than solutions. So there is a real need for a very responsive approach to military operations in Afghanistan. Gerhard Back is right when he says that we need unity of purpose because too many people are currently working in Afghanistan with different approaches. This is the worse position to adopt because in the end nobody on the other side can understand it, neither the people who see the military behaving arbitrarily in one way or another, nor our opponents who eventually do not make any difference if you are "coalition" or if you are "NATO." Their reasoning is that if you are in uniform, you are a Western uniform and therefore I am against you.

Another point also relates to the holistic approach: We all say and believe that there must be a very integrated approach to helping the Afghan government rebuild the society after decades of war but, unlike Iraq, Kosovo or Bosnia, Afghanistan probably never had a central government in history because traditionally it was organized around clans. So what we, the international community and foremost the Afghani people, want to achieve is really to build something from scratch that probably never existed there and Afghanistan in that sense is a very unique case that will take a long, long time. But after that long time shall we see a much more holistic, synergetic approach? I am not sure I see ahead a unified, coherent strategy by all actors to try to work with the Afghan government by using all the instruments of power in a coherent way. Let's take the example of the drug problem. Although there is one nation in the lead, there is not yet, at least the way I see it, a sort of steering board, a political steering board that really sets the road, sets the strategy in which all the others, including the military and therefore including NATO, provides a coherent approach. This is the problem, I think, of Afghanistan. Therefore when we say "Going beyond Kabul," it is not just going to Kandahar or going to Paktika, it is really going beyond in the way we tackle this problem, in the way in which we transform NATO, in the way we really approach the use of military force, the use of all instrumental power. And if we fail to do this in Afghanistan, which is probably one of our most challenging tasks, the degree of our failure will really be felt in all our organizations.

# Chapter 13

## Creating a More Agile and Integrated NATO Force To Respond to the 21st Century Threats

General Richard Wolsztynski[1]

What are the new operational challenges for NATO and how can we improve the employment of NATO military forces to provide a rapid, combined, joint, and tailored response to the threats and dangers of the 21st century: terrorism, humanitarian crises, and threats to civilian noncombatants?

### INTEGRATING CAPABILITIES

We always wonder how NATO will be able to generate forces and funds to address the threats of the 21st century. Most important is to increase the integration and effectiveness of both the different military capabilities and the varied operational concepts provided by the different NATO nations. NATO's recent operations demonstrate that this must occur if we wish to have global operational consistency in future military operations. French Air Forces primarily use NATO procedures within ad hoc coalitions, as we did in the first Gulf War. During the past years, our forces have been engaged in several different operations: in the Balkans, fighting against international terrorism in Afghanistan, and in the two recent crises in Africa, Ivory Coast, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

In my view, two essential capabilities are necessary for global operational consistency: 1) the ability to project and sustain an air base in theatre for both air power and to protect land forces and support operational units and 2) C2 capability for leading air campaigns within the framework of multinational coalitions. We have now tested our C2 structure within the NRF 5 framework and are able to use our tactics and procedures within very different coalitions. We are able to field deploy HQs capable of lead nation status in multinational operations up to medium scale. We are also able to deploy an air base whatever the nature of the engagement.

However, we still need to more efficiently coordinate our efforts to promote the involvement of regional actors in future crises and to enhance the partnership between NATO and these regional actors. NATO must formalize these relationships and they must be coordinated at the regional level in order to

---

1 At the time of this Workshop, General Richard Wolsztynski was Chief of Staff of the French Air Force.

achieve a specific footprint that will enable air action. Even though NATO made great progress during the last military operations the Alliance must become more agile in order to deal with all the new challenges we will face.

## LESSONS LEARNED FROM RECENT FRENCH MILITARY OPERATIONS

I would like to point out some of the lessons learned from the most recent French military operations within the NATO framework:

- NATO forces meet the demands of expeditionary warfare. We are now able to deploy very quickly an agile and autonomous detachment anywhere in the world. The reactivity and adaptability of our last detachment in Afghanistan were keys to its tasks. We must be ready to redeploy in theatre with very short notice.
- The excellent cooperation achieved between both French and U.S. Army and Special Forces on the ground must still be enhanced.

We are constantly improving our ability to deal with time-sensitive targeting (targeting of situations that require an immediate response because they pose or will pose a danger to friendly forces) and reducing the time necessary to move from decision to action. In that area, information capabilities are key to enabling joint force components to respond with remarkable speed and agility to time-sensitive targets, as we saw during recent operations. These capabilities are as critical to conflict as controlling airspace is to conducting air operations.

The NATO Response Force has been our main priority during the last 16 months. When French authorities decided in 2002 to fully support and participate in the NRF concept, the decision had direct consequences for our forces:

a) We had to go through the NATO and NRF certification process. This took the form of a training and preparation phase that ultimately led us to be certified for 200 NRF sorties per day.

b) We had to invest in areas such as CIS, logistics, force protection, and deployability (DOB) and adapt some of our capabilities. It is worth pointing out that the French Air Force and the RAF decided to join their support efforts for NRF 5 and 6. We began in June 2005 with NRF 5 and recently handed over command of the NRF 6 Air Component to our British colleagues.

The Katrina support operation gave us the opportunity to put into practice the generic structure of our JFACC while operating from France and coordinating with SHAPE.

The Pakistan relief mission has been a true test. NRF was deployed to Pakistan under the command of the NATO JC Lisbon and initially met with opposition to NATO's involvement in this humanitarian action.

# Chapter 14

## Canadian Perspectives on the Challenges Facing ISAF

Ambassador Jean-Pierre Juneau[1]

### OPENING REMARKS

I would like to express my gratitude to the organizers of this event for inviting me. I am pleased and honoured to once again participate in the International Workshop on Global Security. For many years, this forum has constituted a fertile ground for new ideas and initiatives. It has also served as an engine of transatlantic cooperation.

I believe this is a timely opportunity to discuss ISAF. As you know, this was one of the main items discussed during the April NATO Foreign Ministerial Meeting in Sofia. On that occasion, foreign ministers reaffirmed the Alliance's resolve and confirmed its readiness to double the number of troops deployed in Afghanistan to around 17,000 before the end of 2006. ISAF will certainly remain NATO's priority topic of discussion as we head towards stage 3 and 4 of the expansion and towards the Riga Summit. Those discussions will take place amid vigorous parliamentary and public debate in Alliance countries, especially in the U.K., the Netherlands, and Canada.

General Back made an excellent presentation that outlined the major aspects of NATO's deployment in Afghanistan. He also raised interesting questions that I look forward to hearing your views on. For my part, I would like to say a few words about the nature of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan and share some thoughts about what I see as the main challenges facing NATO's involvement from a Canadian perspective.

### CANADA IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is NATO's top operational priority. It is also Canada's number one engagement abroad. Over 16,000 Canadian forces have been involved in support of the U.N.-supported International Stabilization and Assistance Force as well as Operation Enduring Freedom, ISAF, and OEF. These forces' remarkable performance was underlined by President Karzai and more recently by President Bush. The Canadian government is also leveraging diplomatic and development expertise and assets across a number of federal departments.

---

1 Ambassador Jean-Pierre Juneau is the Permanent Representative of Canada on the North Atlantic Council.

Our long-term, enduring pledge of solidarity with the Afghan people was emphatically reaffirmed on two recent occasions at the highest political levels. In March 2006, shortly after his election, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, accompanied by Defence Minister O'Connor, chose Afghanistan as his first international destination in order to guarantee Canada's support for the country's democratic transition and to assure our soldiers deployed in harm's way of Canadians' unwavering support. In early May, Canadian Foreign Minister Peter MacKay spent two days in Afghanistan, where he reiterated Canada's pledge to help the people of Afghanistan build a democratic and prosperous society. Minister MacKay acknowledged that this would be a lengthy process and made clear that Canada's support was for the long term.

Even more recently, on June 17, the Canadian Parliament voted to extend our combat mission in Afghanistan by two years, confirming Canada's engagement in this part of the world until at least February 2009. This vote took place just a few hours after we learned about the loss of another Canadian soldier in Afghanistan, the first Canadian woman to be killed in combat since World War II. The vote was preceded by a six-hour spirited debate during which Prime Minister Harper announced that, in consultation with other Allies, Canada would be willing to assume command of the overall ISAF mission starting in February 2008.

## CANADIAN OBJECTIVES

Canada's objectives in Afghanistan are twofold. First, we have a national interest in contributing to the establishment of a secure, self-sufficient, democratic, and stable Afghanistan. Like other Allies, we believe that never again should that country serve as a haven for terrorists. Our engagement reflects the understanding that Canada's security and prosperity are linked to international peace and stability, which in turn cannot be dissociated from the situation in Afghanistan. It also reflects Canada's International Policy Statement that puts special emphasis on the need to address problems linked to fragile or failed states, to fight against terrorism and international crime, and to promote human security.

Our second objective is to help Afghans rebuild their country and improve their quality of life. This very much reflects the spirit of the concept of the responsibility to protect, a concept introduced by Canada to the U.N. A version of this concept was adopted by the U.N. Security Council in April 2006 under Resolution 1674, "Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict." Canada believes that the international community needs to develop rules and the political will to enable collective action, including the use of force, to protect civilians from systematic violations of international human rights and humanitarian laws, in cases where governments are unwilling or unable to protect their own people. Canada would like to see international law evolve in such a way as to allow multilateral action to be taken in such situations in a timely and decisive manner. Canadians hope that the ongoing effort in Afghanistan reflects a new recognition by the international community that it must act collectively when governments cannot provide protection to their population.

## CANADIAN FORCES

Providing a secure and stable environment is a sine qua non for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the transition to democracy and the rule of law, and the exercise of human rights and freedoms. This is why approximately 2,300 Canadian forces are currently deployed in Afghanistan as part of Task Force Afghanistan. The vast majority of these troops are located in Kandahar, in the southern region of Afghanistan, where Canada recently assumed command of coalition forces. Task Force Afghanistan is the first rotation of Canada's renewed commitment to the international campaign against terrorism,

whose mission is to improve security in southern Afghanistan and facilitate the transition from OEF to NATO leadership.

As you are no doubt aware, NATO decided at the 2004 Istanbul Summit to expand the role of ISAF through Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs. These small national contingents, which include both military and civilian personnel, support the Afghan authorities in their efforts to improve governance and provide basic services to citizens. They also monitor security and facilitate security sector reform. Since August 2005, a Canadian PRT has been operating in Kandahar, where it is expected to remain until February 2007. The PRT brings together elements from the Canadian forces, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in an integrated Canadian effort, also known as the "All of Government Approach." In addition, Canada is providing a Strategic Advisory Team of approximately 15 civilian and military planners and support staff to advise the Afghan government on defence and national security issues for a year. The team's job is to enable the Afghan government to run its own affairs.

## INVESTMENT AND ASSISTANCE

In early June 2006, Canada's finance minister announced the investment of an extra 3.7 billion euros for national defence. Those resources are an addition to the 10 billion euros over five years that was added to the defence budget by the previous Liberal government in 2005. These investments will go a long way in increasing Canada's ability to act internationally and, in the long term, contribute to achieving our objectives in Afghanistan.

Canada has directed over 460 million Euros to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, which, since 2002, constitutes our largest recipient of bilateral assistance. Our assistance program is directed at rural development and priorities identified by the Afghan government within its National Development Framework. For example, Canada has taken a lead role in several key initiatives such as anti-personnel mine and ammunition stockpile destruction and the disbandment of illegal armed groups. With regard to drug cultivation and trafficking, Canada contributes to the Counter-Narcotics Integrated Alternative Livelihoods Program in Kandahar in order to provide Afghans with viable and sustainable alternatives to poppy production. Canada also actively supports the Vocational Training and Food Aid for War Widows and the National Solidarity Program, a mechanism geared toward developing rural infrastructure, reintegrating refugees, and demobilizing ex-combatants.

Our new embassy in Kabul, which opened in 2003, is helping to coordinate those efforts as well as develop diplomatic relations with the Afghan authorities. Close to 100 diplomatic officers dedicated to supporting the efforts of our embassy in Kabul are at work both at the headquarters and the various missions abroad.

In collaboration with the Afghan authorities, the international community's efforts are starting to bear fruit. Successful presidential and legislative elections have been held and reforms begun in the defence, justice, and finance sectors. There has also been significant progress in de-mining and nearly 3,000,000 Afghan refugees have been reintegrated into society. Moreover, schools, hospitals, and roads are being rebuilt. Women now enjoy more rights and economic opportunities than they ever could have imagined under the Taliban regime. And almost 5,000,000 Afghan children, a third of which are girls, are now registered for school.

## NATO CHALLENGES IN AFGHANISTAN

Despite all of this progress, daily news reports remind us that a lot of work remains to be done. The reconstruction of Afghanistan will take time and effort as well as a continued commitment from the

international community. The Alliance will face many difficult issues, such as those related to drug cultivation and trafficking, the growing presence of experienced operatives using tactics imported from Iraq, the treatment of detainees transferred to Afghan authorities, and the availability of human, material, and financial resources. Cooperation with Afghanistan's neighbouring countries will also be an issue to keep in mind.

As General Back rightly pointed out, in order to address those issues ISAF must avoid a fortress mentality and work to develop a bond of trust with the Afghans. This will be of particular importance in the south, where recent polling suggests an erosion of the Afghan public's consent to the presence of international forces. The slow pace of reconstruction, the inclusion of warlords and narco-traffickers in the government, and perceived heavy-handed coalition tactics could lead to growing dissatisfaction with the Karzai government and the international community. Some Afghans may become favourable to anti-NATO forces after concluding that the presence of foreign troops has offered few tangible benefits.

Another important issue is the possible growing perception of the international military presence as "forces of occupation." We must continue insisting that our role in Afghanistan is to support the democratically elected Afghan government's efforts to extend its authority across all of Afghanistan and, in so doing, rebuild a better life for its people. ISAF has and will continue to undertake concrete activities in order to dispel false perceptions. Joint ISAF patrols with the increasingly well-trained and professional Afghan National Army are an important symbol of solidarity and growing Afghan ownership of security matters. As their level of professionalism increases, I hope that the Afghan National Police will also become a credible security partner.

Creating links of trust and mutual understanding between ISAF and the Afghan people means being flexible and sensitive to cultural differences, two areas in which Canada can make an important contribution. Canadian forces have developed the necessary abilities to work in areas with diverse cultural backgrounds thanks to the multicultural nature of our own society and, more importantly, through Canada's participation in numerous peacekeeping operations.

With that in mind I would say that, from a Canadian perspective, one of the main challenges may come from Canadian public opinion. Maintaining public support for our involvement in Afghanistan will be difficult, especially in the face of the rising number of casualties. While the Canadian government is firmly committed to the current deployment and the reconstruction of Afghanistan, recent polls indicate that only half the population supports the government's efforts in this endeavour. Afghanistan is far away from Canada and the trauma of September 11 is slowly fading away. Therefore, the need to prevent the return to power of a regime favourable to violent extremists or that poses a threat to international peace and stability is less urgent for many Canadians.

Another issue is that the level of violence has risen sharply in Afghanistan in recent weeks, with a string of deadly roadside bomb attacks, including one that killed four Canadian soldiers in the Gumbad region on April 22. Overall, 16 Canadian soldiers and one senior diplomat have died in Afghanistan. Like others, Canadians are not used to seeing their soldiers and civil servants killed in action. While none question the capabilities and the dedication of the Canadian soldier, active combat does not correspond to the traditional image of Canada's international peacekeeping engagement. Many of our citizens are still coming to grips with the notion that in an interdependent world, Canada must respond to threats—resolutely and often robustly—wherever they emerge. We will have to make additional efforts to explain the nature of this operation to our people, one that has more to do with peace enforcement than peacekeeping.

## INCREASING PUBLIC SUPPORT

I believe that the commitment to transparency demonstrated by the recent debate in Parliament will contribute to increasing public support for our engagement in Afghanistan. Periodic high-level events in Afghanistan, such as the recent visits by our Prime Minister and the Defence and Foreign Ministers, also help increase public support. The same can be said about the upcoming visit by the Secretary General to Canada. Those events attract media coverage and stimulate interest and debates back home. Of course, such attention can also contribute to building opposition over time.

The onus is on us, both at the NATO and the national level, to explain and remind our respective populations of the need to succeed in Afghanistan. It is important to make clear that the sacrifices in human lives are not made in vain but genuinely contribute to the establishment of a free, stable, and democratic Afghanistan. We must insist on the fact that establishing the authority of the central government in the whole of its territory is a sine qua non for reconstruction efforts. Ultimately it must be clear that succeeding in Afghanistan is in our own interest.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

NATO's deployment in Afghanistan well reflects the type of operation the Alliance will be called on to conduct in the future; that is, an operation outside Europe in collaboration with other international organizations that requires forces that are able to do a variety of tasks. It is a major test for the Alliance and its ambition to play a greater role in global security. There is no doubt that ISAF is one of NATO's toughest missions since its creation.

While many difficulties lie ahead, I think we are on the right track to succeed. Largely thanks to the commitment of the international community in collaboration with local authorities, Afghanistan has made remarkable strides since September 11 and the fall of the Taliban. Canada remains firmly committed to the establishment of a democratic and stable Afghanistan and is bearing its share of the burden. The scale of our defence, diplomatic, and development efforts are a clear sign of our support of the future of this country. It also reflects our resolve to continue defending and promoting our values and those shared by all NATO Allies.

# Part Three

# Chapter 16

## Towards a 21st Century Alliance

Ambassador Victoria Nuland[1]

I am very appreciative of the opportunity to address the International Workshop on Global Security. It is a great forum to bring us together to talk about where the Alliance is today. I personally think that we are at one of those rare tipping points in history as a transatlantic community. We are at a moment where free societies, as a transatlantic community, have come out of the readjustments of the post-Cold-War period, we have come out of the near divorce on Iraq, have decided we are going to stay in this marriage together. But I personally do not think we have spent enough time explaining to our publics what this marriage, what this transatlantic community is about in the 21st century. Our leaders – Bush, Merkel, Blair, Solana—they are all saying very loudly now that we need each other. That is a very, very good thing. But how do you explain to our people what it means? And have we related it to what they care about?

### MAKING OUR CASE TO OUR PEOPLE

What do our citizens, our nations, really care about? What is it that they want for themselves, for their kids? Are the views of families in North America the same as the views of families in Europe? You can tell I am a mom, and I think about this from a mom's perspective. Do we really all believe that we need each other and that the institutions that bind us are important? I would argue, obviously, that they are and that we do, and that we care first and foremost, and we need to make this case to our publics, we care first and foremost, at the very local level, that our families can live in dignity, live in security and in freedom.

We also care because we believe collectively in the idea of progress, that we should live better and do more than our parents did, and that our kids should do better than we did. That is, after all, one of the great promises of a free society and one of the fundamental, undergirding principles that binds us. It is one of our values.

Above that, we care about human dignity for others. Our shared liberal democratic tradition does not allow us to check our feelings at the transatlantic border. It bothers us. It bothers our people when they see displaced kids in Darfur, when they see earthquake victims in Pakistan sitting in the snow, when they see golden mosques smashed in Iraq or Palestinian youth hurling rocks or wandering idly in the streets.

1 Ambassador Victoria Nuland is the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO.

We also remember. We remember that not so long ago Europe itself was a strife-torn continent and it took all of us to put it back together. We have a common memory that we are important to each other and that we pay a high price when we are divided.

We also remember the cost we pay when we are late to come together. It happened three times in the last century, and I do not need to remind you of those incidents. I certainly do not need to remind this audience. And I would argue that as a transatlantic community, we were also late beyond our own space. We were late in Rwanda, and we paid too little heed to the gathering dangers in the sands of Afghanistan.

So the lessons of the 20th century are not just that we need each other, but that we must be engaged and vigilant so that we never again leave small things to fester and become large things that are still much harder to deal with. We have to act together and early, and we have to make a difference.

## WORKING TOGETHER TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE

So the question is how to continue to do that better and better in the future.

First, we have to be strong at home, strong in protecting our own liberties and strong in our commitment to open and tolerant societies, despite the global challenges pressing in on us. For Americans today, that means addressing the questions of social equity, immigration, and civil rights. It means reserving the open door that has made us such a strong nation of immigrants while ensuring security, equity and dignity for all. And as you can tell, this also means in our post-9/11 world that we have to balance the basic human rights inherent to free democratic societies with the fundamental duty of governments to protect their citizens.

For Europeans, it means strengthening, deepening and broadening the amazingly successful European project which has brought unprecedented peace and prosperity to this continent and has now become such a model and a magnet for others around the planet.

At the Wehrkunde Conference, Chancellor Merkel called on the U.S. to see Europe's integration as an opportunity and we very much do. But if Europeans are challenged today, it is because as the European magnet grows in strength, you also face challenges in welcoming continued diversity in your societies, and in preserving tolerance, while protecting your national heritage and the rule of law.

But as we look at the challenges we face at home, we know—particularly the folks in this room know— that so many of our problems at home have their origins in instability, poverty, and bad governance along our borders and beyond. That is why it is so important that we stay together in turning the great power of our alliance outward to be exporters of prosperity, stability and hope to those who live far from us so we can continue to live well and strongly. We do it in our own interest, we do it because our humanity and our sense of human dignity demand it, we do it together, and we do it early because we have learned the lessons of the 20th century.

## NATO TODAY

This brings me to my day job at NATO. Why should people care about it today? First of all, because NATO today is an alliance that delivers; it is today, one of the best examples of a strong and effective multilateralism. In the past year alone, NATO has conducted successful operations, and continues to conduct them on four continents.

NATO has undertaken its first large-scale humanitarian relief operation in Pakistan, and not only did we get into Pakistan to deliver some 500,000 blankets, and clear hundreds of kilometers of roads and treat some 6,000 people in our medical facilities, but we got back out—and that is important. It is important because we turned that mission over to the Pakistanis, the U.N., and other entities.

We are obviously expanding in southern Afghanistan. I know Jim Jones talked about that at length. We are taking a majority stake with the Afghans, obviously, in that country's prosperity.

And we are supporting the AU in Darfur, bringing our own lift, our logistics, and our training to make that mission a success.

Today's NATO is a far more flexible instrument than it has ever been, and it is where North America and Europe meet as peoples. It is our only permanent structure together as a transatlantic family that has a proven track record of effective action against common challenges.

But, first and foremost, NATO is a political instrument. It is where we say together that Afghanistan matters, we care; Darfur matters; training Iraqi security forces matters; bringing relief to Pakistan matters; keeping the Balkans, Georgia and Ukraine, on a reforming path matters.

Europeans and the EU, as an institution, can do that alone and it helps. Americans can do it alone and it is better than nothing. But when we do it together, the difference is dramatic. Things actually change.

So what are we doing at NATO Headquarters to strengthen this vital tool of common-will action, which has served us so well in the 20th century, for the 21st century, which is even more complex? I would argue as we head towards Riga—and I know you have talked about some of the pieces of this over the conference and you will as you go forward—we believe that NATO needs to be strengthened in three essential pillars: politically, operationally, and as an exporter of security training.

## The Political Challenge

First, politically. Two years ago, Chancellor Schroeder called for a deepening and broadening of the transatlantic political dialogue. It took us some time to come around, but we did, and my President is as strong a supporter as is Chancellor Merkel. As we head towards Riga, I think we have done a good job of broadening the conversation of NATO, which frankly had shrunk over the period of the 90s to lots of discussion only about where we were operationally, the Balkans, and some discussion about expanding freedom. But today at NATO, we are talking about Middle East peace, we are talking about energy security, we are talking about Africa, we are talking about Iran at the level of foreign ministers. I brief on North Korea regularly, and we recently had a NATO-EU conversation about China in my living room. That is really important. Not because NATO is going to be the solution to all of those problems, but because when we use that transatlantic table to talk about all the challenges we face and the tools we have to address them, then we can work more smoothly on common actions in any organization or nationally where our interests converge.

So we need to continue to deepen and strengthen the strategic dialogue so that when our leaders meet in Riga they will have a spontaneous conversation among them about whatever is on their minds without having to think, 'is this a NATO issue?' No, it is a transatlantic issue and we are going to talk about it because we care.

Partnerships are the next large political issue. NATO has done a good job, as has the EU, in creating strong partnerships to mentor and strengthen countries around its periphery. In the NATO context, we are talking about countries from Sweden out to Tajikistan or along the Med littoral or now in the Gulf, and bringing them into our operations if they are interested to create the ability to work together.

We believe that, as we head towards Riga, it is time to take a broader view. These partnerships that are regionally based, have served us well, but they have also become somewhat constraining. Countries who are partners of ours, are sometimes limited by the regional box they find themselves in, as the kind of relationship they can have with NATO.

Then we have some countries who want to do more with us who have no box. And then we have other countries who we should be encouraging in their relationship with us who we are going to have to plug in.

Those who have no box—Japan, Australia, who this summer, as Jim Jones probably told you, becomes a NATO troop-contributing country, or South Korea: all these countries are starting to play a larger security role globally and want to work with us.

Afghanistan. There is no PFP or other box for Afghanistan. They now want a strategic relationship, and they want an ongoing training relationship.

Mongolia has been knocking on our door and told they are geographically inappropriate.

And what about India? Doesn't it make sense as India becomes more and more of a global force, a strong democracy, that we should be encouraging dialogue with the Alliance? But there is no place to do it now.

So, as we head towards Riga, we would like to see a much larger box of NATO partnership tools where we can strengthen our relationship with existing partners and welcome other partners. Some people have said to me, this sounds like encirclement of China. My answer to that is if China wants a relationship with NATO, let's build that box big enough so that she can have one too.

The other political aspect is the relationships between the two great multilateral institutions on this planet: NATO-EU. Look around the world today. In almost every major theater of operation, we need NATO and we need the EU, and we need them to work better together. It is, forgive me, stupid that we cannot have the kind of flexible operational conversations we need to broaden and deepen what we talk about in Brussels.

NATO-U.N. NATO has worked for the U.N., and the U.N. has worked for NATO on and off. We need a formal liaison relationship. And NATO and the AU, obviously, in Darfur and beyond. That is the political challenge.

## The Operational Challenge

Afghanistan. We are well on it. It is our biggest challenge. We must succeed. We must succeed at the high end of the operation in nesting out the Taliban and turning the tide on the increasingly criminal drug-based culture and providing security; but we must also operate effectively across the full spectrum of stability and reconstruction. We must help train the Afghan National Army, we must help train the Afghan National Police, and we must provide stable neighborhoods for good governance to grow among the Afghans. It is our biggest test.

Kosovo. An enduring mission, a very important year—we must continue to keep faith with each other.

As we strengthen our missions we must also strengthen our arsenal of capabilities. You all are here to look at the fantastic aerial hardware available to us. Unfortunately, our alliance today does not have enough lift. I would argue our transatlantic community, including the EU, does not have enough lift. We are hoping on the road to Riga, we are having a very serious conversation at NATO about how we can offer more options to more nations to meet strategic lift requirements, and I am hoping something good will hatch by Riga.

Special forces. Many of us are operating with special forces, but our special forces do not operate well together. By the time we head to Riga, we would like to have an integrated ability for special forces in the alliance to work together and force multiply their efforts.

Deployable assets. As we work at strategic distance we have got to have deployable coms. We have got to have deployable logistics. We have got to buy more of this in common so everybody does not have to buy it and take it home when they leave. We are working on all of those kinds of things.

The NATO Response Force is obviously our premier capability, which I am convinced will be fully operational and has already proven itself, when we needed forces fast for Pakistan.

## Security Training

The last pillar is training. This is one of the most successful things allies have done for each other. Throughout our history, we have trained and integrated our forces. We now believe it should become an increasingly strong export, and in fact, a pillar of Alliance work in the 21st century. How much better is it to strengthen the regional forces in other parts of the world than to have to send our own soldiers?

So when you look at what NATO is already doing, we trained more than 2,000 Iraqis last year in Baghdad and we trained more in our own schools. Our Darfur mission, which is right now a logistical improvement mission, the United States hopes will become an embedded training mission over the summer. How much better is it to do that kind of mission than to have to shoot our way into Darfur ourselves? If we can strengthen the African Union, if they can succeed on the way to a U.N. mission, then they will be more capable in the future to handle more of their own problems.

We also should expand our schooling. The United States has put forward with some of our allies—Italy and Norway—to establish a Middle East Training Center. We believe that the countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue region and the Gulf are much more ready to work together in defense of common security than they were just ten years ago. We see it in the Mediterranean Dialogue, in the work they are doing with us in controlling the Med. We think that with a permanent center in their region, we would be encouraging them to train and school together at NATO standards. We would be bringing more allies to them, and we would be creating a culture of commonality in defense of our security from the threats that we share, whether it is WMD, terrorism, weak borders. So, training is an investment we should make in that region.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Of course, we are committed to keeping the alliance's door open. We have candidates—Georgia, Ukraine. Like the EU, NATO has already accomplished so much as a mentor and a magnet for democracies. But our membership must still be performance-based. We do not think anybody is ready this year but we want to see more candidates ready for our next summit in 2008.

All this talk and all these plans will not do much good against the threats that we face unless we can sustain the investment, the political will and the capital to do all that we said that we want to do. It requires vision and leadership, not just at the NAC table but in capitals, in the press, with people, with the next generation, to sustain popular support for these kinds of shared commitments.

Today I would argue that it is just as important as strengthening our capabilities and our political will as capitals and leaders, that we have the strength and popular support for our great alliance. As our colleague Kai Eide likes to say, we have got to get what we do at NATO from the summit table down to the kitchen table. So I would ask all of you, who I know are strong supporters of this alliance and invested over many, many years, to help us with that as we head towards Riga. I truly worry that there are very few people in my country under the age of 40 who could tell you what NATO is doing today, and even fewer who are willing to invest in it. So help us get this message out there and help us get it to the kitchen table.

# Chapter 17

## NATO-EU Cooperation Requires Political Will

Ambassador Harri Tiido[1]

Listening to the panelists for the NATO/EU session, I get the feeling that there is the EU and there is NATO. We in the EU find it this way and those in NATO find it this way. Well, there is no EU and there is no NATO—there are member-nations. Without member-nations, the international staff and the council and committee staffs would be out of a job. There are 19 nations that are part of both organizations, and instead of talking as though we have a split personality—I do not have a split personality—we must look at EU and NATO from the aspect of cooperation. Individual nations have identities—as a nation, a region, part of Europe, part of the transatlantic community—but the greater the number of identities, the easier it should be to accept the concept of cooperation.

### FEAR OF COOPERATION

Some nations, however, have what Alain de Botton calls "status anxiety" in his book of the same name—the concern that cooperation might diminish or raise the nation's status. And right now I find cooperation between NATO and the EU totally lacking, especially at the political level, and every kind of cooperation, especially military cooperation, needs a political framework. Yes, there are papers—there is the declaration from the 2002 Berlin Plus—but this document is nearly five years old and the world is changing. We must do the same, but how?

First, perhaps, we should sit down and write down all the fields and issues that need cooperation, on the consultation level, the political level, and so on, regardless of the documents that have been drawn up. We could make this list and then take out Berlin Plus and see what fits in and what does not. If a number of issues do not fit in, then we could renegotiate Berlin Plus.

Let's say, for example, that we needed to discuss Byelorussia both in the EU and NATO. We could discuss it together as well because nations would not have one view in one organization and a different view in the other. The issue of Iran could be discussed as an acute security issue. The issue of the Balkans could be discussed on an operational level. We could also discuss the issue of the Caucasus, the issue of energy security, terrorism, etc. As far as agencies go, the European Defense Agency has been working for some time on the long-term vision that has been referred to. It seems only natural that the Allied Com-

1 Ambassador Harri Tiido is the Permanent Representative of Estonia on the North Atlantic Council.

mand Transformation would be involved in this work as well because they too are trying to define the security environment that will exist in the world in 20 or 25 years, and there should not be two different future environments, one for NATO and one for the EU.

## THE NEED FOR POLITICAL WILL

I believe the EU and NATO could coordinate their views on many wider issues.

But cooperation is not working, basically because of the lack of political will. I do not want to say that the staffs on both sides are trying to keep everything to themselves, and keep it separate. But I do think the nations need to take up this issue. The German minister of defense did refer several times in his workshop presentation to the need for good relations. Ambassador Nuland also mentioned EU-NATO cooperation, and Madame Arnould talked about several small but important obstacles that have been around for decades. However, I believe that in the case of the Defense Planning Questionnaire, the issue on the EU side can be solved and the 23 in favor can be turned to 25 provided the missing two sign the NATO information security agreement. It can be done without membership in the PfP and it can be done legally. For cooperation to take place, however, we need the political will. We also need to remove the obstacle on the NATO side. But the member-nations have to work on it.

# Chapter 18

## NATO-EU Cooperation Needs to Begin at the Top

Ambassador Dr. Jerzy Nowak[1]

My intention is to reply to three questions: 1) Is there really a need for NATO and the EU to work together? 2) Is it true that currently there is an impasse in the NATO-EU relationship? And 3) What is to be done if there is an impasse?

### IS THERE A NEED FOR NATO AND THE EU TO WORK TOGETHER?

My answer to the first question is of course yes, for both strategic and political reasons. First of all, while the Euro-Atlantic region currently has two slightly different centers, it is still one common Euro-Atlantic community—what used to be called the Western world. So the Euro-Atlantic community has common characteristics and values, which must be strengthened to meet today's security challenges and to build a common security architecture.

Second, the transatlantic link constitutes an integral and strategic part of the Euro-Atlantic area. This link is composed of the transatlantic triad: NATO, which embraces Europe and North America; European Union and U.S. relations; and the NATO-EU dialogue. Because of the existence of this triad, it seems to me that the idea of building the European Union into a counterweight for the United States had to be put aside or dropped. In addition, at least some of us believe that NATO should participate in the U.S-EU dialogue as far as security questions are concerned, because NATO is involved with both entities.

The third and final point regarding the need for NATO and the EU to work together is that bringing overlapping strengths to bear on common causes in the Western world is obviously something that should be done.

The most desirable option would be to have NATO as a military arm of the Transatlantic Committee, complemented by the EU for soft security tasks, and accompanied by a viable EU-US dialogue.

---

1 Ambassador Dr. Jerzy M. Nowak is the Permanent Representative of Poland on the North Atlantic Council.

## ARE THINGS AT AN IMPASSE BETWEEN NATO AND THE EU?

I believe that currently there is an impasse. The basic element here is political: Both organizations are in search of a new identity though they are in different phases of this process. NATO is constantly looking for ways and means to confront new challenges, to transform itself and go global. The EU is trying to find an identity in the new fields that are ahead of it and is searching for ways to develop capabilities for autonomous actions. The problem between NATO and the EU is how to reconcile their ambitions and avoid overlapping. There are still residual doubts on the side of the European Union about what role the United States and Canada should play in this game. NATO is looking for a new global role, which largely is inspired by the United States as part of NATO, but Iraq has shown that U.S. leadership was questioned.

The second element of the impasse is that while there are elements of cooperation, for example, in the Balkans, there is also competition. For instance, we are being told in NATO that Africa should belong to the European Union's area of responsibility, and the same is true concerning the Mediterranean. So we have differing political perspectives and sometimes, let's face it, some elements of mistrust.

The third element of the impasse is that the formal dialogue on strategic issues de facto does not exist. Practical collaboration except in the military field, which is developing relatively well, is very limited. Capability harmonization and synchronization have produced only partial results, not those we all desire.

The fourth element of the impasse is that of natural institutional or bureaucratic differences, which some say make it difficult to collaborate. There are also disputes between the two groups about areas of responsibility. NATO certainly is competent in regard to everything that is covered by the Washington Treaty and related to military aspects of security. This last element of impasse is probably the easiest to deal with and remove. In sum: formal dialogue on strategic issues between NATO and the EU does not exist, efforts toward promotion of capability harmonization and synchronization have produced only partial results, and concrete examples of practical collaboration remain very limited.

## WHAT CAN BE DONE TO RESOLVE THE IMPASSE?

This situation, however, is not irreversible. First of all, we have to come to a basic agreement that cooperation is needed, but this is politically difficult and extremely laborious to do. There is a need to begin frank and more open strategic reflection on the EU-NATO partnership, to go a little bit deeper than we are at the moment and to perhaps make an effort similar to the so-called Harmel Report that was made at the end of the 1960s. To start this process it would be helpful to have a clear political signal from the highest level, for example, from the Riga summit, and then to have the effort supported and monitored by the political directors from the EU and NATO and by the Foreign and Defense Ministers

Of course, a broad range of consultations would be desirable. As a Pole, I would like to see more dialogue on common energy security issues, on the so-called Eastern dimensions of NATO and the EU. We may advance informal consultations "at 32," including at the ministerial level and at the level of political directors as well.

We can better exploit joint action between the NATO Secretary General and the EU High Representative to follow up on opportunities for joint diplomatic actions and to ensure that the NRF and battle groups are more compatible; to adopt a common approach to strategic lift, (the British idea); to build strong relationships between the European Defense Agency and NATO institutions and committees; and to go beyond the exchange of information on NATO and EU capabilities. We can also make better use of the EU cell at SHAPE and the NATO liaison teams for the EU Military Staff. So there are many concrete things we can do but some political signal is necessary.

Without a strong political impulse, NATO and the EU will continue to evolve separately, with growing areas of unnecessary duplication.

# Chapter 19

## *A Holistic Approach to NATO-EU Relations*

Lieutenant General Michel Maisonneuve[1]

A few years ago, while I was working for the OSCE, I testified against Slobodan Milosevic at The Hague. On cross-examination he accused me of being an agent of NATO—I wonder what he would say today because now I am indeed an agent of NATO. And if you think NATO has a hard time marketing itself, as I have heard here several times, we on the other side of the Atlantic at ACT in Norfolk have a hard time marketing ourselves as the only NATO headquarters outside of Europe, the only one in North America. So when people talk about the transatlantic link, our people are that link, and they live that link every day. With 24 of 26 nations represented as well as seven PfP nations, I believe we in Norfolk are the primary means of cooperation with the U.S. and Canada on the military side.

### CLOSER COOPERATION

Since I am a military officer, I am going to speak pragmatically and leave the political issues to my colleagues. I want to make three quick points. The first point is that I think logic and reason make it apparent that closer cooperation between the EU and NATO is needed. The security challenges are enormous in today's world and there is enough work out there for any global security organization that wishes to get involved. So I think we should try to improve and cooperate to make things better.

Europeans have been making good progress in developing their security structure within the EU. There is a lot of maturity now and the back and forth is great. But since NATO has 57 years of experience in the areas of military interoperability, process development, and so on, I think we can assist the EU in developing its security apparatus—why should they reinvent the wheel?

Similarly, NATO has a lot to learn from the EU—a lot of good ideas have been generated as they set up their apparatus. NATO's comprehensive political guidance states a desire to closely coordinate and cooperate with the EU. My boss, SACT, has the task of establishing strong working relationships, and General Back, ACT, is developing means for enhancing operation coherence between the different actors on the ground. This cooperation is now taking place in all our operations but we need to formalize them by, as the Secretary General says, "Applying military, political, economic, and other instruments in a well-coordinated way." This includes as a priority the European Union. And "the EU can only be an

[1] Lieutenant General Michel Maisonneuve is Chief of Staff, Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.

effective security actor when it is a partner for NATO and not a counterweight." So, logic and reason dictate that we need to create these linkages before a crisis, before we need them.

## INCREASED DIALOGUE AND ROUTINE CONTACT

My second point is that in the current situation, there are definitely areas of cooperation. For example, at the Military Committee level, there are regular meetings between the EU and NATO. DSACEUR has his responsibilities regarding operations, but there is a question now whether we should actually be looking at these responsibilities again and whether they need to be enhanced and widened. There is the NATO permanent liaison team. There is the international staff that has a NATO-EU capabilities working group of which ACT is a member. There are informal talks at the lower staff levels as well, particularly in the defense planning area. And, for the first time, in December of 2005, I took a number of my flag and general officers to the EU Military Staff meeting and Jean-Paul Perruche and I worked together during a series of meetings. We discussed issues of mutual interest and got to know each other a little bit better. We also agreed to continue our cooperative work and will do so in the fall of 2006 when the EU Military Staff sends a delegation to Norfolk. Of course, because of the relative size difference, it is important when we get together not to have the NATO side overwhelm the other side—we tend to overwhelm, and so we need to temper our aspirations there. We need to build on and increase all these areas of cooperation.

But how should this cooperation take place? The first thing I recommend is achieving a common understanding of the security environment, how it is today and how it will be in the future. Then, to develop that common understanding, there has to be a sharing of intelligence and a sharing of assessments through discussion and joint assessment; we also need to update the rules that currently exist regarding information sharing and security exchanges.

My second point is that we need to have a strong dialogue, routine contact, and an exchange of information. Again, I think we need to be pragmatic here, by building on the current arrangements. But we should also have more liaison officers and review any bureaucratic obstacles to facilitating contact, for example, document release and participation. The NATO school that answers to us for curriculum reasons is undergoing real trouble right now having EU officers participate in NATO school courses. These are obstacles to cooperation that need to be reviewed and destroyed. We would also favor having a much stronger relationship with the European Defense Agency, with Allied Command Transformation, because in the areas of lessons learned, in the areas of training, concept development, experimentation, and process development, I think there is a lot that we can help each other with.

## COMPLEMENTARY CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT

My third point is in the area of capabilities development. Of course, there is already, as I mentioned, some work going on, but we need to do away with conflict. Development should be complementary, for example, between the European Defense Agency and Allied Command Transformation, and we should try to work at all levels. This includes developing the EU battle group with the NRF. There are things we can learn from each other here and I think we should try to enhance the learning.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

I believe we can build on current mechanisms, which are coming along well. But a holistic approach, with coherence between all actors on the ground, should be the basis for future cooperation, both in planning and during operations. I am certainly in favor of stronger relationships, and I believe Canadians very much support a strong and effective EU as a partner for stability and security operations.

# Chapter 20

## The EU and NATO: From Complementarity To a Real Partnership

Lieutenant General Jean-Paul Perruche[1]

I would like to make six observations. First of all, since 2005, despite a rather complex political context, the EU has continued developing its actions and capabilities in the ESDP field. We can see this through our commitments to Indonesia for the Aceh mission, which is a civilian mission but which requires military skills; the continuation of our mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the launch of two missions in Palestine, small tailored missions for monitoring the checkpoint between Gaza and Egypt and to train the police there; and a mission in Africa—we have been assisting the African Union in its first peacekeeping operation in Darfur for 18 months and are continuing on with the current transition phase. We are also going to launch a new operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in support of the U.N. mission (MONUC) during their elections, with roughly 2500 men, which will support our two current missions there—the EUSEC Congo to assist the Congolese in rebuilding their defense and security administration and a similar mission to assist the police administration.

### PROGRESS IN CAPABILITIES

The second area in which we are working is capabilities, and we are working to reach the 2010 Headline Goal. We are preparing our new force catalogue for the end of 2006 and have also engaged in meeting the long-term vision of the European Defense Agency, whose aim is to define more clearly the security environment for the EU and the capabilities that must be developed by 2025-2030.

With regard to structure, our newly created civ-mil planning cell and our Ops Center are either already operational or are close to being operational. With the Ops Center, the EU will have a third way to build an operational chain of command when operations are ready to be launched, particularly those that require civilian-military integration. We have also developed our relations with NATO and the EU and have sent a liaison officer to the U.N. to work with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and sent another liaison officer to the African Union in Addis-Abbeba. The EU has become an actor in global security, meeting an objective included in the European Security Strategy document that was

---

1 Lieutenant General Jean-Paul Perruche is Director General of the European Union Military Staff.

agreed to by heads of state in December 2003. The development of ESDP has not hampered NATO's actions nor has it been affected by our action and its ambitions have not been reduced.

## EU-NATO COMPLEMENTARITY

My third observation is to say that EU-NATO complementarity is already a reality. Though the two organizations have different natures and formats, they complement each other by their different types of action—NATO is more militarily focused and the EU is more multidisciplinary focused; different areas of interest—there are some crises in which the United States might not wish to become involved with troops, even though they would hope for a resolution, and in which the EU could have some more specific interest, for example, in Africa; and different images.

## ACTIONS TO AVOID

My fourth remark is to say that this complementarity can be improved by avoiding certain things: failing to respect the autonomy of the two organizations; allowing the EU-NATO relationship to be taken hostage by some members; and competing excessively. We can also promote a realistic partnership, as already mentioned by Michel Maisonneuve, which will come from a more robust dialogue on security objectives and courses of action. Complementarity in military affairs can only be a consequence of agreed-upon complementarity in political affairs.

## DEVELOPING MEANS AND CAPABILITIES

Fifth, we should get rid of the paradox of asking Europeans to become militarily more capable and simultaneously preventing them from developing their capabilities in a common way. Both NATO and the EU can benefit from a reinforcement of the European command capabilities, encouraging more standardization and more integration of capabilities in the EU through the creation of the European Defense Agency. Though there is not likely to be a significant increase in defense expenditures in the foreseeable future, by suppressing internal duplication in the development of national means and capabilities the EU can hope for a considerable increase in its capabilities. Duplication does not seriously exist between the EU and NATO structures but does between EU member-states themselves. More integration would also open the way to more interest in developing new systems and investing in new technologies, which is only possible at the European level.

## STRENGTHENING EU-NATO-U.S. DIALOGUE

Finally, complementarity between the EU and NATO would benefit and strengthen EU-U.S. dialogue regarding security. Such dialogue would foster mutual understanding as well as develop a partnership from which NATO could also benefit. Competition between the EU and NATO only leads to divisions within those two organizations and is something that should be avoided. Therefore, we must all make great efforts to develop partnership while respecting the nature and format of both organizations.

# Chapter 21

## EU and NATO: Successes and Challenges

Ms. Claude-France Arnould[1]

### INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

In discussing the relationship between the European Union and NATO, I think we have to consider what has been achieved, what is a success, and what is even more than a success, an "acquis." We need to recognize all that our military commanders have achieved.

A great achievement is that Berlin Plus has been implemented and in a most satisfactory way. Its beginnings were not so easy, because the chain of command for the FYROM mission was entirely European. Now, however, in Operation Althea in Bosnia, the feeling within the European Union is that a European chain of command is entirely proper. However, while Operation Althea is going well, the planning phase was rather difficult—at the very beginning we did not know we would have to share responsibilities with the remaining NATO presence. Now, however, the operational phase is running perfectly and we need to pay tribute to those who implemented it and to recognize that it is a real success.

It is also a success on which we are ready to build. If scenarios such as those described by General Schuwirth occur, we in the European Union will be very happy to use the Berlin Plus arrangement again, because it has proved efficient and satisfactory. One sign of its success is that our Althea force commander, Major General David Leakey, was selected to succeed General Perruche as Director General of the European Union Military Staff.

Regarding Sudan, everybody must recognize that our military has functioned well on the ground and that the mission was coordinated in a perfectly military manner. We continue to have regular staff-to-staff contact with the Commission, the Military Staff, and our equivalents in NATO. I hope we will be able to do the same thing in Kosovo because we will stay, and we are committed to implementing a EU civilian mission and want to do a good job. I realize that this is one of the priorities of the future German presidency, but we are already having staff-to-staff contact to start off on the right foot and to ensure cooperation.

---

1 Ms. Claude-France Arnould is Director for Defense Aspectsof the Council of the European Union.

## INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES

In addition to our successes, we must also look at what is problematic. We have two kinds of problems, I believe. First, there is the question of the format, which is poisoning our relationship. While many have said that it is silly and has to be stopped, we do need to understand why we have the problem. I believe we have the problem because we have built on compromise, and when you build on compromise you do not always have thoughtfulness and clarity. I understand that compromise was necessary so that Berlin Plus could be agreed to, implemented, and launched, but now we have to understand that it is not acceptable for NATO to discuss all subjects with the 25 member-states of the EU, because classified information cannot be shared with all 25. Another problem is that Berlin Plus operates with the 25 member-states but we do it with 23, and that is acceptable.

We also have a problem with the Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ). It is very difficult to assess whether the DPQ is satisfactory for the European Union because the European Union discusses capabilities with 25 member-states. I do not know if this is silly—as a diplomat I am not qualified to say that the concerns of those who have a problem with the Alliance and of those who have problems with the EU are silly. I believe we need to take the concerns seriously and we need to apply our imagination and be flexible in our thinking about any arrangements that would enable us to work together, which I believe everyone wants.

The second problem is with substance. General Perruche said that complementarity is clear, but it is less clear than it was a few years ago. When we came in with ESDP, we had a partner that was mainly military and whose main interest for us was that the United States takes on a huge part of the action and the burden. Now we have a partner that is engaged and will be engaged in many more fields and we will have a worldwide membership, and that we have to adapt to. I cannot speak for NATO, but what I would like to say for the European Union is that we would like to bring the whole range of instruments developed within the European Union, including the military elements developed through ESDP, to implement the European security strategy.

We will be able to add value to the international community, and help to bring peace and stability, when our military element is part of the EU global monetary framework. I am sorry to speak about money, but the European Union has a 4.5-billion-euro budget for external uses plus the European Defense Fund (EDF). We spend that money for development, for external relations, for policing, for third-pillar rule of law, and so on, and we want to bring the military element in that framework. I know we can add value and that is why we want to act. It is why we came to the Balkans with NATO and why we came to Congo and why we came to Sudan, and I think that is natural complementarity. So let us concentrate on specific jobs that we can do well together. Kosovo is one, and it will be a great achievement if we have success together there.

# Part Four

# Chapter 21

## Agility, Uncertainty and Information Sharing

Dr. Linton Wells II[1]

My goal tonight is to build on some of the things I have learned at the workshop and to cover some of the important issues leading up to the Riga summit.

### THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE

Minister Jung noted the changes in the international security environment since Germany's 1994 White Paper. The U.S. 2005 National Security Strategy pointed to uncertainty as the key characteristic of the future national security environment, something that was reinforced by the so-called Quadrennial Defense Review. DOD plans on a six-year defense program and beyond that a 10-year defense planning projection, a total of 16 years though it is really 18, because we cannot get to the budget until 2008—and, as somebody pointed out, 18 years is longer than from the Wright Brothers' first flight to the end of World War I. So we are basically asking people to estimate the need for military aviation before the first airplane is flown at the end of a war that nobody expects is coming.

Let's go back 18 years, to 1988. Much of the Army is being sized and structured for armored warfare in the Fulda Gap; a key role of the Air Force is to win air superiority over the inter-German border; defense of the North Atlantic Sea Lanes is a key mission for the Navy; the Mujaheedin are loyal freedom fighters in the fight against Communism; we have a really strong buffer against the Islamic Revolution in Iran and his name is Saddam Hussein; and almost nobody has ever heard of the Internet. So I think the point about uncertainty being a characteristic of the environment is really important and that we need to factor it into everything we are doing. I have no clue what 2024 is going to look like, but I am sure it is going to be nothing like what we think it is going to be today.

Just think about what we heard at this workshop. We heard about the global war on terrorism, failed states; we talked about Africa as a key security issue for Europe; we talked about virtually global operations and interactions for NATO; the dangers of nuclear, chemical, and biological proliferation; avian flu; and the religious, social, and economic dimensions of security. In this context, SACEUR noted that the changes NATO will need to respond to in the 21st century environment are expeditionary, rapid reac-

1 Dr. Linton Wells II is U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration.

tion, and wide ranging. I think that is pretty descriptive of what will be needed for the uncertainties we face.

## THE NEED FOR NON-TRADITIONAL MISSIONS AND PARTNERS

These uncertainties and related changes mean that our forces need increasingly to emphasize non-traditional missions such as: stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations; humanitarian assistance; disaster relief; and, increasingly, something called building partner capacity, which is trying to set conditions so that war does not happen—engaging before a war starts. Many of these are "indirect" approaches, in the sense of B. H. Liddle-Hart in that they leverage others' actions to accomplish missions, not just our own.

Tom Barnett wrote a book called The Pentagon's New Map that shows that most of our interventions have been in failed state "gap" areas, and it reflects pretty well what we are actually seeing. Regarding reconstruction, I heard a quote the other day that; "war is much simpler than the stabilization and reconstruction operations that are needed at the end of it. But if we fail in those reconstruction operations, we cannot achieve the goals for which we went to war in the first place." In other words, it is not enough just to design our forces for military operations now. We have to train the people and design the support systems to carry the operations on long term—at low to mid-level intensity, but long term.

This implies that we will be dealing with non-traditional partners, for example, aid organizations, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, indigenous security services, commercial partners, people who will never get inside the firewalls of our network but with whom we need to share information. In the U.S., as an extra benefit, if we can communicate, collaborate, translate, in some cases, and engage with these non-traditional partners, it will strengthen our ability to work domestically with state and local first responders in the kind of disaster relief that was needed along the Gulf coast. But this then leads to Minister Jung's construct of "Network Security." Such security needs to encompass all aspects of national power, not just military. It involves diplomatic, intelligence, information, economic, and other aspects, and it is potentially long term. We need to begin thinking in terms of 10 years, and someone said in terms of generations. That needs to be part of the planning process.

The other thing that is absolutely critical is local knowledge. We have to be able to communicate with the recipients of our aid, stabilization, and transformation work in ways that make them feel that we are working on their behalf, not just trying to impose our system on them. That requires a whole different set of skills—people, language, and cultural skills—that by and large our forces do not have right now.

## THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION SHARING

There is a common theme to both areas I have talked about: information sharing is critical. That means we need to change "need to know" to "need to share." We have to change from being owners of information to being stewards of information. But the information has to be interoperable, across all coalition partners, and has to come with appropriate security. It is not enough to pursue the Microsoft solution to information sharing or the Cisco or the Oracle or the American or the Portuguese or the Dutch solution. We have to be able to share appropriately throughout whatever coalition environments we are going to be in.

It is key, then, to recognize that information has become a strategic asset. It is not the province of techie geeks, it is a core element of national power. And to get the proper emphasis, at the right levels of government, this fact needs to be recognized by ministers and commanders. It is not enough for mid-level personnel to try to get this point across; it needs to be endorsed and acted on at senior political and command levels. The explanations also have to address domestic audiences. If the alliance is going

into something which will engage people for 10 years or a generation, leaders have to tell that story up front to the people who will have to support it at home.

These changes reflect the fact that the information revolution is transforming our societies, our way of life, the way we do business, the way our children think. They reinforce the sense that information issues involve strategic political-military-social questions that need senior level attention. Speaking to that need, NATO has something called NATO Network-Enable Capabilities (NNEC), and I believe they are key to providing the Alliance with the agility it needs to meet the uncertainty of the future.

Take, for example, the special operations force soldier on horseback in Afghanistan who is receiving close air support from a 40-year-old B-52 via precision-guided munitions over a digital network using navigation from global positioning satellites. These involved many changes to original concepts of operations, but because the components are flexible, because they are agile, and because they are networked, commanders could put them together on the fly and produce great effects. Network-Enabled Capabilities are important to the Alliance's transformation. The United States reached several conclusions in the Quadrennial Defense Review. Networks to transform the way we do business, the way we collect intelligence, the way we fight our wars. Net-centric concepts also support the point that General Jones made that you need to make more rapid decisions in order to support distant operations.

## THE CHANGING FOCUS OF NET-CENTRICITY

Two important evolutions of net-centric concepts have taken place over the last year about which we have to reorient our thinking. The first is moving from a focus on information—information superiority, information dominance, information whatever—to a focus on knowledge. The Quadrennial Defense Review reinforced the importance of net-centric operations but it also talked about moving from data-to-information-to-knowledge-to-decision-to-action as quickly as possible. So it is not enough just to have information; you have to turn the information into effective decisions and to turn those into actions.

The second evolution is that NATO's network-enabled capabilities have to apply to a range of contingencies. It is not enough that these capabilities can help us fight armored combat in the open desert or fight naval warfare at sea. They have to be able to work in urban warfare in Fallujah, in counter-insurgency operations, in stabilization operations with the Afghan military, in tsunami disaster relief, in building the capacity of partners in Africa.

The U.S. will be investing about $27 billion in the core programs of the global information grid over the next several years. When NATO goes into Afghanistan, as soon as the commanders feel ready, the Alliance will deploy a command and control information exchange data system that is built not on American standards but on NATO standards. The developers went out of their way to build to international standards, not just the American way of doing business. Serious efforts are underway to support the network-centric concept of providing information on demand to people when they need it where they need it.

Security is also key. But it has to be under a different paradigm, a different way of doing business. The globalization of the IT sector and the expansion of the network boundaries mean that the perimeter defenses alone just do not work anymore. You cannot put a big firewall around the network and expect it to protect you. You need, instead of defense and depth, "defense in breadth," from where the software begins to who is using it, and you have to assume that there will be antagonists inside the network—you cannot assume that all the bad guys are going to be on the outside.

Another piece that is really important is something arcane called Identity Protection and Management, because we will have a very diversified system with all sorts of people in it. In order for security to

work, you need to know who those people are, and that leads you to all sorts of approaches such as biometrics, identity tokens and role-based access; things that most people do not think about but that are critical in their environment.

## BUDGETARY ISSUES

Let's talk about resources for a moment. SACEUR expressed concern that NATO's role is expanding but without an increase in resources. In fact, the resource constraints, at least in the U.S. Department of Defense, are going to become even tighter in the years ahead. People have referred to the fiscal 2006 budget as the "tunnel at the end of the light." From 2008 on it is going to be even tougher for a variety of reasons: the top line is not going to grow as fast; many new military health care benefits have been approved by Congress; there is a lot of equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan that will have to be refurbished; and the supplemental budgets that have been supporting operations eventually are going to go away. This tightened resource environment will have a particular impact on discretionary funds—acquisition and research and development—which of course is a concern to the defense industry.

## COOPERATIVE RECONSTRUCTION

It is therefore critical that these tightened funds be focused on the needs of the new environment. We have to use them, not to prepare for comfortable, traditional missions, but to support a broad range of possible contingencies in an uncertain future. Conventional conflict cannot be ruled out, even as capabilities are built for irregular warfare, but we cannot just keep buying stovepipes and stand-alone platforms and point-to-point communications. Perhaps there are ways, which General Wolf talked about, to use the NATO Response Force for tactical network building and then have units cycle through it—they will get trained and improve as the NATO Response Force is used.

The sociology of this work is as important, if not more so, than the technology. If you have not seen the brochure about Multinational Experiment (MNE) 4 by the Joint Force Command in Norfolk, I strongly recommend you look at it. This work, which has gone on for two years and involves stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan, makes a very important contribution to preparing for the future security environment. MNE 5 is now being planned and I recommend that any of you who are interested in it contact Joint Forces Command, because the concepts are being designed to work with industry partners and alliances. Multinational Experiment 4 involved the U.N., the EU, Sweden, Australia, and Finland—not just NATO countries. So there are many opportunities here.

Another important event that is in planning is Strong Angel 3 (www.strongangel3.org). It is looking at the technology, Conops and sociology of reconstructing a society after all key networks and services—power, water, communications, transportation—have been disabled. This demonstration is looking at how to help restore the functions of a society using communications, and collaboration, and how to re-establish the trust of people in their government.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

What is the way ahead? Again, I encourage every interested party to become involved in MNE 5 and Strong Angel, but the very important Riga summit is coming up, so I offer two issues for ministers and commanders to consider.

The first is the critical need for information sharing as a core approach to a wide range of scenarios. We do not know what those scenarios will be. We do know, though, that we are going to have to share with many non-traditional partners in any scenarios that arise and that information will be a strategic asset.

The second is that network-enabled capabilities really are critical to Alliance's transformation and help give it the agility it needs to face the uncertainty of the future. But these capabilities are not based on technologies alone. Technologies and material must co-evolve with the full range of doctrine, organization, training, leadership, personnel, and facilities to truly be transformational and to build greater security.

If I were to ask industry for one area of emphasis, it would be to give us more security in networks and commercial network-related. We cannot continue to work in isolated enclaves or stovepipes, but the insecurity of much of the software, hardware, being developed today is a source of genuine concern.

# Chapter 22

## A New Concept of Transformation

General Harald Kujat[1]

I have two messages to share with you. The first one is very much related to the place where the Workshop is being held, which is very close to the former East/West border, the Berlin Wall. The disappearance of the wall was an indication of the end of the East/West conflict, but though many people, in Germany and the United States and elsewhere, think we have left the post-Cold War transition period behind, my message is that we are still in it. The tectonic movements that were initiated by the end of the East/West conflict are still ongoing, and those of us from Georgia, from the Caucasus region, from Moldova, and elsewhere know exactly what I mean.

I think it is important to acknowledge that we still live in a continuously changing political and geostrategic world. NATO has so far managed to deal with the fundamental changes and the last four summits have been milestones on the way to shaping the international security architecture. Along the way, NATO has extended its spectrum of tasks beyond Article 5 and expanded its engagement well beyond the NATO Treaty area, and I believe it is important to understand that NATO must still control and manage ongoing major changes. To do so, NATO is expanding its cooperation with countries that already work with us, such as New Zealand, Australia, and Japan; and will cooperate more closely with the countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Near East.

It is also important to understand what Dr. Linton Wells said—that we have to deal with the uncertainties of the future but also with those of today. We also have to deal with new environments and new concepts such as network-enabled capabilities and knowledge superiority. Forces will need to be able to acquire intelligence and carry out surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition at all levels of command, from the sergeant leading a few soldiers to the general maneuvering force formations on the ground, on the sea, in the air, or in space. We need to have network readiness for interoperating Allied forces.

### LOOKING AHEAD TO THE RIGA SUMMIT

I think calling the Riga Summit a transformation summit is definitely the right thing to do. However, it is not a summit in which we should lean back and report our success on the NATO Response Force, the

[1] General Harald Kujat is the former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee.

new command structure, the new force structure, and the new political-military decision-making processes. What heads of state and government need to do is to understand what transformation actually means. It is not just new technology, it is a new concept, a new way of operating our forces, a way of dealing with uncertainty—with the "fog of war," as Americans say, or "friction," as the German military thinker Clausewitz called it. My personal definition of transformation is a process with knowledge and information technology as its centerpiece at the end of which friction and its effects are reduced to the absolute minimum (all military leaders know you cannot eliminate it completely). That is what we need to achieve.

My hope is that the Riga Summit will spotlight the concept of transformation for everyone within and outside NATO and not just refer to what we have achieved so far. In NATO we have achieved quite a lot, but it is only the first step into the future. I believe that heads of state and government should use this opportunity to tie together the need to deal with this transition period and to transform the Alliance both militarily and politically.

# Chapter 23

## Does NATO Meet the Challenge of the Information Era?

Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf[1]

Before I start with my remarks, I think I should explain from which kind of a perspective I deliver them: As the Director of NATO's Communications Agency I am responsible for the provision of communications support to NATO's static and deployed command structure. This brings me in close contact with the political and policy authorities in Brussels as well as to the operational commanders and planners.

### NATO: MOVING FROM THE INDUSTRIAL AGE TO THE INFORMATION ERA

When I first saw the topic of this panel, I thought that we had missed a question mark at the end. However, I am convinced that no one in this room is in any doubt that NATO is on the move into the information era. The recent organisational restructure of the Alliance has even created its own strategic headquarters with the one and only aim to manage the transformation of the Alliance into the future.

Therefore, what I would like to do in my remarks is to answer the question of whether or not NATO really meets the challenge of the information era and if not, what should be done to bring it up to standard.

I think there is no need to underline again and again that the most important feature of today's defence planning and running operations is decision superiority based on information superiority. This aim is laid down in the Bi-SC Strategic Vision as well as in all publications related to NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC). Information superiority needs to be based on a capable and secure communications network utilised to its full capabilities by users, who fully understand the game of effective networking. This applies to governments, humanitarian organisations, and civilian companies as well as to military structures in peace and operations.

Main characteristics of the information domain are the high-speed technical developments and the hard competition between security measures and cyber attack.

---

1 Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf is the Director of NATO's Communications Agency.

## WHERE DOES NATO CURRENTLY STAND ON ITS WAY INTO THE INFORMATION ERA?

At first glance, the situation is not so bad:

NATO has a communications network, which spans the static Headquarters structure as well as the current operational areas worldwide. There is a Consultation, Command and Control (C3) organisation in place, which manages requirements, developments, implementation and control of the physical dimension of information support.

Part of this is a developing capability in cyber defence. The Alliance has a published Vision and Concept for Network Enabled Capability (March 2006). There is a huge potential for synergy to be drawn from the experience and efforts of the 26 member-nations. (One of the reasons NATO is of high interest to the communications industry, despite its limited number of equipment). NATO has and sets standards as a prerequisite for interoperability and most importantly the Alliance has success in operations.

However, a second look from an insider's perspective reveals some serious weaknesses:

NATO lacks some of the necessary flexibility, speed, aggressiveness, resources and the appropriate level of common interest, which might endanger successful transition into the information era. This may sound a bit too harsh a criticism. It needs to be explained:

Although we have made considerable progress in speeding up the development and procurement process, in particular in the field of meeting urgent requirements of current operations, it has to be said that NATO's bureaucracy is still too slow in bringing operational speed and the necessary communication support fully in line.

The planning and decision making process is still very much geared to the procedures, which grew over decades of successful deterrence. This leads to procurement circles, which produce communications equipment designed up to ten years before introduction into service. This is one of the reasons why NATO's standard communications software is on the average two generations behind the actual versions.

Strict risk avoidance rather than risk management mainly drive NATO's information security regulations. In addition to that is the transition from the traditional "need to know" to the network enabling "need to share" culture severely hampered by the complicated structure of the information security community of the Alliance. This results in three or more physically separated communications networks: NATO Secret, NATO Restricted, NATO Unclassified and Mission secret for the integration of Non-NATO-Members into an operation —certainly not a suitable environment for efficient networking and collaboration in particular with industry and non-governmental organisations.

NATO's basic rule for providing resources is the minimum military requirement. This needs to be agreed unanimously by 26 nations all of which have their own understandable political and economical interests. This approach works reasonably well as long as the alliance is predominantly involved in peacekeeping and relatively low-intensity operations. However, we will face considerable difficulties in a high intensity environment if we plan only for the minimum instead of a robust support with sufficient reserves for the unpredictable.

A difference in the operational level of ambitions and the provision of the necessary resources was to a certain extent acceptable during the deterrence based Cold War but it cannot be afforded anymore if one strives for information superiority today and even more in the future.

An example of the deficiencies of the alliance is the manning situation within the NATO's communications support organisation. Based on the minimum military requirement commonly agreed by the nations in 2005 it should have about 3.700 personnel. About 1100 of them are not yet provided.

At this stage, I should avoid painting the situation too much in black and white. We have developed an interim solution for the communications support of NATO's response force, which was operational after less than one year. The Alliance is currently taking a second look into its level of ambition and new priorities in the communications support. A solution for the manning problems is currently under revision within the relevant committees in Brussels. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of room for improvement.

## WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

I have five suggestions to make:

- We need to strengthen the common interest of the Alliance and reduce the influence of national interests and agendas.
- We need to invest! Why not reverse the rule of minimum military requirement to an approval of a maximum operational requirement that incrementally can be adapted to the actual needs?
- We need to share! The technically most sophisticated communications system is not efficient if the users do not share all of the necessary information. This is in particular true in the fields of intelligence and cyber-defence. The latter is a good example for a chance for a new kind of partnership between military and industry. For the security of our networks, we all have to fight the same enemy. There is an opportunity for cooperation beyond commercial interest but of mutual benefits.
- We need to implement! The Alliance is always in danger of missing the point where concepts need to be translated into action. NATO's Network Enabled Capability may serve as an example. The Concept is developed, we should now utilise the NRF as a catalyst to realise practicable solutions, which drive the network development from the bottom up. Let's find for example for each rotation of the force technical solutions for the communication interfaces between NATO and national force contributions, which are still on a swivel-chair basis. This could be a common project for nations, industry and NATO.
- We need to reform the planning, development and procurement process of the Alliance. There must be a solution, which efficiently combines national interests, budget control and operational requirements. This is of particular relevance in the fields of information technology and communications support.

NATO has great potential to master the challenges of the information era. It just has to be utilised a bit more efficiently.

# Chapter 24

## Transitioning Into the Information Age

Mr. Robert Lentz[1]

This panel on the information age is a panel that grew out of a lot of discussions we have had over the years about how we in NATO, how we in the EU, we in general, are transitioning into the information age. This past January when we had an informal session that Roger asked to be put together in preparation for this Workshop, one of the key discussion topics was trying to actually establish a panel to concentrate on this subject of the information age and the impact on global security. And so that is why we have this panel on the agenda.

When we organized the panel, it reminded me since I come from the Department of Defense of a panel that we put together five years ago for the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld, where we brought in some of the leading industries within the United States who are heavily involved in transitioning into the information age. We brought some twelve different companies in, companies ranging from FEDEX, Boeing, AT&T, several from the automotive industry, and others together and had what started off to be only an hour discussion planned that was just going to be for the Secretary of Defense; it ended up being a four-hour-discussion in which the Secretary adjusted his plans and stayed for two of those four hours which, according to his staff, was unheard of. And then after about fifteen minutes into the initial discussion, Secretary Rumsfeld turned to his aide and said something; the next thing we know, the Deputy Secretary of Defense showed up, Secretary Wolfowitz, and then about three minutes later, each of the Service Secretaries showed up from the Army, Navy and Air Force, as well as the Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense; they all stayed for the next hour and a half.

The reason why that is important is because these industry leaders were very frank to the Secretary and his leadership that if you continue to stay in industrial age processes, you are going to find yourself not advancing at all, not achieving the transformation that his leadership team wanted to accomplish in their term. And he took that very seriously and I am convinced, even though I do not have direct evidence of this, that when Secretary Wolfowitz moved on to the World Bank, it was one of the key reasons why the Secretary of Defense chose Gordon England, who was from industry and with the reputation of being an information age catalyst, to replace him.

---

1 Mr. Robert Lentz is Director of Information Assurance in the Office of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration.

The other thing that has happened is that he has invoked a number of changes within the Department of Defense because of that. The most important is that he established a very prominent role of the Chief Information Officer which was one of the recommendations that was consistent along all these companies that you needed to have a catalyst, you needed to have a transformation agent and you needed to have someone well schooled in information technology if you are going to be successful. And you actually needed to have a "ruthless czar," a quote that was common in this discussion, leading your transformation. The Secretary nodded his head and he in fact has done just that. He has made the CIO for the Department, the Chief Information Officer, a member of his top leadership team, a group of twelve, we call that, with all the Under Secretaries.

So I make that as a prelude to this discussion because as I said, in past Workshops and then again in January, it was a consensus of many people that NATO in particular was not moving fast enough, was not agile enough to keep pace with technology and was not keeping pace with the kind of capabilities required to be able to meet this globalized force that we heard about today, that we have heard about from the Minister of Defense of Germany and General Jones etc. Some felt that significant transformation was needed or NATO would become increasingly ineffective and some actually went so far as to say, completely irrelevant. Many thought that the root cause was not adjusting to these information age changes and that we were constantly being stuck in the 20th century industrial age Cold War way of operating which is the concern that we had in DOD when we looked at our processes. I think that the example that General Jones used yesterday about the acquisition process and the fact that it takes three to four years to be able to respond to a commander's request, a plea for help, is indicative of the kind of transformation that any information age business or agency or government entity cannot afford not to have happen. And that is the concern that many had about NATO.

So often these discussions came around to the fact: let's ask some of our industry leaders to give us those experiences. That's what we have done today, Roger and I, in putting together this panel. It is a very esteemed panel, it is one that has the experiences of living in a world that is fully immersed in multiple communities of interest, dealing with customer sets that are very diverse, and used to dealing with information technology in their military or civilian experiences and to leverage that to the betterment of the commands that they have or the businesses that they run. So as we heard today and again yesterday, as NATO expands, moves from regional to global security, implements deployable headquarters, and tries to counter the asymmetric threat (as a security person, which is my main job, that is my number one concern) it is our adversaries, the terrorists, and others that are looking as we transition into the information age and they are going to go after the area that is easily exploitable. I think most people realize, just looking at your home computers and looking at your IT systems, that they can be easily exploited. So, if we are not prepared as we hook our forces together and begin to move into the information age for this asymmetric threat, we are going to be in trouble.

When I am asked the question about NATO and its maturity and net-centric operations, (I am often asked the question when I speak to groups about the Department of Defense and its maturity level in that area) my answer ranges between about a 2 and a 3 out of 10 for the Department of Defense. We have a long way to go and when you hear this group speak and groups like Microsoft and Northrop-Grumman who are implementing technology to its greatest extent, I think that the first question I would have is, if you have independent experts just spend one week at NATO and their operations and compare that to the modern industries that are out there today leveraging technology, I would be very surprised to see NATO at a maturity level very high, just like I do not think DOD is at a very high maturity level. So when I hear during this Workshop how NATO does not have the resources, NATO wants to become more globalized, NATO wants to collaborate with more and more different partners, wants to work with private organizations and stabilizing and working with NGOs etc., it is not going to be able to do that with

an archaic information technology capability. And, as Jonas Persson says, we are not going to be able to maximize the return on that limited investment that countries can bring to the table in the way NATO was organized today.

So, as we talk with great vision about how we want to move NATO forward, if we do not have that complemented with the kind of information age processes that we are talking about, we are not going to be successful. As Mr. Schneider talked about with identity management, how many people in NATO are using biometrics and using identity management in terms of its ability to leverage technology out in the field? And when General Wolf talks about four different networks for NATO, just imagine how expensive it is to establish a separate network for every different community of interest that you have to establish. Within DOD, we have many communities of interest, many different networks and it is exceedingly expensive to the way we operate and we have to change that in today's modern era. So that is the challenge that we have in the information age and, as I said, we are not going to realize that vision that this Workshop talked about quite a bit if we do not leverage the kind of insights that these panel members have brought forward.

# Chapter 25

## Challenges of Information Security

Mr. Robert Lentz[1]

Over the years we have engaged in many discussions regarding the new challenges facing global security for the coming decades. Last year, Admiral Di Paola, Chief of Defense of Italy, talked of the new challenges in a world of transformation; General Naumann, Chief of Defense of Germany, emphasized organizations in need of a fresh look; and, Dr. Wells, the U.S. Department of Defense CIO Department, emphasized the transition to net-centric operations. All these presentations and many others in past summits have a common thread that is, Are we positioning ourselves effectively for the future security environment? I would argue that we are confronting an information revolution in which we all are unprepared!

While the U.S. Department of Defense and many other military defense establishments are making significant progress towards leveraging emerging information-age technologies and grasping the vision of network centric information operations, a transformation of this scope offers innumerable challenges and opportunities. The reality is that inducing change in military and governmental establishments is slow, painful work. This probably explains why most "information age" experts feel we in the government are only now beginning to emerge from industrial age thinking.

Why is this important? Everyone appreciates the power of the Internet—how it makes the world smaller, more connected, more efficient. Experts agree that networked computers are our most powerful assets! As you know, within DoD, we call this the Global Information Grid (GIG). Other expert views:

- For Vint Cerf, father of the Internet, "the GIG will change the military the way the internet is changing business and culture."
- For Lockheed Martin's CEO, "the GIG will shape the 21st century operations in the way nuclear technology concluded WWII and controlled the Cold War."
- According to former Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. Hamre, "our unending appetite for information can only be realized by leveraging the power of the internet and fully implementing the GIG."

---

[1] Mr. Robert Lentz is Director of Information Assurance, Office of the United States Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration.

- And for Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, "the single most transforming event is not the weapons system but the GIG/Net-Centric Operations."

As the former CIO from AT&T has stated, on the most basic level, we all are witnessing radio, TV, movies, telephones, all converging to leverage the Internet. We are all going to operate in communities of interest that are wider and more powerful than we ever imagined. And we all are going to have to quickly adopt new technologies in "information age" speeds in months, not years, if we are going to be competitive and meet the demands of 21st century operations. Some examples are deploying a powerful Internet Sensing Grid for early warning and response to environmental disasters like this past year's earthquake in Pakistan or the 2004 tsunami. Other examples are sophisticated collaboration networks being deployed to detect the movement of potential terrorists; micro-sensors embedded in structures for real-time reconfigurations in the face of hurricanes, tornadoes or other catastrophes; and of course, the multitude of transformations underway in monitoring the power grid, roadways, and telecommunications networks in most cases belonging not just to governments but to global enterprises with no national boundaries.

On the negative side, the information age gives our adversaries a fertile footprint to operate to further their interests. Recreational hacking has become hacking for money. The FBI in the U.S. is getting more than one cyber extortion case every day. More than 100 organizations report cyber extortion. This epidemic originally started as a way for rival cyber gangs to take down chat rooms of their competitors. Now, for money, gangs will threaten to take down sites in time increments—15 minutes etc.—and will escalate as you bring in law enforcement. The Bali Bomber wrote in his autobiography that, "if hacking is successful, get ready to gain windfall income for just 3 to 6 hours of work, greater than the income that a policeman earns in 6 months of work. But, please do not do that for money alone. I want America and its cronies to be crushed in all aspects."

Here are some interesting trends by 2010:

- 1 cyber bug will hit the internet every 5 minutes.
- The number of security incidents will swell to 400,000 a year or 8,000 a week.
- An average PC will cost $99 and will contain 200 million LOC.
- Within those LOC there will be an estimated 2 million software bugs.
- The average software vulnerability that used to take months/weeks to be exploited by hackers is now taking days and very soon these groups will have Zero Day and sub-Zero Day capability to attack systems/networks before a vulnerability is known or published.

So as an information security leader, I am excited but deeply worried that we are not taking these future challenges as seriously as we need to in light of the asymmetric and unconventional threats facing us today and especially those on the horizon. From my vantage point, it is not just about technology. In fact, I would argue it is more about governance and leadership.

Traditionally, military organizations have focused primarily on delivering military mass and power into the battle space. This approach to military operations has been platform-based, but that is now changing in military organizations around the world as they move toward network-centric operations.

While the details of new network-centric operational concepts are being applied differently by nations, the new concepts are all underpinned by the common understanding of the changing and growing role that one critical factor will play in increasing military effectiveness: Information. The Chief Information Officer (CIO) has really become the center of gravity. In most military establishments this is not the case. They see the CIO as the IT operations focal point. In reality, the primary concern of the CIO in the future enterprise is as the visionary and strategic planner; the core technical competency is to

ensure the integrity of the information and availability of the infrastructure. In the information age that is a daunting challenge! Looking over the entire enterprise, they have to be certain there are no errors or losses of any of the data and of the information being served up to the users. Today this job is important; tomorrow it is a huge responsibility. The CIO is not only the technologist but also the knowledge leader and the information strategist.

The intelligent use of information across an organization and its partners affects and influences all aspects of that organization—from the front line to the back office, from equipment purchase to financial controls, including the organizations' relationships with its partners, whether they are commercial suppliers or other government organizations.

Most information age experts attest that the paradigm shift is more cultural then technical. A growing body of evidence shows that successful net-centric operations are about human and organizational behavior. This is not just for the private sector but government organizations as well. The purchase and deployment of net-ready capabilities will deliver little benefit if the processes and procedures that govern how they are used are left unchanged. Another key objective in achieving success will come from prioritizing and coordinating the myriad pieces that make up new initiatives. Success will be realized only if the approach and the changes it requires are embedded across the whole organization—in the way its people think, train, and act and in everything it does.

Within complex organizations like NATO this is a huge challenge!

So as an example, one of the CIO's core responsibilities is also the chief security officer! There is a completely new paradigm for running a business or government enterprise. In the face of asymmetric warfare and the reality that a successful information attack can paralyze an organization or bankrupt a business, this responsibility has become a core role.

Most, if not all, successful businesses today rely on the CIO. He sits at the right hand of the CEO. Within the U.S., good examples are Wal-Mart, FedEx, AT&T, and Southwest Airlines. For Wal-Mart, their CIO was an early pioneer in pushing radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, embracing it as a tool for reducing inefficiency and increasing productivity. Officials at the European Central Bank, for example, are working on a project to embed RFID tags into higher-denomination euro bills. And going hand in hand with these new technologies is security. The key attributes of all these successful enterprises are agility, adaptability, scalability, and interoperability.

Within DoD we have a three-prong CIO strategy: build, populate and protect. For the protect mission area, we have five strategic imperatives: empower the people, transform the processes, trust the info, secure the network, and effectively operate! What is important is not necessarily the specifics as much as having a strategic framework. The question is: Are all the institutions we rely upon for our safety and security, such as NATO, aggressively moving in this direction? Are we effectively balancing the key tenants of Net-Centric operations to transform the organization, culture and planning?

In reality, we are all in this together. We must develop a simple, open, flexible, and on-demand infrastructure to share security information and policies. We need a common, interoperable architecture. The wider we view the global network traffic the more proactive we become in responding to threats. The experience gained by the commercial industry during large-scale transformations can benefit the armed forces in their practical realization of network-centric operations.

# Chapter 26

## Network-Centric Transformation and Transatlantic Industrial Cooperation

Mr. Carl O. Johnson[1]

During the course of the workshop we heard Minister Jung speak about the joint responsibility and joint obligation of the Alliance and how the EU is faced with broader and longer obligations than it has faced in the past. He also spoke of the need for collaboration between civil and military forces and for the systematic development of capabilities. Slovenian Defense Minister Erjavec stated that new challenges require new capabilities and that duplication of effort should be avoided in developing them. General Jones spoke of the transformation of the NATO Response Force and how the NEC must be part of the transformation.

My remarks today focus on network-centric transformation and transatlantic industrial cooperation as the Atlantic Alliance and the EU extend their engagement to out-of-area operations—confronting new asymmetric threats and unanticipated challenges.

### THE REALITIES OF TRANSFORMATION AND COOPERATION

Two strategic realities confront us: First, while the European continent and the member-nations of the Alliance are prosperous and secure, our stability remains dangerously at risk. Terrorism, as well as weapons of mass destruction and the technology of failed states, all represent challenges that are considerably more complex than those of the past. We find ourselves in a period of increasing peril, facing a potential spectrum of crisis and conflict from that of high-intensity conventional warfare on the Korean peninsula to the specter of military hegemony in East Asia to a nuclear Middle East and the ongoing threat of global terrorism. The second reality is that meeting these common challenges requires new ways of cooperation, new strategies, and new capabilities.

Both the United States and the Alliance are in the midst of a complex transformation to provide forces that are light, mobile, rapidly deployable over long distances, and sustainable for as long as needed—in other words, forces able to carry out the full spectrum of Alliance missions. Alongside this

[1] Mr. Carl O. Johnson is President, Northrop Grumman International Inc.

fundamental shift, the transatlantic defense industry is strengthening its efforts in reconnaissance, surveillance, and network-centric operations.

## PROVIDING THE INFORMATION-TECHNOLOGY EDGE

Today in Afghanistan and Iraq, brave men and women of many Alliance nations and their coalition partners are putting their lives at risk. As an executive of a U.S. defense industry, I feel a strong sense of purpose in bringing our technological ingenuity and know-how to bear in order to help them. Technology will never be the complete answer to asymmetric threats, but it will certainly be a large part of the solution. In battle, gaining superior knowledge, or situational awareness, can be the key to victory.

In the past, the controlling reality of war was uncertainty. The fog of war meant that commanders were often unsure of the exact location of their own forces or of adjacent friendly forces, to say nothing of the enemy. In operation Iraqi Freedom, much of that changed. The war has been called the first network-centric war, with information technology linking existing assets to enable fast-paced joint integrated operations. Carried aloft on manned and unmanned airplanes and satellites, increasingly sophisticated sensors monitor movement on the ground day or night, in all kinds of weather. As a result, the fog of war has been lifted, revealing an electronically described landscape that gives commanders a highly detailed picture of the battlefield in near real time. Information is a decisive force multiplier. And it is not simply commanders who have gotten close to real-time information. In many instances so has the soldier or marine in the field, whose armored vehicle, truck, or Humvee was outfitted with satellite antennas and laptop computers netted together in a wireless web.

This ability to gather, manage, assimilate, and act on huge amounts of information can help reverse the information asymmetries that terrorists exploit. It can also provide the technological edge needed to make up for the shortfall in the ends-means relationship for future NATO out-of-area deployments. Ultimately, putting the advantage of network-centric systems directly in the hands of individual soldiers, linking them together, will enable the Alliance to do what we are all asked to do these days: more with less.

As has been stated here at the workshop, neither North America nor Europe can afford duplication of capabilities. All of our budgets are pressed to sustain legacy systems that are not relevant to the current threat and that compete for funding with critical technologies needed for the battlefields of the future. In addition, we cannot afford to reinvent technological solutions that already exist. Instead, we need to leverage and take advantage of the strengths and the investment already available among us.

Today, the transatlantic defense industry is better linked and stronger than ever. Trusting relationships have been developed based on our common values. Witness the growth of BAE in the United States, with its recent acquisition of UDLP; the selection of an AgustaWestland helicopter as the replacement for the U.S. Presidential helicopter; the limited partnership between Northrop Grumman and EADS for EuroHawk; and the phenomenal strides EADS North America has taken competing strongly for U.S. Army and Air Force contracts, including the new USAF tanker replacement program. And, of course there is the AGS industry team working together to provide critically needed transformational capabilities.

It is clear that better transatlantic defense industry relations are benefiting both U.S. and EU defense companies. We have found new partners that enable us to be more competitive in our own domestic markets.

What commanders and their soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines need most today is information and the tools to act on it, enabling them to see first, decide first, and act first. Today's young people in uniform tend to be technologically sophisticated and are used to finding the information they want. Our task is to provide them with the means to acquire and act on the information they need. This implies complicated

issues of connectivity, the availability and reliability of capability, and providing information assurance to make the information immediately useful to the commander and the soldier. This means running the gamut of feeding the entire common operational picture at the strategic and operational level as well as the relevant area to the lowest tactical level. Both are national and Alliance problems, and as we address them we must bear in mind that we must break down the firewalls that inhibit our ability to work together.

## ADDRESSING CHALLENGES AND FINDING SOLUTIONS

For the transatlantic defense industry this poses both challenges and opportunity. The technology challenge is exciting: How do we design the applications, standards, transport mechanisms, and network enterprise services that provide a fully mobile network? How do we make the network interoperable with related systems? The business challenge is equally exciting: How can we adapt current commercial technology? Where are the margins for R&D investment beyond existing "off the shelf" technology? How can we better partner with you?

I can assure you that my colleagues in industry and government on both sides of the Atlantic are wrestling with these challenges every day and working hard to forge their solutions. So my message to you today is that industry is ready: ready with mature technologies, ready with cost-effective solutions, and ready to cooperate fully to satisfy national, NATO, and EU needs for modern defense systems capable of meeting present and future threats to our security and stability.

# Chapter 27

## Moving from Interoperable to Integrated Systems

Mr. Kent Schneider[1]

From the beginning of this workshop, starting with Minister Jung, we have heard that the threat has changed, the mission has changed, and the diversity of the mission has changed and that all of those changes require more rapid and agile decision making. I realize that the vast majority of the people at this workshop are not information-technology professionals but they are information-technology users, so they must recognize that you cannot make effective decisions if you do not have the information that you require to make them. They also must understand that when you try to make decisions within a complex enterprise framework such as NATO or the European Union, you have to be able to share information effectively across the entire enterprise.

### THE INCREASED COMPLEXITY OF INFORMATION SHARING

General Wolf talked about the dichotomy between national interests and the enterprise requirements of NATO and the European Union and how it can inhibit moving forward with information technology. We also heard several times that, in addition to needing more rapid decision making, we have a more complex set of players and that the new focus on counterterrorism has caused an increase in the number of players who need to share information and make decisions. The conventional defense community of course is still a player but so are police organizations and state and local organizations. That makes information sharing even more complex because those additional people typically do not share the networks and systems that the conventional defense players play in.

The good news is that information systems are evolving to support this new set of demands. We are seeing more distributed systems with the ability to share information and still retain control over sensitive data. But coordinated effort on the part of NATO is essential for implementing these new capabilities. NATO member-nations certainly are investing in modernization and replacement of information infrastructure and systems as they must, but in these days of constrained budgets we want to be sure that those

---

1 Mr. Kent Schneider is President, Defense Group, Northrop Grumman Information Technology.

investments are as effective as possible in supporting both the state and the Alliance. That, unfortunately, does not always happen.

## INTEGRATING STATE AND ALLIANCE INFORMATION NEEDS

Admiral Ed Giambastiani, the past commander of NATO ACT, repeatedly reminded us that NATO needs to shift emphasis from interoperability to integration. Why? Because interoperability brings us to the lowest common denominator, the ability to move information from one system to another rather than to share information as it is stored. It is also because interoperability is very expensive: If you are developing national systems and then go back and spend money to make them interoperable you invest twice in the same solution. The need to shift our focus to integration is becoming even more important as technology shifts to promote enhanced collaboration and information sharing in a global environment and as defined network boundaries begin to disappear.

The investment in new technologies does not mean that NATO member-nations have to give up unique functional content or control of sensitive national data. It does mean that common standards, governance rules, and consistent implementation of core technologies that enable collaboration and information sharing must be agreed upon. To go back to General Jones' comments in response to Lin Wells' question about who is responsible for the decision making in this area, his answer was clear: that it is the people at this workshop and the other decision makers within NATO and the European Union who need to make the decisions on governance rules and how information is going to be shared. This, as SACEUR agreed, is the appropriate role for the decision makers.

Let me give you one example of a technology that is growing in importance and being modernized and replaced throughout Europe today but not in a very efficient way. That technology has to do with identity management and the associated establishment of access to the most broad-based information sharing. Virtually every nation in NATO is engaged in developing, improving, or standardizing national-level identity management systems. But, in fact, many countries within NATO are developing multiple systems that are not even compatible within their own nation. The national health system, for example, may be generating an identity management system to ensure that health services are delivered to only the most appropriate people. At the same time, the passport service may be generating an identity management system to ensure greater control at the border. But the two systems may not be compatible within the home country and I can tell you for a fact that they are not compatible across the NATO nations. The result is that there are islands of networks that can share information only at points of interface and that is going to be a large inhibitor to wide-scale information sharing.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Standard business rules in governance need to be consistent across NATO. Industry stands ready to work with NATO to move toward common standards and governance, but, as I said earlier, the people at this workshop and the other decision makers in NATO need to establish the information sharing policies and communicate them to industry and allow us to work with you to help move in that direction. As General Wolf mentioned, you need to be able to reconcile your national interest with the Alliance interest in developing integrated systems if you are to optimize your decision making process.

# Chapter 28

## Information Technology: Trends, Opportunities and Challenges

Mr. Jonas Persson[1]

I am going to speak about trends, possibilities, and challenges related to information technology, both now and in the future. I am also going to tell you about how a global security incident changed the way my company thinks about architecture, organization, and strategy.

### OPENING REMARKS

Let me first set the stage by describing the current situation in the IT products mass market. The pace of innovation for IT technologies has been amazing the last couple of years, although I am aware this is not true for every country on earth. It is clear that Internet-connected software is starting to play a bigger and bigger role—for example, the next-generation telecommunications networks, the so-called 3D and 4D networks—are very much about software and not so much about hardware. In addition, traditional industries such as mining see a growing opportunity to compete using software.

Modern software and systems allow us to communicate, search for information, and make informed decisions in a way that previously was completely impossible. The amount of information collected about customers, competitors, and markets is unprecedented. Today, we communicate and collaborate instantly with colleagues, customers, and partners around the world, and global supply chains speed the flow of products from factory floor to store shelf. Cell phones are ubiquitous, mobile access to email is rapidly becoming the norm. In Sweden, where I live, the mobile phone penetration is higher than two, which means that most people have more than two devices. The vast majority of these devices connect to email, business applications, and sensitive corporate data, which is both good and bad.

### THE EFFECTS AND REACH OF TECHNOLOGY

The impact of IT on the work force is remarkable. Sellers now have access to markets that were once beyond reach. Productivity is higher than it has ever been and buyers can shop the entire world without leaving their desk. I sold a home kitchen appliance over the Internet a couple of days ago in about four

[1] Mr. Jonas Persson is Chief Technology Officer of Microsoft EMEA (Europe, Middle-East, Africa).

hours. From my desk outside Stockholm I can make a high-quality phone call to my friend in Japan without it costing me anything, just a fixed fee of about 20 euros a month, and we can talk the whole night. I can share documents, pictures, videos, any type of information. Except for being able to shake hands and physically exchange things I can share just about anything with my friend in real time across the globe. There is no limit to what I can do collaboratively with him and the cost is virtually zero.

The same should be possible for our defense forces. My son, who is eight, checks every morning when he gets up, through the web camera installed at his school, to learn if friends arrived there early or if the condition of the soccer field is okay. He can be alerted if the temperature of the aquarium at his school, part of a science experiment, has gone below a certain level. He is connected at no cost to sensors at his school that tell him about certain things that are happening. He can also search for information on the Internet, read, and create applications that run freely. All of this is possible using commercially available software that anyone can buy and use.

Although I am the CTO of Microsoft, I have no idea what my son will be able to do in a few years. I just know that I will have to be ready for all the good things that he will do with this technology and make sure that he does not do any bad things!

When my son gets his first job, he will have high expectations of the tools he will be provided with. In the same way, the new generation of commanders will have high expectations of the information technologies they will be working with to achieve their objectives. The challenge here, though, is that access to the net and the virtually unlimited possibilities to collect and act on information and use technologies are also available to the wrong people. If my eight-year old son knew how to do it, he could design applications and scenarios from his desk, never leaving the room, never giving his name, never needing a dollar, never needing a driver's license, and have the potential to create havoc among millions of people. The opportunities but also the challenges are tremendous.

## USING TECHNOLOGY TO SUPPORT, NOT TO LEAD

I would like to spend the remainder of this short talk telling you what happened a few years ago with the virus called Slammer and how it impacted our company. The vulnerability to the virus was discovered in a piece of software in a patch that was issued to solve a problem. Organizations around the world had been informed about this problem and the solution was available, so everything seemed fine. But we discovered in early 2003 through our early warning systems that problems were beginning to be exploited. Based on that information we rallied our organization and issued communications to customers around the world about how to protect their computers. But Slammer was the fastest virus ever created. It doubled in size every 8.5 seconds across the world. Within 10 minutes of the time it began to infect hosts, around 5:30 on Saturday, January 25, 2003, it infected more than 90% of the vulnerable computers. It traveled from the U.S. to Australia to Sweden in less than two minutes. It was like somebody was running around the world with a bomb and managed to deploy it worldwide. Slammer eventually infected more than 75.000 computers, flooded networks all over the world, caused destruction to financial institutions, and even disturbed a country's elections.

I do not believe we will see the same thing again. I believe that these kinds of attacks will be much more focused, much more vertical, and much more targeted. But they will continue. While we will not see Slammer again, we hope, the challenge has not gone away.

We did learn a lot from this experience, however, about where we had to improve as a company. We also learned that issues such as these should no longer be handled by technical people but by the top leadership. It also became clear that while the solution for the problem existed before Slammer hit the world, a number of organizations were not ready to act on that new type of threat. Processes were not in place,

governance models were lacking, and senior leadership teams were not engaged until it was too late—responsibility was delegated to technical people.

But technology is not the solution to everything. Technology must not lead us; we must lead and have technology support us. My company came out of the Slammer crisis looking at the design of our organization and how we design our systems and we began designing them around core capabilities in our organization. By mapping capabilities and then processes and not vice versa, we found we could quickly respond to fast-moving threats and opportunities. Acquisition is much easier if an infrastructure is agile and design is based on the organization's capabilities, not its processes. So industry and government must work together to seize opportunities that IT gives us but also help each other become more agile so that we can respond to the unforeseen.

I am from a small country, Sweden, and although I am not a spokesperson for the government I do think that the Swedish defense forces and police have managed to utilize state-of-the-art IT for greater impact and to scale our scarce resources in an economically good way. We have little money and we have few people, so we must make our resources effective and scalable. All of Swedish military operations are international, but it is imperative that our systems become integrated or interoperable so that we can effectively work together. This is one of the most important areas in which industry and government can work together to ensure not only integration but independence and innovation in each country.

# Part Five

# Chapter 29

## Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Our Obligation To Future Generations

Under-Secretary-General Nobuaki Tanaka[1]
United Nations

### OPENING REMARKS

I would like to focus on one of the most pressing issues of today, that is, nuclear non-proliferation. I believe this issue will have a strong impact on the next generation and what we do about it now will truly determine the future.

Let us first look back. At two major international meetings in 2005, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference and the World Summit at the U.N., agreement was not reached on the twin issues of disarmament and non-proliferation. In addition, efforts even to begin negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) have been hopelessly deadlocked. For almost a decade, ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been stalled and the treaty is unlikely to come into force any time in the immediate future. Taken together with the ongoing and highly publicized Iranian issue in the U.N. Security Council and the apparent lack of progress on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, it is commonplace to argue that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime is in crisis.

### FACTORS THAT AFFECT NON-PROLIFERATION

It is worth recalling that the change in international mood and outlook has been very rapid. The optimism and expectations that followed the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and the Final Document adopted at the 2000 Review Conference have now almost entirely dissipated. The direction of factors outside the treaty may have influenced this change, but just which developments over the last 10 years have brought about such a radical shift in thinking? A short list of external factors would have to include the following as the most salient examples of the fracturing of the non-proliferation landscape: First, in the Korean peninsula, North Korea (DPRK) was caught pursuing a clandestine enrichment pro-

[1] Ambassador Nobuaki Tanaka is the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs.

gram and responded to international pressure by restarting its plutonium production facilities, expelling IAEA inspectors, and withdrawing from the NPT, claiming possession of a nuclear bomb.

Second, Iran acknowledged that it has developed a uranium enrichment program, ostensibly for civilian purposes, but the country is strongly suspected of having nuclear weapon breakout capability.

Third, nuclear tests by Pakistan and India in 1998 shook the entire NPT architecture. Together with Israel, the two countries continue to this day to stand outside the regime, and their adherence to the NPT remains a distant aspiration, a prospect made even more distant by the long-term ramifications of the proposed U.S./India nuclear deal. This could also have significant repercussions on the thinking of some countries that have thus far agreed to be bound by the bargain at the heart of the NPT itself, which is that in order to obtain benefit, you have to give up nuclear weapons.

Fourth, a clandestine supply network was uncovered that is known to have provided sensitive enrichment technology to the DPRK, Libya, and Iran, substantially assisting their nuclear ambitions. The globalization of the flows of knowledge, goods, and people has advanced so much that the control of such flows seems almost impossible.

Fifth, a new post-September 11 threat has emerged posed by non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations and criminal groups, potentially taking the form of nuclear terrorism. This highlights the awful possibility of nuclear terrorism, which benefits from ease of access to information via the Internet. It has also caused the great expansion of monitoring of nuclear materials lest those materials be used in radioactive dispersal devices, so-called dirty bombs.

Sixth but most important, the stakeholders of the NPT regime, the five nuclear powers, have failed to meet their disarmament obligations. This is evident and resented, particularly at the United Nations, where there is wide representation of countries that have foresworn the most significant option of acquiring nuclear weapons and accepted the discriminatory system in return for the higher moral values of nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Seventh, on top of all this, we have witnessed an increasing tendency toward so-called unilateralism, which averts time-consuming consensus building in this very diverse community of nations. This has alienated smaller nations and put them on the defensive more than necessary, fueling resentment and confrontation.

## THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-PROLIFERATION

But what overarching trend can be detected from these apparently disparate but inextricably linked issues? There are two ways to interpret the current state of nuclear non-proliferation:

The first, perhaps more reassuring, trend is that proliferation remains associated with a small group of countries such as Iran and North Korea and that the political and technical factors supporting the nuclear non-proliferation regime remain valid for the majority of NPT state parties.

Another viewpoint is that we are in fact entering a new era of nuclear proliferation and that a wave of explosive proliferation may be about to take place. Some go so far as to argue that this could extend beyond the acquisition of nuclear capabilities and bring pressure to bear on other WMD treaties covering biological and even chemical weapons.

The two interpretations are of course not mutually exclusive, but whichever is correct, it is clear that an important threshold has been crossed in the evolution of nuclear proliferation. The proof of this was the black market supply network that developed during the 1990s, which I believe emphasizes both the seriousness of the current situation and the high price of failure if the international community does not act successfully in its handling of both Iran and North Korea and in stemming the activities of the network, with its possibilities for nuclear terrorism.

A few other factors further complicate this picture because they contribute to the difficulty of resolving the non-proliferation conundrum:

We all know that the war against terrorism has become a priority item, threatening the security of even nuclear weapon states. These states, however, have not only privileges but obligations for disarmament. If they tend to forget this "noblesse oblige," then we will continue to see revolts, if not revolution, in the world.

There is also a paradox. The nuclear weapon states perceive the nuclear deterrent as the most important element of their security. Why should others not wish to emulate them? At the same time, nuclear weapons are increasingly seen as the only possible means of standing up to the superpower or actively opposing its policy objectives. From this tension stems a great deal of the current international instability.

What is to be feared is not so much the imminent collapse of the non-proliferation regime but rather a wider and more gradual erosion of its strength, which will happen unless the entire international society resolutely takes remedial measures. Of course, if there were to be a second withdrawal, for example, by Iran—and such threats have certainly been made by them in recent weeks—then many believe there is a good chance that by 2015 we might have no fewer that 10 new nuclear or quasi-nuclear nations. This would most definitely be a profound crisis of multilateral diplomacy. But reports of the NPT's demise are premature: the treaty continues to command wider adherence than any other arms control treaty of its kind because the nations believe that, after all, there is no other alternative than NPT.

## NECESSARY STEPS TO SUPPORT NON-PROLIFERATION

We should not be complacent. There is an urgent need to take more drastic steps and demonstrate the political will to restore the credibility of the treaty, especially as there is widespread international concern about an imminent proliferation risk. Although the world leaders failed to address the serious concerns about nuclear proliferation at the September 2005 World Summit, I strongly believe that there is an urgent need to address the following issues:

- Reaffirmation of the commitment to nuclear disarmament under Article 6 of the NPT and to demonstrable steps in that direction.
- A commitment to upholding the moratorium on nuclear test explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, whose universality we should vigorously pursue.
- Agreement to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and to bring them to an early conclusion. The U.S. just made a new proposal for an FMCT, which is a welcome sign that the U.S. will remain multilateral, but the U.S. has also warned that if the proposal is not accepted, it will withdraw from the Conference on Disarmament. I earnestly hope this will reactivate the debate in this forum, leading to a successful package.
- Adoption of the Additional Protocol as the global standard for verifying compliance with the NPT. Perhaps this is the single most important means for restoring the credibility of the regime of non-proliferation.
- Exploration of multilateral options for improved controls over the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle consistent with the NPT principles of the right to peaceful uses and the obligations for non-proliferation.
- Because the two most salient long-term challenges are North Korea and Iran, it is of the utmost importance to lend full support to the respective diplomatic initiatives that are aiming to resolve both crises. In both cases, time is a crucial issue because a delay in agreements may mean an advance in acquiring technology and its products.

- Strengthening of the measures to curb proliferation of WMD. In this sense, full implementation of the work led by the 1540 Committee on the Non-Proliferation of WMD is important. Many measures remain to be taken to establish domestic laws and regulations to criminalize activities concerning the proliferation of WMD by non-state actors and to establish and tighten export and border controls. In addition, the Proliferation Security Initiative and export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which play an important role, should also be strengthened.
- IAEA remains the preeminent forum for discussion and investigation of NPT implementation. The agency's proposal on multilateral nuclear approaches to controlling proliferation of sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle while preserving assurances of supply and services for peaceful nuclear energy exploitation would serve as a useful basis for discussion. The link between IAEA and the Security Council should be strengthened. There should not be any hesitation in bringing matters of nuclear proliferation to the attention of the Security Council.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

I believe it is important to draw the correct lessons from the setbacks suffered in nuclear non-proliferation thus far. We should uphold the NPT regime. We should not undermine the treaty principles, which would be tantamount to opening Pandora's box. Nevertheless, I must stress that the essential bargain of the NPT is under increasing strain and that the nuclear weapon states in particular ignore it at their peril, with consequences for long-term global security.

The current political climate for strengthening the regime is not necessarily a receptive one. However, moments of deep crisis in international relations are also moments of great opportunity. In a major disarmament speech in Tokyo on May 18, the Secretary General said the following: "We owe it to future generations to breathe new life into all the forums dealing with disarmament and non-proliferation. No one wants to live in a world of permanent and fearful instability where nuclear weapons are the commonplace currency of international relations. Alternative paths that can bring peace, stability, and prosperity are within our reach. All members of the international community must show the necessary spirit of compromise and imagination to grasp those solutions before it is too late."

# Chapter 30

## Proliferation Risks and Challenges

Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins[1]

### OPENING REMARKS

On behalf of Dr. Dale Klein, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense who oversees the full range of U.S. Department of Defense efforts to reduce threats from weapons of mass destruction, I am honored to participate in this 23rd International Workshop on Global Security. I am also honored to lead off the panel focused on the emerging risks of nuclear, chemical, and biological proliferation. I will talk about the risks of, and responses to, proliferation—risks that have become well known through recent headlines, such as those referring to Dr. Khan's admissions, the current situation in Iran, and the increase in the number of nations attempting to acquire nuclear weapons.

As a result of all of these dangers, and the potential threats from those who would do us harm, countering the threats of weapons of mass destruction has become an urgent international priority. As Dr. James Schlesinger, U. S. Secretary of Defense under Presidents Carter and Ford and the first U.S. Secretary of Energy, said at the end of the Cold War, "Terrorism just made a big rise."

The world has become a much different, much more dangerous place than many people envisioned at the time those words were said. As President Bush has stressed, the threat of a terrorist organization obtaining and employing weapons of mass destruction is real and poses a danger to free nations across the globe. Whether motivated by religious fanaticism, political idealism, or other reasons, the quest for WMD by terrorists is well known. Threats against our national economies, to international trade, and to the environment are now commonplace. Even basic individual freedoms are at risk from those who would terrorize our countrymen in order to achieve their own objectives.

My talk will focus on three imperatives for controlling risks: controlling nuclear proliferation; controlling WMD materials; and developing and sustaining strong international partnerships.

---

[1] Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins is Principal Deputy to the Assistant to the U.S. Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.

## CONTROLLING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Meeting today's nuclear proliferation challenges and preventing nuclear proliferation is fundamentally important to international safety and security. It is also a basic precondition for the use of nuclear power in the 21st century. In this environment, two challenges stand out:

1. Terrorist seizure of nuclear materials or nuclear weapons
2. Rogue states seeking nuclear weapons

For its part, Al-Qaeda has made clear its intent to obtain nuclear weapons and materials. Prudent people must assume that Al-Qaeda or any terrorist organization will use weapons and materials they acquire and therefore we must act to prevent these organizations from obtaining them.

Action must also be taken to block rogue states from acquiring nuclear weapons and materials. Iran's recent actions certainly have raised concerns about the effectiveness of nuclear nonproliferation safeguards. They also highlight the security challenges that must be met as more nations turn to nuclear energy to meet their energy needs.

A lesson from history is instructive. More than 60 years ago, President Eisenhower, in his "Atoms for Peace" address, called on the nations of the world to tap the power of the atom for peaceful purposes. Inspired by this vision, the United States led the way in encouraging the peaceful uses of nuclear energy—training other countries' scientists and engineers, transferring nuclear technology and materials, and supporting new international institutions and instruments such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to deal with the proliferation risks of peaceful nuclear cooperation.

In the decades that followed, many countries began to explore and exploit those peaceful uses of nuclear energy, from medicine to power generation. However, some countries chose to use their newly found nuclear knowledge to seek and develop nuclear weapons. There was only limited resistance to proliferation of technologies and concepts derived from the nuclear weapons program. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was created to prevent the misuse of peaceful nuclear cooperation, may have provided a cover under which rogue states could move ever closer to developing nuclear weapons while claiming an interest only in nuclear power.

A readiness to stand behind the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency is especially important for the peaceful future uses of nuclear energy around the globe. If a rogue state can use the cover of membership in the NPT with impunity to acquire nuclear understanding to use in nuclear weapons, the confidence needed for global use of nuclear power will be gravely damaged.

The task we now confront, as President Bush has stated, is to find a safe and orderly system through which nuclear power can be used to help meet growing energy demands without adding to proliferation dangers. To implement that vision, the United States has proposed a new Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). This initiative sets out a strategy to increase U.S. and global energy security while reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation.

At the heart of this new strategy is the partnership between nuclear fuel-supplying nations and nuclear energy-using nations. Nations with secure, advanced nuclear capabilities would provide fresh nuclear fuel to and recover used fuel from nations that would agree to employ nuclear energy only for the purpose of generating nuclear power. These user nations would also agree to refrain from developing uranium enrichment and plutonium recycling technologies. The initiative would also work toward developing enhanced nuclear safeguards that could be built in to a new generation of advanced nuclear energy facilities.

The GNEP is one method that, if properly implemented and monitored, could successfully straddle the gap between the growing need for energy and the need to prevent nuclear proliferation. There are also other actions and technologies that could meet today's proliferation prevention challenges, including a more proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycle and transparency and confidence-building measures.

## CONTROLLING WMD MATERIALS

My second imperative for controlling risks is one of the most vital steps in combating the WMD threat and ensuring the physical security, safety, and control of WMD-related materials throughout the world.

The United States' Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) is a centerpiece of U.S. efforts to combat the WMD threat. The program's ability to effect cooperative dismantling of WMD production facilities and stockpiles, increase transparency, and encourage higher standards of conduct represents a most effective and efficient means of proliferation prevention.

Under the CTR Program, the U.S. Department of Defense works with Russia and several other former Soviet states to enhance nuclear, chemical, and biological security. Cooperative efforts are proceeding to:

- Dismantle former Soviet weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure
- Consolidate and secure weapons of mass destruction and related technology and materials within the former Soviet Union
- Increase transparency and encourage high standards of conduct
- Support defense and military cooperation with the objective of preventing proliferation

In parallel with the CTR Program the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration is participating in a number of nuclear security cooperation programs with Russia.

One important part of the CTR Program is helping Russia and other former Soviet Union countries to secure, dismantle, and destroy nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems. The results of this work have been dramatic, from the deactivation of many thousands of nuclear warheads to the destruction or elimination of thousands of missiles, silos, bombers, and nuclear submarines. Because of this work, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are now nuclear weapons free.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program also works to bring about chemical weapons destruction in five different ways:

1. We provide the technology to eliminate chemical weapons. In Russia we designed, constructed, and equipped a chemical analytical laboratory to assist with procedures at destruction and storage facilities.

2. We provide physical security for current stockpiles. In Russia we have done this in Planovy and Kizner.

3. We demilitarize old production or research facilities. We have already completed our work at Nukus, Uzbekistan, and Volgograd in Russia and will soon complete work at a third site.

4. We work with international partners to assist Russia in building a large, complex Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility near the town of Shchuch'ye. The U.S. has already contracted $876 million for the effort, the largest of the CTR projects, and will contribute a total of more than $1 billion. We work on this project in partnership with the United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, Czech Republic, the European Union, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland.

5. We assist Albania with the destruction of discovered chemical agents in a safe, secure, and environmentally responsible manner.

CTR also has biological threat-reduction programs in Uzbekistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia. Efforts include security systems for facilities that conduct research with especially dangerous pathogens, research to gain knowledge about endemic diseases, and training for former weapons scientists. The program also includes:

- Pathogen consolidation efforts that reduce the number of storage locations
- Bio-security and bio-safety upgrades at existing institutes to prevent terrorists from obtaining pathogens and enhance safety; we are also helping to tear down legacy facilities that are no longer needed
- New facilities for the storage and diagnosis of human and animal diseases; new facilities, plus equipment and training, allow recipient countries to diagnose, prevent, or contain diseases that could be part of a public health outbreak or a bio-terrorism event

Other cooperative programs with Russia help counter the WMD threat by enhancing the security, safety, and control of Russian nuclear weapons during shipment and while in storage. Working with our Russian counterparts, the United States has provided a wide range of services that include:

- The design, construction, and equipping of perimeter security systems for nuclear weapons storage sites
- Support for automated inventory control and management systems
- Specialized equipment, training, and logistics support to improve guard force capabilities at Russian nuclear weapons storage areas
- Special rail cars, security systems, and containers to support the Russian Ministry of Defense in shipping nuclear warheads to dismantling locations or to more secure storage sites
- A state-of-the-art storage facility for securing weapons-grade nuclear material removed from Russian nuclear weapons

In addition, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration participates in many cooperative programs to help enhance the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials storage sites in Russia.

## SUSTAINING INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

Clearly, combating the proliferation of WMD requires international community collaboration, my third imperative.

Under the WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative, or WMD-PPI, the U. S. Department of Defense is working to address potential vulnerabilities of the borders of former Soviet Union states other than Russia. WMD-PPI complements the CTR Program's traditional focus, "WMD at Its Source," with the focus "WMD on the Move." Currently, the WMD-PPI is working in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan to develop and sustain capabilities to prevent the proliferation of WMD-related materials, components, and technologies across state borders and in Black and Caspian Sea shipping lanes. It is being coordinated with Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense Program, which works with other countries to help them equip their border crossings, airports, and seaports with radiation detection devices.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is another element of our "defense in depth" against the proliferation of nuclear and other WMD-related materials and delivery means. The goal of this initiative is to enhance and expand our efforts to prevent the flow of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials on the ground, in the air, and at sea, to and from rogue states and terrorists.

Since the launch of PSI, in Krakow, Poland, the number of countries supporting its activities has grown from 11 to over 60. PSI partners have built a record of success by stopping the transnational shipment of WMD-related materials, prosecuting proliferation networks, and shutting down "front companies" trafficking in WMD and dual-use materials. PSI's effectiveness is enabled by participant nations agreeing to interdiction principles, giving the program the ability to act as well as to serve as a model for future diplomacy and partnership initiatives. The dramatic October 2003 interdiction of a shipment of uranium enrichment centrifuge parts to Libya under PSI cooperation directly contributed to Libya's decision to acknowledge and stop its WMD activities.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents real and growing risks to the interests of free people around the world. Challenges are so vast and so diverse that no single nation can anticipate and deal with all the potential threats alone. Three imperatives—controlling nuclear proliferation, controlling WMD materials, and sustaining strong international partnerships—are fundamentally important to successfully addressing proliferation risks.

# Chapter 31

## The Emerging Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Threats

Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter[1]

There is no doubt in my mind that the greatest emerging threat is that of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and although I am director general of an organization dedicated to one particular category of these weapons, I hope I will be forgiven if I deal with three of them: nuclear, chemical, and biological.

### THE THREAT AND STATUS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

In the case of nuclear weapons, it is very important to realize that not only are we talking about something with devastating power but that the main actors of concern for using them are not only terrorists but above all states. That is because a nuclear program of any credibility can only be carried out by states. Therefore we have to look at states in order to detect the reasons for the malaise that affects them as well as the way forward.

There is no doubt that the nuclear scene is in major crisis. This is the result of the challenges posed by certain states but also from situations that existed previously. First of all, it is quite clear that the system of safeguards for the NPT as applied by the IAEA has been insufficient at least in its traditional form. It has not been able to prevent some states from developing secret programs that are contrary to the purposes of the NPT. The additional protocol was concluded but is not yet in effect for many relevant States.

Second, it is quite clear that not all member-states of the NPT can comply with the treaty in the way it was envisaged originally. Third, nuclear powers have emerged from outside the NPT. All of these things have created a situation in which some countries felt that they could abandon the NPT or challenge the system of safeguards and carry on programs lacking in transparency. Therefore we need to act decisively to change this situation, because the threat posed by the further proliferation of nuclear weapons creates a great danger for civilization as a whole.

How should we react? First and foremost, we need to give diplomacy a chance. But diplomacy means not only the NPT but the United Nations Charter. The U.N. Charter contemplates a series of measures

[1] Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter is Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

that are available to member-states in their different organizations. All of them should be explored and exploited to the maximum to make sure that we do not allow proliferation to go unchecked. It is also crucial that states that possess weapons of mass destruction behave in a responsible fashion and not act as a source of proliferation or transmit know-how to others. This, I think, is indispensable.

It is also important that agreements that serve the specific needs of particular states be arrived at. I was very much involved in an agreement between my own country of origin, Argentina, and our neighbor Brazil. Amongst ourselves we were able to work out a treaty that has served our needs very well. When one looks at the very good political relationships that prevail today in the southern cone of South America, one can see that nuclear agreements are at the core of it because it is crucial to build confidence if countries' relationships are going to progress.

We need relationships to progress. We also need countries that possess large stockpiles of nuclear weapons to continue to reduce those stockpiles. When we preach nonproliferation, it is important that we also demonstrate it and show our commitment to it—the continuum requires concrete action by the powerful and the not so powerful.

However, it is quite clear that the big nuclear powers have not yet destroyed their stockpiles, something that can serve as an excuse for other countries to become nuclear. I believe it is of the highest priority to act decisively against continued proliferation and we must do it by balancing our act against something that is very important to all nations. All nations are equal and of course appreciate the right of development. So the challenge is to respect that right and at the same time avoid the right's perverse logic—that if the United Nations had 194 member-states we might end up with 194 nuclear states.

It was bad enough when we had five nuclear weapon countries. It was worse when we had seven nuclear powers. Certainly we should avoid having eight nuclear powers, or more.

We also need to balance the need to stop the further development of nuclear weapons with the need to recognize that the world is genuinely interested in finding new sources of energy. We need to tackle that issue though it is quite clear that in the view of many, nuclear energy is a desirable source of energy and electrical power. I can think of countries that lack water and that are far from sources of oil or gas in which small nuclear reactors could act as efficient sources of energy. It is very good that Europe is now discussing this issue because it will have an enormous impact on the way forward.

## THE THREAT AND STATUS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

As far as chemical weapons go, and here I am wearing my hat as director general of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the dangers come from states but above all from their potential use by terrorists. In the case of states, we are lucky to have the Chemical Weapons Convention, because it establishes how states are to dispose of the chemical weapons they have and how states are not to use chemical weapons in the future. Not an anti-terrorist instrument, the Chemical Weapons Convention is an instrument for dealing with relations between states, worked out during the Cold War and therefore pervaded by the mentality of the Cold War—the equality of stockpiles, the need to advance proportionally and symmetrically to destroy the stockpiles, and so on. It is working out fairly well, even if the big possessor states, particularly the Russian Federation and the United States, are experiencing delays in destroying their stockpiles.

There is no question, however, that there is the political will to do so, and I think this is very good news for everyone, though we should encourage these states to do even more. We must also encourage those states that are still outside the convention, particularly Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and North Korea, to come into the organization and clear their act with us and allow for international supervision under the

Convention. Universal acceptance of the Chemical Weapons Convention is indispensable to ensure that the threat posed by chemical weapons is checked and eventually stopped.

Another issue that is important is the need to involve the chemical industry. That is being done by the OPCW through a very stringent verification regime; the work is progressing very well but much more needs to be done. To work things out effectively in the field and to prevent further proliferation, the chemical industry must be active and involved. The convention would not exist without the partnership of industry and industry must understand that it is necessary to continue to support the work so that we can provide the international community with assurances.

Of course when it comes to chemical weapons, the fact that they are relatively easy to access creates a greater possibility for terrorist groups to make use of them. While the Chemical Weapons Convention is not an anti-terrorist organization, in the wake of September 11, Member-States to the CWC got together to determine whether there was anything the convention could do to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from having access to chemical weapons. The member-states concluded that by fully implementing the convention, they would be making a major contribution to the struggle against terrorism.

The United Nations has also recognized that the Chemical Weapons Convention is a good instrument in the fight against terrorism. As a matter of fact, one of the Security Council's recent key resolutions, Resolution 1540, which is aimed at precluding terrorists from having access to weapons of mass destruction, includes in its operative paragraphs mandatory measures that are tantamount to what the Chemical Weapons Convention contains in its chapter on nonproliferation.

Because the issue of terrorism is increasingly on everyone's mind, states are now joining the convention in great numbers—there are already 178 member-states. This is not only a result of concern about terrorism, but the fact that international cooperation could bring many benefits, including being better prepared for dealing with terrorism. The threat of chemical weapon terrorism is quite real, and therefore the Chemical Weapons Convention is needed. Of course we must act strictly within the boundaries of the mandate that the member-states have agreed to.

## THE THREAT AND STATUS OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPON PROLIFERATION

Regarding biological weapons, I believe that it is very important to move decisively towards creating an organization that would be in charge of verifying compliance with the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention. Of course, the verification regime needs to be agreed upon, and we know there will be difficulties establishing a proper verification regime for the biological sphere. Yet it is quite crucial, in my view, that we continue to give multilateralism, which is an indispensable instrument for the advancement of peace and security, a chance in this sphere, without, of course, affecting the legitimate right of states to remain vigilant and to act in ways that protect peace and security. But we live in a world that is complicated enough to make us renounce the possibilities that diplomacy offers. I believe we stand a better chance of achieving peace if we give everyone the impression that there is room and a place for them under the sun and that we are prepared to see if we can work together for peace and security.

Having said that, of course, we should work relentlessly to ensure that no additional nuclear weapons are produced, that terrorists have no access to weapons of mass destruction, and that ultimately we remain united in preventing governments from using the weapons that are available today.

# Chapter 32

## The Spread of Avian Influenza

Professor Dr. Hans-Dieter Klenk[1]

### THE HISTORY OF THE AVIAN FLU

Influenza is a global threat with two dimensions: avian and human. Human influenza viruses cause epidemics every year, with millions of human illness cases and many thousands of deaths. Avian influenza viruses cause periodically large outbreaks in domestic fowl, with high commercial loss in the poultry industry. All influenza viruses, including the human ones, originally come from birds. Their natural hosts are wild aquatic birds, ducks, geese, gulls, and many others.

Influenza viruses occurring in this reservoir have a very high genetic variability defined by 16 hemagglutinin and nine neuraminidase subtypes—these are the proteins on the surface of the virus particles. We are therefore talking of H1N1 viruses, H3N2 viruses, H5N1 viruses, and so forth. Usually these influenza viruses are confined to their natural hosts, the wild aquatic birds, but occasionally they are transmitted to other species such as terrestrial birds, chickens, turkeys, pigs, and horses in which they cause disease without having changed their genetic makeup very much. This is where we are now with the human cases caused by the H5N1 bird flu virus, a very early stage in the transmission to another species.

However, on rare occasions the avian viruses adapt to their new hosts. Then, for example, a duck virus is converted into a pig virus that is then transmitted within the pig population. If this occurs in humans—if a virus with a new hemagglutinin or a new neuraminidase subtype is introduced by this mechanism into the human population—then we have a pandemic, a worldwide outbreak affecting the entire human population, with millions of deaths. In the last century, we had three such pandemics. The great Spanish flu of 1918 caused more than 40 million deaths and was probably the most devastating outbreak ever of an infectious disease within a limited time period. There were also two less severe pandemics in 1957 and in 1968.

Because of their importance as disease agents, influenza viruses have been studied in great detail. The structure of the virus particles has been elucidated, their replication strategies are known, and their genome has been sequenced. In fact, we can manipulate these viruses with gene technology, so we can

[1] Professor Dr. Hans-Dieter Klenk is the Director of the Department of Virology at the University Hospital Giessen and Marburg.

convert a dangerous virus into a harmless virus and then use it as a vaccine. We can also convert a harmless virus into a dangerous one. As in many other fields we have a dual-use problem.

H5N1, the so-called bird flu virus, first caught our attention in 1997. Until that time we thought this particular virus was completely harmless for man, but in that year a large outbreak in poultry occurred in Hong Kong and 18 human infections, with six deaths, also occurred. The virus disappeared, but re-emerged in 2002, and since 2005 has been endemic in Southeast Asia, killing more than 200 million chickens. On rare occasions, the virus has also been found to spread to other species—monkeys, cats, tigers, leopards, civets, and martens—and though there have been very few cases, the virus caused very severe disease in these new species. So far, about 200 humans have been infected, about 100 of whom have died. But because there have been 200 human cases as opposed to 200 million chicken cases, this is still very much an animal disease and not yet a human disease.

In May 2005, however, something unusual happened. The virus was reintroduced from domestic fowl into wild birds, evident in a large outbreak in a nature reserve at Lake Qinghai in Northwest China, where thousands of wild geese, ducks, and gulls were killed. This was the start of the travel of the virus through large parts of the world, moving quickly to Siberia, southern Russia, the Black Sea countries, and Central and Western Europe, where it arrived by the end of 2005. Now it is also spreading in Africa.

## THE GLOBAL OUTLOOK

What is the potential of H5N1 to cause human disease? Because the virus spreads quickly in poultry and wild birds, there is an enhanced chance of human exposure. The virus has the ability to cross the species barrier, to be transmitted to man and other species. It also is highly pathogenic for these other hosts, and of course the human population has no immune protection because it has never been exposed to this virus. But so far no man-to-man transmission has been observed although there have been some mutations in the virus that we may call humanizing mutations, since they are similar to features in present human viruses. Fortunately, they have not proved to be stable.

## FIGHTING THE AVIAN FLU

Many countries have reacted to this threat—not only the H5N1 threat but also the threat of a pandemic in general—with preparedness plans that are very similar. One important part of these plans is having tight surveillance of influenza activity in man and in animals, implying close cooperation between medical surveillance organizations and veterinary surveillance organizations. However, in Third World countries, where the virus is often endemic, there may be a reasonable human medical system but a very weak or non-existent veterinary system, which is a big problem.

Another part of most of the preparedness plans is providing vaccines. However, a major problem with vaccines is that they are being aimed at a moving target, which means that we have to prepare vaccines against a virus that we still do not really know—the virus could be H5N1 in its present form, H5N1 in a modified form, or a completely different virus. So we need to develop new vaccine strategies that are different from the current vaccine production strategies and we have to make more vaccines, because the entire world should be vaccinated, and we have to prepare them in much less time than is required to prepare conventional vaccines. Another problem is that the world's vaccine production capacity is far too low, so there needs to be a significant increase in vaccine production capabilities.

The first tool to be used in our fight against a pandemic is the so-called antivirals, such as Tamiflu or other neuraminidase inhibitors. But again there is a production problem: the production facilities are too small. While many countries have stockpiled these drugs, there is yet another problem with them: If we apply these drugs against the virus, then the virus will develop resistance and stop being sensitive to these

drugs. So we need to develop a large variety of drugs as we have done with drugs against bacterial infections.

Another problem is the control of avian influenza. This must be handled by culling, animal vaccination, and sheltering of flocks, as is practiced now in Germany. We also must be prepared for patient management in the case of a pandemic. We need to be prepared to care for many thousands of seriously ill people who will come down with the disease in a very short time period and who will be highly infectious. Currently our hospital systems are not prepared for this.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Right now we should keep in mind that avian influenza is still an animal disease; it is not yet a direct human threat. H5N1 outbreaks are under control in some of the countries in which the virus originally appeared—in Thailand and in Vietnam—but it is still active in Africa, Indonesia, and some parts of Central Asia. So we must be on continuous alert for a pandemic caused by H5N1 or another influenza virus.

# Chapter 33

## Pandemics: Potential Sources and Global Effects

Professor Dr. Reinhard Burger[1]

The institute I work with, the Robert Koch Institute, is responsible for protection against infectious diseases in Germany. Looking back at the last 20 or 30 years, you will see that a new infectious agent was discovered in almost every year—or you could say that every year a new infectious agent discovered the human population.

### THE HUMAN AND FINANCIAL COSTS OF PANDEMICS

Thinking in that way, and recognizing how much people travel around the world and how influenza is very easily transmitted through aerosols and smear and has a short incubation period, it should not be astonishing that even minor, relatively limited epidemics just as the SARS epidemic can have financial or economic consequences in the range of $50 billion. Regarding human costs, Professor Klenk has already mentioned the enormous number of deaths caused by the major pandemics of the last century, and I would like to add that these pandemics, particularly the1918 Spanish flu, affected young, healthy people, not just the very young and the elderly population. In a country such as Germany, just to give you an idea of the normal influenza impact, there are about six million cases in a bad year, like the 2004-2005 winter season, with about 2.5 million people unable to work, about 30,000 people requiring hospitalization, and between 10,000 and 20,000 deaths. This is not the result of a pandemic, but a typical influenza outbreak.

### SOURCES OF A POSSIBLE PANDEMIC

All influenza experts agree that another influenza pandemic is inevitable and probably imminent. Currently the risk of avian influenza being transmitted to human beings is probably low and, as Professor Klenk mentioned, there are relatively few human cases if you consider the unprecedented enormous number of infected animals. But avian influenza could be the origin of an influenza pandemic and then we would have to deal with large numbers.

---

[1] Professor Dr. Reinhard Burger is Vice President of the Robert Koch Institute and Head of the Department of Infectious Diseases.

While also Germany or Sweden could well be the source, at present the most likely source for such a pandemic virus is of course southeast Asia, because the sheer number of animals infected is very large and contact between human beings and infected animals is much closer there than in the transatlantic area. You have backyard chickens—poultry is an important source of food—and you have people living closely together in the same house and a warm climate, all of which increase the concern for spread in the host range, which includes stone martens and other kinds of birds and cats.

WHO, the World Health Organization, defines the risk of spread with six different color levels ranging from cream to dark red. Right now we are in phase 3, yellow, which means there is no or limited human-to-human transmission. However, in early June a family in Indonesia was reported to have the largest cluster of influenza infections so far, with six deaths in a single family, so we are perhaps on the verge of moving to level 4, in which increased localized human-to-human transmission is in evidence. Intensive efforts are now underway to determine if this cluster of cases involved transmission from human to human or if it came from an identical source, for example, the family might have prepared and eaten an infected chicken. But the chance of eliminating the disease from the bird population currently is zero—it is endemic.

## POTENTIAL GLOBAL EFFECTS

If a pandemic should occur, it would affect the daily life of populations all around the world for months. There would not only be special demands on medical, emergency, and relief workers and affect their health but intensive personal hygiene measures would have to be taken and public gathering places such as schools and events such as this one would be affected. In all likelihood there would be shortages in medical care because medical personnel would be sick and because no effective vaccine would be available in time. It is probably also unrealistic to expect assistance or material help from other countries because everybody will be concerned with their own welfare.

Epidemiologists are discussing whether a pandemic virus could be detected and identified very early, i.e. when there are fewer than 10 or 20 cases. But even if this were to happen, sufficient quantities of antiviral agents would need to be available locally and the problem of resistance would most likely keep the effectiveness of early quarantine measures low.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

I believe very strongly that the risk of an influenza pandemic is a very clear and present risk because the virus can change its genetic makeup very rapidly. Efforts are now being concentrated on reducing morbidity and mortality in the population, but this requires international cooperation because viruses do not observe borders. Efficient, effective cooperation needs to take place because viral agents travel quickly—the 1918 virus traveled the world in a few months when there was no air traffic. Antiviral drugs or vaccines must also be equally available to all states.

# Chapter 34

## Dealing with Impending Crises

General of the Armed Forces Jiri Sedivy[1]

For the first two days of this workshop, the topics we discussed mostly centered on how to improve our security, a political question that must be transformed into military reality. We found that many issues need to be solved—how to prepare our forces, train them, have them react quickly, move them, and support them on their mission—and that our decision makers have to make decisions.

It is easier to try to define the relationship between NATO and the EU, as we discussed during the session that was chaired by Ambassador Harri Tiido, the Estonian representative on the North Atlantic Council, and during the session chaired by the minister of defense of the Republic of Albania, Fatmir Mediu. But we also must find ways to face non-military threats, including the spread of avian influenza. Up until today, this was more a medical problem, but now we are aware of the potential worldwide disaster.

In the past we have been successful helping nations that have suffered from earthquakes, tsunamis, and the consequences of drought; we have deployed forces rapidly and fulfilled our obligations because we were prepared, and we will be ready if avian influenza spreads to large areas and if there are mutations. But we also must be prepared, even on our own territory, to use military forces to minimize consequences, as Germany, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, and some other countries have done. Large-scale disasters can sometimes lead to economic and political instability as well as violence, terrorism, and mass migration.

Energy security is also a very important topic that we cannot split from critical infrastructure protection. This point was mentioned several times by SACEUR General Jones, and he was not the only one to discuss the importance of this matter. Energy is vital for all human societies. However, prices are climbing and several statesmen, for example, Russia's President Putin, have said that, if Europe does not approach Russian companies, Russia will turn to China. President Chavez, the president of Venezuela, has used energy and oil as arguments against the U.S., and of course there is the very problematic decision concerning building a new gas pipeline and the agreement between Russia and Germany. Poland and the Baltic States feel that Russia is pressuring them, and even the minister of defense of Poland, Mr. Sikorski,

[1] General of the Armed Forces Jiri Sedivy (Ret.)is a former Chief of Defense of the Czech Republic.

called the agreement between Russia and Germany a new Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. Not only resources but supply lines must be protected. However, this topic is the domain of the Norwegian Ministry of Defense State Secretary Espen Barth Eide.

I would like to conclude by saying that energy security is becoming increasingly important, especially because it sometimes is used as a weapon by some improper state leaders and some of our opponent states. However, the European Union has been working very intensively on the topic and in March 2006 issued a green paper called "A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive, and Secure Energy."

# Chapter 35

## Energy and Security

State Secretary Espen Barth Eide[1]

### OPENING REMARKS

The theme I have been asked to address is somewhat different from the avian flu but there are some similarities with that subject: Energy and security clearly belong to the extended security concept and are clearly global, and, as a global challenge, require global responses, so I think they do fit in this section.

It has already been mentioned by several speakers, not the least by SACEUR, that energy security—the relationship between access to energy and energy supply lines and security—is an emerging theme in the NATO context just as it is in several other international contexts. We have seen energy crises before, not only related to scarcity of resources but also due to political overtones. Such crises will happen again, so it is better to be prepared for them in a structured way.

### CURRENT AND FUTURE ENERGY CHALLENGES

There is an increasing discrepancy between energy supply and demand, one that is becoming a structural problem for all of us. Europe, the U.S., and emerging industrial nations such as India and China are all demanding much more energy than is available, at least as of now, and the international energy agency predicts that without preventive measures, global oil demand will reach 121 million barrels a day by 2030, an increase of more than 40% compared to today's 85 million barrels a day. In the EU/Europe, dependency on imports for energy supplies is 50% now and is expected to rise at least to 70% by 2030.

We know that much of the oil and gas supplies are coming from a rather geographically concentrated area, the belt that stretches from Iran to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and West Africa in general, and we know there is quite a lot of political turbulence there. So the things we are doing to enhance stability and security in this area for other reasons may in part be contributing to the security of energy supplies.

The energy market of today is characterized by a lack of resilience and robustness and even small disturbances can have immediate effects on global energy prices. This situation makes us very vulnerable to

---

1 Mr. Espen Barth Eide is State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Defense.

actors who may want to use energy supply as leverage, as General Sedivy mentioned earlier. There is also the prospect of terrorist attacks against energy-critical infrastructure with the intent to destabilize economies at the national or even global level.

## ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES

These challenges require a broad approach addressing the specific interests both of suppliers and consumers. When we talk about the relationship between energy and security, it is important to underline that this is not security in a classical sense, directed against a defined adversary or defined adversaries. Rather, it is an issue of collective security in which in principle there should be a clear common interest among those supplying, those transporting, and those consuming energy in having a predictable, clear, and well-functioning open international market.

This theme is to be placed on several international agendas in the months to come, one of them being the G8 Summit in Russia. Russia initiated its placement on the agenda and at least some member-states believe it will also emerge as a theme at the NATO summit in Riga. Of course, the IAEA and OPEC and other organizations and the relationships between them remain important in this setting.

From the perspective of the demand side, diversification of energy supplies is increasingly important in order to increase the resilience of the market. As part of diversification, major consumers and industrial economies in the West will inevitably have to put more resources into developing alternative sources of energy. With new transport routes emerging not only for oil and pipeline-based gas supplies but for liquefied natural gas (LNG), which will eventually become an important source of energy, transportation will be increasingly important.

Another important theme, which has been touched upon by several speakers at this conference, is providing surveillance, presence, and protection for ungoverned spaces - not only in "failed states" - but also the sea-lines of communication that need better protection and better surveillance than we have seen so far. While this has been a theme for NATO in the past, I think it will grow over the next 10 years. NATO should provide a forum for discussing the physical protection of energy infrastructure, though this is and should remain a national focus, and assist both members and partners in improving their ability to provide such protection in the interest of all.

## DEVELOPING NEW AREAS OF ENERGY SUPPLY

Over the course of the workshop we have discussed the emerging importance of Africa and its humanitarian and global security challenges. Because energy importers are looking increasingly toward Africa as a potential area of supply, we, and other international and regional organizations, must now look to the area's energy dimension.

Another area of growing energy importance is what we in Norway refer to as the High North, which includes the Barents Sea. According to a U.S. geological survey, approximately 25% of the undiscovered petroleum reserves lies in the Arctic—north of Russia, north of Norway, and close to the North Pole. These areas are becoming increasingly accessible because of new technology that makes it possible to extract oil and gas and provide a new source of fossil fuel that we were not even aware of only a few years ago. We believe this area should be developed. We are working closely with Russia and with other international partners to build a regime to exploit these resources, both oil and gas but with an increasing emphasis on gas.

This coming exploitation, however, must combine three equally important dimensions. One is that the development includes the building of transport routes, both pipelines and sea-based routes from the Barents Sea to the main market. The second is that the work is done in an environmentally friendly way, so

that the enormous fish and other marine resources we have access to will remain, even after the oil and gas era is over. The third is that all of this takes place within a stable and secure international geopolitical environment, which is quite possible but in no way guaranteed. Right now we in Norway are trying to make our partners, friends, neighbors, and allies more aware of this increasingly important area, not only for our own interest but for all of our interests.

During the Cold War, the area I have been speaking about was an area of strategic military confrontation. Fortunately, it is not that any longer, but it is an emerging crucial focal point in the geopolitics of energy. Just think of this: LNG ships will be sailing out of the region toward the U.S. in a few years. Those ships will more or less use the same sea-lines of communication that we were so eager to protect during the Cold War, albeit in the opposite direction. This illustrates that while security has changed, there are still recurring themes. Predictability, stability, and transparency need to remain key words as we develop a policy for this area and we need to base the policy on a broad set of international cooperation themes.

## ENERGY SECURITY AS A CONTINUING NATO THEME

I believe energy security should remain an important NATO focus because, as was very clearly expressed recently by Chancellor Merkel, by the United States, and by many European partners, we need to broaden the political debate in NATO and to reestablish NATO as a forum for political discussion of themes of mutual interest that have global ramifications, which this subject certainly does. This does not mean that all the solutions will be found in NATO but that it is a subject we believe needs to be discussed and is of great importance. All relevant countries and partners should be invited to the debate to underline that energy security is part of collective security in the 21st-century global environment.

We also need to look into ways in which the Alliance's capabilities for surveillance, technological cooperation, and military cooperation can be made relevant for this theme. We should also have additional discussions regarding energy security between NATO and the EU. We must ensure that the market forces work and that we enable them to continue to be stable, predictable, and reliable in our common interest.

I believe energy security has come to stay on our agenda.

# Chapter 36

## Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons: A Czech View

Ambassador Jaromir Novotny[1]

I would like to emphasize U.N. Under-Secretary-General Tanaka's statement that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is in deep crisis. There have been news that three countries that are known to be nuclear powers—Israel, Pakistan and India—are out of the treaty. We also have the new steps that two countries which accepted the treaty—North Korea and Iran—are withdrawing. And when Pakistan tested a nuclear bomb in 1998, the Iranian government congratulated Pakistan on deploying the first Islamic bomb, a Sunni bomb. Now Iran is on its way to create a Shiite bomb, which is another problem. As to North Korea, it is violating the NPT Treaty and has announced it.

A new step, a very dangerous step, was taken by the U.S. government when it proposed to the Indian government to sign a deal on the transfer of nuclear technology to India. This very action created a third category of state, a state that is not in the NPT Treaty but is obtaining all the advantages of it. In exchange, India did not give anything away. India did not allow the control of their new seven fast-speed reactors which were developed under a purely Indian technology. According to the U.S./India agreement, only the old reactors are placed under the control of the international community. So as Orwell said, "all animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others." This is a very dangerous step.

We are also witnessing the spread of nuclear technologies. The discovery of the clandestine network of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan is a shock but it seems hard to believe that Pakistan's government agencies had not been informed of it and this is very difficult to accept.

If we look at the history of chemical weapons, they have already been used by states. They were used in the Iraq-Iran war. They were used by the Iraqi government against the Kurds. And if you remember the first Gulf War, the Czech chemical units measured the presence of chemicals in the air. Subsequently thousands of U.S. and British soldiers suffered from the so-called Gulf War Syndrome. Perhaps it was an accident in which a depot was bombed —I do not know— but the fact is that the presence of chemicals was measured and they were used.

Chemical weapons have also been used by non-state actors. For example, they were used in Tokyo's metro a few years ago by the Aum religious sect. So the question is not whether these weapons will be used, it is when they will be used because sooner or later, chemicals will become the weapons of the poor

1 Ambassador Jaromir Novotny is the Czech Ambassador to Japan.

since it is not very difficult to create a chemical or a biological weapon. There are manuals on the internet on how to make them. In the United States, one fanatic detonated a bomb made with fertilizers in Oklahoma City causing at least 150 deaths. It was a chemical weapon. So the main question is when they will be used.

Again, it is the same with biological weapons, it is even more simple: very small amounts of a biological concentration in the drinking systems could annihilate entire capital cities. So the situation does not leave room for much optimism.

# Chapter 37

## Several Questions to Be Raised on the Iranian Crisis

Lieutenant General Christian-Charles Falzone[1]

When I was asked to chair this session about Iran, I had no hesitation in accepting because it was a tribute to the need for a meeting like this one and because each of us here brings along his own experience, which is so important for the complex problems we are dealing with. Before getting started, let me convey the best wishes for success from General Bentegeat, the French Chief of Staff, who has asked me to represent him.

The question about Iran is easy to formulate: How much pressure is the international community ready to apply on Iran while at the same time recognizing Iran's right to access nuclear energy for economic development? In order to answer and come up with an approach that will make it possible to fulfill the goals approved by the community of nations including Iran, we must first ask several sub-questions that will provide partial answers.

First set of questions: In that poker game which, in case of failure, will have tremendous consequences, how good a hand does Iran seem to have? Can it rely on the support of Muslim public opinion? Is it capable of exerting influence by applying economic pressure through control of the oil and gas supply? Can it initiate under-cover actions in Lebanon through Hezbollah or in Iraq through the Shiite community? Can it threaten to leave the non-proliferation treaty, thus triggering unknown consequences? (I do not need to say more on that point because it was largely addressed by the previous session).

Second set of questions: Is Iran really able to negotiate a deal while internal debates within the country reveal fierce political struggles? Using external affairs for internal purposes is a well-known stratagem. Given the pressures exerted by the present social and economic conditions, could Iran afford a major economic crisis? The current government was elected to improve the daily life of the Iranians, who are proud of their history and their country but also want to improve the life of their children.

Third set of questions: How feasible is a regional security arrangement? Is it realistic? Is it possible under the umbrella of the United States? Can a direct negotiation between the United States and Iran be the key to success, once a framework has been delineated by the Euro three, the United States, China and Russia, and the U.N. Security Council as well? There are many questions and one fact: a lot of discussion

---

1 Lieutenant General Christian-Charles Falzone is Deputy Director, French Armed Forces General Staff.

is needed and other points of view than the Western one must be taken in account. For this reason, I am now leaving the floor to our two experts, Ambassador Munir Akram and Major General Zhan Maohai.

# Chapter 38

## The Iran Crisis

Ambassador Munir Akram[1]

Let me preface my remarks about this important issue by saying that what I am going to present are my personal analyses and views rather than those reflecting the views of my government. I also want to say that I believe the context of the crisis relating to Iran needs to be understood, and that it is basically a struggle for Persian Gulf dominance between Iran and the United States and its friends.

### DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES ON THE IRANIAN CRISIS

There are two very different perspectives from which the Iranian crisis can be viewed. First, the U.S., or Western, perspective involves the need for effective control over the oil and energy resources of the Gulf Region, which will remain an important source of energy for the next 25 years. The failure of the effort in Iraq to achieve greater control over these resources has made it all the more necessary to address Iranian power in the Gulf.

There is also perceived danger in the West of Iran assuming a dominant position in the area known as the Shia Crescent, which stretches from Iran through Iraq into the eastern regions of Saudi Arabia, where their oil fields are. In addition, there is perceived danger in the fact that Iran is the only Islamic country in the Middle East that is resisting the dominant forces seeking a solution of the Middle East crisis on the basis of land for peace. To add to that, Iran is perceived as supporting Hezbollah, supporting Syria, and supporting groups such as Islamic Jihad and the Hamas government that are now in power in the Middle East. Finally, there is the defiant Iranian rhetoric against the U.S. and Israel and the Western belief that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran would make it virtually impossible to change that behavior and the country's disruption and dominance of the region.

The Iranian perspective is very different. Iran sees that the U.S. and its allies seek not only regime behavior change but regime change. Some in Iran even fear that the Western objective is fragmentation of Iran, and see nuclear capability, if not the acquisition of nuclear weapons, as the only long-term guarantee against attack and for consolidating the dominant role that Iran feels it has a right to play in the region.

---

1 Ambassador Munir Akram is the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations.

The Iranians believe that Iran's power is now at its zenith. Its regional rivals, both in Iraq (Saddam Hussein) and in Afghanistan (the Taliban), have been eliminated by its global rivals and Saudi Arabia has been weakened by the terrorism that has been occurring since the post-9/11 period, when it came under U.S. and Western pressure. In addition, Iran is not broke. It enjoys unprecedented oil revenues because of a high demand for oil and gas worldwide and believes that any disruption to the oil pipelines would cost the West more than it would cost Iran. The Iranian nuclear program has also generated unprecedented national unity in Iran and support for the hard-line government. In addition, the country believes it has the capability to cause disruption throughout the region, which it feels is a strength. Finally, Iran believes that the dialogue it conducted with the EU 3 did not work, because the EU 3 did not deliver on its incentive promises despite Iran's two-year suspension of enrichment. The unyielding posture now displayed by Ahmadinejad is seen in Iran as yielding better results. The government has had enough of dialogue and discussion and has resumed enrichment.

The nuclear issue is thus at present the fulcrum of the struggle between the U.S. and its allies and Iran, and the positions taken by the two sides on this issue appear to be mutually exclusive. The P-3—the U.S., the U.K., and France—has called for a halt in enrichment, but President Bush has been quoted as saying, "Iran should have no nuclear weapons, no nuclear weapons capability, and indeed no knowledge of having nuclear weapons." The U.S. has stepped up sanctions and the use of force has not been taken off the table. Iran, on the other hand, says that it has a right to nuclear enrichment on its soil under the NPT and that its extent is negotiable. Until now, Iran has disavowed nuclear weapons ambitions but it has threatened to reject the additional protocol and indeed to walk out of the NPT if the Security Council or the international community adopts punitive measures against it.

## DIFFERENCES IN ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM

There are divisions within the policy establishment on both sides. Within Iran, three groups exist: the reformers, led by Khatami, the previous president, who have now been marginalized; the pragmatists, Rafsanjani and Rouhani, who are prepared to work out a deal and from whose efforts the Russian proposal was born; and the hard-liners, Ahmadinejad and the leadership of the Revolutionary Guards, who have insisted on enrichment on Iranian soil as part of any deal. The supreme leader, Khamenei, and his appointed negotiator, Larijani, are somewhere in between the pragmatists and the hard-liners.

So far, the hard-liners seem to have the upper hand—there has been enrichment without punishment. But the Iranian bottom line appears to be moving up. First the hard-liners considered the Russian solution; then they insisted on the Russian solution plus symbolic enrichment; and now three cascades of 164 centrifuges are in operation, with plans to build 30,000 more at the plant in Natanz. So the question is, in future negotiations, whether the Iranian bottom line will come down from this declared position. Of course, everything could change once pain is inflicted and once the confrontation heightens between Iran and the West, which is obviously the hope of the P-3.

Within the U.S., the hard-liners also seem to have the upper hand. As I said, they want no enrichment, escalating sanctions, and the option to use force, and have kept the heavy influence of Israel in the background. The pragmatists in the West, however, want to negotiate with Iran, escalate the pressure slowly, and not talk about the use of force, either for tactical or strategic reasons. There are also evidently some differences between the United States and its European allies, the latter seeking a more pragmatic approach that involves the slower escalation of pressure and no possibility of using force. But the U.S. objectives are unclear, particularly to the Iranians. Is it about ending enrichment and the entire Iranian nuclear program altogether, changing the behavior of the Iranian regime or the regime itself, or dissolving Iran because of reports of various activities against Iran inside the country?

The P-3 resolution in the Security Council has been delayed because of Russian-Chinese objections to Chapter VII, the role of the IAEA versus the Security Council, and because of concern regarding Iran's threats of retaliation. Currently a package of incentives and disincentives is being elaborated by the Europeans but its finalization has been delayed. Will the U.S., Russia, and China endorse the package? The answer is unclear at the moment because it is uncertain whether Russia and China will go to the extent of vetoing the resolution. It seems that they will be cautious, but if the resolution includes sanctions, it is likely to be blocked. If the resolution is adopted, however, it will have legal and political repercussions for Iran and for the rest of the international community, but it will also set off a reaction. Iran has threatened to disavow the additional protocol, eject IAEA inspectors, and begin consideration of Article 10 of the NPT withdrawal. If these things happen, or if Iran continues to be noncompliant, it is likely that the P-3 will respond with a new resolution envisaging sanctions. Initially, such sanctions might be symbolic—a travel ban and an arms embargo. Later, however, they could include freezing assets and banning investment in Iran. Oil and trade sanctions, though, are unlikely because they would be counter to the interests of the P-3.

## POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

Therefore, unless the dynamic of the U.S.-Russia relationship and the U.S.-China relationship changes and if Iran further alienates friends such as Russia and China, sanctions are unlikely to be approved by the Security Council, especially those that apply to investment and economic cooperation. Such sanctions, however, might be applied unilaterally by the U.S., Europe, and others willing or persuaded to join in a coalition to penalize Iran. Those sanctions, however, are unlikely to change Iran's position. More likely, Iran will move towards NPT withdrawal and other "retaliatory" measures, for example, halting its cooperation in Afghanistan. They could also cause problems in Iraq as well as make the hard-liners in Iran stronger.

A failure of sanctions against Iran would increasingly narrow Western options, leaving only the use of force as the ultimate and unpalatable alternative. Indeed, as the confrontation escalates, the danger of a conflict could arise, not merely by design but also by accident. There are several scenarios in which this could happen. For example, you will recall several months ago that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards captured eight British soldiers from Iraq on the border and paraded them blindfolded on Iranian television. If such a thing were to happen with U.S. soldiers, I think there could be grave consequences in an atmosphere of conflict and confrontation. So conflict could happen without a decision having been made at the top.

## OPTIONS FOR ACCORD

What options are available? First and foremost, I think the international community needs to set two realistic objectives for achievement in this crisis:

- A cap on Iranian enrichment activities, leaving one or two cascades subject to total IAEA inspections, and Iran's acceptance of the additional protocol and anywhere/ anytime challenge inspections
- An agreement for changing Iranian behavior vis-à-vis the Gulf and the region as a whole

While the modalities for reaching such an agreement are uncertain at this time, given the positions of the two sides, it would perhaps be best to use an intermediary—Russia, China, or perhaps Pakistan or Turkey—to craft a compromise solution. Another possibility being advocated is an open Iran-U.S. dialogue with everything on the table: nuclear programs and weapons, Iraq, the entire Middle East, terrorism, security, and so forth. A third modality would be to convene a Gulf or Regional Security Conference

to work on all the above issues and the creation of a regional security forum that could include Iran. Perhaps the three approaches could be pursued in three different time frames to bring security to the Gulf: the intermediary approach in the short term, the U.S.-Iran dialogue in the medium term, and the security forum in the longer term.

# Chapter 39

## Safeguarding the Integrity of NPT Mechanisms and Handling the Iranian Nuclear Issue Properly: a Chinese Perspective

Major General ZHAN Maohai[1]

The Iranian nuclear issue is becoming one of the thorniest issues in the international arena. This issue draws attention all over the world, including China, which is working to find a resolution to the problem. In this address I am going to share my personal views on the Iranian nuclear issue.

The basic independent unit of the current international system is the sovereign state. The principle of sovereignty enables the system to operate and makes all countries, regardless of their size or wealth, equal. Within this system, every country must comply with the principles of international law and treaties and must solve international disputes and conflicts through peaceful means or diplomatic channels. Therefore the Iranian nuclear issue should be resolved peacefully through international mechanisms.

### THE EVOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE

Iran's idea regarding its development of nuclear technology is completely different from that of Western countries. Iran insists that its nuclear program has only peaceful purposes, but Western countries, particularly the United States, accuse Iran of developing nuclear weapons under the guise of a peaceful program. I actually believe that there are three possible alternatives: first, that Iran is conducting R&D for the peaceful use of nuclear technology under the monitoring and guidance of IAEA; second, that Iran is secretly conducting R&D of nuclear weapons and building nuclear weapons outside IAEA monitoring; and third, that Iran is conducting secret R&D of nuclear weapons as part of normal development and employment of civilian nuclear technology or using the civilian nuclear technology for military ends. It is difficult to determine whether a country's nuclear R&D is for civilian or military ends without sufficient evidence. Although Western countries, particularly the U.S., have long suspected Iran of clandestine development of a nuclear weapons program, no evidence has ever been found that supports the accusation. Therefore, the current nuclear development can be regarded only as civilian nuclear R&D, though it is possible that Iran will use nuclear technology for military purposes. This possibility can be either a strategic deterrence or a certain threat to America, Israel, and other neighboring countries.

[1] Major General ZHAN Maohai is Vice Chairman of the China Institute of International Strategic Studies.

We all know that Iran began its nuclear energy program in the 1950s, with the support of America and other Western countries. In 1979 the Iranian Islamic Revolution put the nuclear energy program at a standstill, but in the early 1990s Iran signed an agreement with Russia for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The United States was unhappy with this agreement and accused Iran repeatedly of secretly developing a nuclear weapons program under the guise of a peaceful-use program, and adopted a containment policy towards Iran.

In early 2003, Iran declared that it had found and successfully extracted uranium that could be used to provide fuel for a nuclear power station. The U.S. reacted to the news because sensitive uranium enrichment technology is strictly forbidden by the international community in order to prevent proliferation. American military experts believed that Iran's possession of enriched uranium was equivalent to its possessing nuclear weapons, warned Iran against continuing all its activities relevant to uranium enrichment, and threatened to take the Iranian nuclear issue to the U.N. Security Council to establish sanctions against Iran. In the meantime, IAEA passed several resolutions asking Iran to cooperate with it, sign an NPT Appendix, and allow IAEA to carry out a schedule of strict inspections to make certain that Iran terminated uranium enrichment activities.

With the active mediation of the international community, especially France, Britain, and Germany, Iran adopted a series of measures concerning the nuclear issue. On December 18, 2003, Iran signed the NPT Appendix and in April 2004 declared it would suspend assembling uranium enrichment centrifuges. However, after Iran's new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, came to power, Iran not only resumed its nuclear program but also took a tough stance towards America, causing an escalation of problems between the two countries. It has been reported that American military experts are now discussing the possibility of military attacks against Iran.

The issues between Iran and America are at the core of the Iranian nuclear issue. The crisis appears to have resulted because Iran failed to comply with NPT and the regulations of IAEA and because its development of nuclear technology constitutes a grave threat to the security interests of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other countries in the region. In reality, the crisis is a result of problems left over from history, namely, the existence of geostrategic and structure issues between America and Iran. Since the end of the Cold War, the Middle East's geostrategic significance has greatly increased, and the collapse of the Saddam regime elevated Iran's strategic status to a major regional power. But as U.S. armed forces have entered Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Iran has been the only barrier to America's building a Central Asia/Middle East/South Asia link.

After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Iran was categorized by the U.S. as one of the axes of evil, and America intended to get rid of that regime. Certainly solving the Iranian nuclear issue will help America have greater supremacy in the region and gain a leading edge against Russia there. It will also enable the U.S. to realize its Middle East and Central Asia programs both militarily and politically. But the issues between Iran and the United States are complicated and will be difficult to solve.

## IRAN'S REASONS FOR NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT

I believe there are three possible reasons why Iran developed its nuclear program. First, it intends to deter America and America's preemptive military strategy, preventing the U.S. from striking Iran and assuring Iran's national security. Since American military forces entered Afghanistan, Iraq, and Azerbaijan and overthrew Saddam's regime, Iran has felt the need to augment its security. The Bush administration's hostile attitude toward Iran solidified and consolidated anti-American feeling in Iran and served as an excuse for Iranian anti-American diplomacy. At the same time Iran concluded that R&D and possession of nuclear weapons were an effective deterrent and an important strategic option that could

help Iran increase security and prevent America from using force against it. Saddam Hussein was overthrown because he did not have nuclear weapons.

Second, developing a nuclear program can help Iran win prestige in the Islamic world and build its regional power status. Whether or not a country has nuclear weapons is a direct reflection of its strength and weakness and a measure of its international influence. Some Westerners believe that Iran is taking pains to obtain nuclear technology and know-how in order to gain the status of guardian of Islamic followers. The active use of Islamic elements along with its nuclear program is not only a strategic way to ensure Iran's security and become less isolated but also increases its military strength, enhances its ability to counter Israel, and expands its influence for gaining regional power.

Third, according to international law and international treaties, every country has the legal right to conduct peaceful R&D and to make usable nuclear energy, and that right should not be stripped away because of the big powers' opposition. As the Iranian foreign minister pointed out, Iran has the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful ends, and as a responsible member of NPT, Iran is justified in doing so. Mohamed El Baradei, Director General of IAEA, also declared that as an independent country Iran has the right to conduct uranium enrichment research and projects and to use the material for civilian technology; the research and projects, however, should be completely transparent to international experts.

## SOLVING THE CRISIS

From the above analysis, it is clear to see that the Iranian nuclear crisis is complicated. On the one hand, Iran has the legal right to develop nuclear technology. On the other hand, Iranian nuclear R&D has aroused suspicion and uneasiness in the international community. Because of these two points, the international community, particularly the western countries, should manage the crisis cautiously until all aspects have been investigated and inspected. Otherwise, the crisis could lead to further disorder and chaos in the Middle East.

Diplomatic efforts within the framework of IAEA are still the wise option for managing the crisis. Peaceful approaches are needed to promote compliance with the purposes and principles of NPT and the relevant resolutions of IAEA and the U.N. Security Council. Such peaceful means are not only conducive to safeguarding the effectiveness of NPT, strengthening the authority of IAEA, and ensuring that every country develops nuclear energy for peaceful ends, but they are conducive to peace and stability and development in the Middle East as well as the world at large. They are also in the interest of all parties concerned.

The international community should therefore carefully review the positive and adverse effects generated by the past activities of the parties concerned and remain calm, flexible, and wise. It should also show more patience and restraint, offer more time for diplomatic efforts, and refrain from taking any actions that would escalate the crisis, providing a more favorable environment for diplomatic negotiations and maneuvers.

For its part, Iran should strictly comply with all the obligations of the treaties. It should comply with the resolutions endorsed by the board of IAEA, cooperate fully, enhance transparency, and respond to the suspicions of IAEA and the international community. Iran should also take measures that can enhance mutual confidence, including the confidence-building measures laid out for uranium enrichment, and create conditions that will enable settling the crisis within the framework of IAEA.

That organization, after many years of deliberate investigations and inspections in Iran, has not found the nuclear dossier to be transferred into nuclear weapons and other explosive devices but is still investigating because some problems have not been solved. At present IAEA is not certain whether Iran has

nuclear doses that were not reported to the organization or if it has conducted secret nuclear activities. Therefore IAEA should continue its independent and fair investigation and inspection and Iran should cooperate with IAEA to solve the crisis at the earliest possible date.

In the meantime, all parties should broaden their minds and explore new solutions both to safeguard nonproliferation objectives and to assure Iran of its right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. Russia has offered a good proposal that would allow Iran to conduct uranium enrichment in Russia or to develop and use its nuclear technology in ways recognized by IAEA. Reportedly the Euro-3 is also going to put forward a proposal for a light water reactor and we welcome all other workable proposals that would benefit both Iran and the other parties concerned.

## THE ROAD AHEAD

The last point I would like to discuss is the future of the Iranian nuclear crisis. It goes without saying that Iran's continuing to pursue a nuclear technology program and expand its influence in the Islamic world would constitute a great threat to pro-Western countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel and would disturb the geopolitical balance of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan have made it clear that they would not like to see Iran become the dominant power in the region, and Iranian possession of nuclear weapons would certainly be a threat to the stability of the entire Arabic world. The Western countries, including Israel, have also united as a result of the crisis to prevent Iran from enlarging its influence in the Muslim world. All of this has left Iran in a very embarrassed and passive position, opposing both the west and the Arabic world.

On April 11, 2006, Iran declared that it had succeeded in extracting enriched uranium, which means that it acquired the know-how and the capability to make nuclear weapons. Both America and Russia believe that Iran is going in the wrong direction, and I fear that the probability of armed conflict between America and Iran is now higher. Of course, it is up to the two parties to choose war or peace, and I hope that both will strictly comply with all international principles.

For its part, Iran should correctly define its vital national interests and recognize its position in the Middle East and the world. Iran should also fully understand the imbalance between its military forces and America's forces and choose the correct option. For its part, America should drop its hostile policy towards Iran in order to safeguard peace and stability in the region and actively work to find peaceful solutions with Iran. By de-escalating the conflict, America and Iran cannot only safeguard their security and other interests, they can provide more opportunities for cooperation among the EU, Russia, China, and other countries and jointly promote economic prosperity and development in the Middle East, in the interest of all.

China's policy on this issue has been manifest and consistent out of the need to safeguard peace and stability in the Middle East and the world. China upholds the authority of the international nuclear safeguard mechanisms and opposes any form of proliferation. My country sincerely hopes to resolve the issue through diplomatic means and actively supports any suggestions for achieving a peaceful solution. To sum up my points:

- Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy should be respected;
- All parties concerned should comply with the agreements and regulations of IAEA and the United Nations;
- The issue should be solved peacefully in a diplomatic way.

# Part Six

# Chapter 39

## International Cooperation

Mr. Alfred Volkman[1]

As a practitioner of international cooperation within the Department of Defense, I will say that within the U.S. Department of Defense, we are very committed to international cooperation in the development of both equipment and technologies. My office, which is responsible for the development activities, not the actual sale of equipment that is being produced, handles over 100 cooperative agreements every year. We do it because it makes military sense to do it; we do it because it contributes to our national security. Obviously, there are other reasons to do it such as economic reasons and, as we discussed throughout the conference, we need to cooperate for economic reasons because we need to combine our resources and save money. Defense budgets in general are not going to go up and they are not going to go up in the United States either, at least for the acquisition and development of equipment. So we must find ways to cooperate together intelligently and efficiently and we do a pretty good job of it, I think. Programs like the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)—although the U.S. is the biggest contributor, it is good to have partners contributing to that program—or the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) and, I hope, the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance System (AGS), are good expenditures of our resources.

However, from my perspective in the Pentagon, there are two impediments that greatly inhibit more successful arms cooperation. Here, I am going to be critical of my own government but as an American, it is part of my birth right to be critical of my government. The first impediment is the U.S. Congress. The Congress is primarily a problem, not because they are hostile toward international cooperation but because they are indifferent to international cooperation. Now admittedly, there are a few congressmen who are protectionist, who do things, introduce legislation that is not useful but, although some of it is passed, by and large that legislation is not passed. But there is a general indifference and lack of understanding in the U.S. Congress of the benefits of cooperating with our allies and that is unfortunate. We need to do a better job of correcting that. The other impediment of course is, as Admiral Ray has pointed out, the whole problem associated with technology transfer in the United States. We have a technology transfer process that is slow, ungainly and opaque. Nobody can really understand what is going on, often

[1] Mr. Alfred Volkman is Director for International Cooperation in the Office of the United States Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics).

even those people who are involved in the process. And frankly, it makes sense to be cautious in the control and transfer of your most sensitive military technologies. Any intelligent administrator will say, these are expensive costly military technologies that we spent a lot of money on, they give us a military edge, we should be careful of how we transfer these technologies. So I do not think anybody who has any thought about it argues that we should not be cautious on how we transfer these technologies. And as Admiral Ray said, in fact we do transfer a lot of technology because it is in our national interest to have strong allies and if we can benefit their military strength by transferring technology, we should do it. The problem is that we do it in a very difficult manner. And frankly, although I often place the blame on maybe another government agency like the Department of State, much of the blame rests on the U.S. Department of Defense. Within the U.S. Department of Defense, we have now four different processes that we use to look at the transfer of technology; those processes frequently are conducted not concurrently but serially and it takes a long time and people do not know what is going on. So the good news, at least from the Department of Defense perspective, is that we have been asked—I have been asked along with one of my colleagues who works for the Under Secretary for Policy—to look at these processes and try to find ways that we can make more timely, clear technology transfer decisions and we are doing that.

But I think that there is a more fundamental problem in the sense that the U.S. has an arms export control process, an arms export control law and practices in the Department of State and in the Department of Defense that are relics of the Cold War and badly need to be examined and to be reformed so that we can make more rapid and more intelligent decisions. So we are committed in the Department of Defense to making technology transfer decisions and we are looking at better ways to do this. I can understand the frustration of our allies and frankly our contractors when they try to get a quick decision out of the U.S. Government on a technology transfer issue. It is not easy to do, I will be the first to admit it, but it does happen and we get it done eventually.

# Chapter 40

## Developing a Strong Technological and Industrial Base in Europe

Dr. Hilmar Linnenkamp[1]

It is my pleasure to be here as a representative of an intergovernmental organization supporting European Security and Defense Policy capabilities as well as the development of a strong European defense technology, and industrial base. Our goal is twofold: 1) to get the capability dimension of the European Security and Defense Policy on a better footing, and 2) in order to make that happen, to help Europe get its act together on the defense technology, and industrial side.

I would like to make four points regarding these goals. The first is about the importance of the research and technology agenda we at the agency are currently working on. Second, I will analyze the current situation in Europe. Then I will say a few words about the transatlantic dimension in all of this, and, last, I will talk about policy challenges as we see them.

### JOINT RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY ISSUES

The year 2006 is a year of research and technology at the agency. Some of you may remember that in 2005, our first year of operation, the biggest success we could muster was the design of a code of conduct for defense procurement that would allow more competition in the European defense market. This code of conduct went into operation on July 1, 2006, and only two of the 24 member-states, Spain and Hungary, opted out of agreeing to the code, though even they made it very clear that it may well be in their longer-term interest to become a partner in this endeavor. So 22 member-states have committed to opening their defense markets more than ever before. While following the code is not a legally binding commitment, it is a political commitment, and the agency will monitor its use and report on how it is operating. But in 2006, following the task assigned it by the defense ministers, we are concentrating on research and technology.

I must say that we have been given major support from the defense industry all along, for which we are grateful. The defense industry has been very outspoken in asking the agency and the governments to sup-

1 Dr. Hilmar Linnenkamp is Deputy Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency.

port our agenda and made it very clear that it has very high expectations for the Agency having the freedom to act and the freedom to maneuver. Industry has floated quite a number of proposals regarding how much money the agency should be able to spend on common research and technology—member-states go up to 200 million euros a year—and we have been very strongly supported by a very effective and very well-written CSIS study done in 2005 that quoted this number again. It is not likely that we will end up with a 200-million-euro operational budget, but we are currently working on an instrument to make it possible for European Union member-states to do common research on a basis not restricted to ad hoc negotiations and ad hoc schemes, which suffer from all kinds of uncertainties and frictions. For example, as soon as you have four member-states working together on a certain project, three of the finance ministers say, We don't have money next year, we only have it the year after, so the whole thing collapses for a year. So we are trying to establish a way, with the help and the support of member-states, to obtain some kind of pre-commitment for common research and technology work. Member-states will decide soon to what extent they would like to use this instrument.

## THE CURRENT SITUATION IN EUROPE

One of the criteria that are used to measure the degree of commitment to the technological agenda is the percentage of research and technology spending in relation to the defense budget. I think you will not be surprised to hear that this is not a very impressive figure. In 2005, for example, only 2.3 billion euros were spent on European research and technology, which is roughly between 1.3% and 1.4 % of European Union Member States' defense spending. Of course, there are big differences among the member-states: There are those who spend considerably more in absolute terms and in percentage, but on the whole European Union member-states' investment in research and technology is not what we want to see.

We have also studied how much of European research and technology spending was spent on collaborative projects. While there has been a "chiffre" in some circles that said that this was not more than 5% of the amounts spent, we found, to our surprise, that it is roughly double that, or 10%—again with large differences among member-states. This, however, is again not much, and we would like to see, and have been given the authority by the defense ministers to work toward, more collaborative spending on research and technology. Our idea is that the percentage should at least double over a number of years, and though the defense ministers have not agreed on precise numbers or objectives, perhaps wary because of previous experiences with projects that had precise targets, they have generally been very supportive.

It is interesting to compare the 1.3% figures with the percentages of spending on research and development, which of course is different from research and technology, in the aerospace industry. In the aerospace industry, these numbers are between 12% and 15% of total turnover, which is the most likely comparative measure, over the last 10 years. In land systems, it is only 6% and in the naval area it is about 10%. The realities do not satisfy the agency nor do they satisfy the defense ministers when they act as a collective body, so we need to work further to improve this situation.

## THE TRANSLATLANTIC DIMENSION

The European defense technological and industrial base, of course, is not an island, and it needs partnership with the United States and with other parts of the world. We would very much like to see the competitive drive that we work for in the European context be enhanced as well in the transatlantic context. More and more transnational companies go to the American market. Therefore, we expect a stronger competitive position of Europe in the future. The basic hypothesis for this happening, which has

been expressed several times by defense ministers in their collective wisdom, is that having a stronger European defense technological and industrial base is the right way to move forward. The transatlantic dimension is very much in our minds as we work to strengthen the European defense technological and industrial base, not only for Europe but for many areas beyond its borders.

## CURRENT POLICY CHALLENGES

When you get right down to it, the defense industry debate in Europe is a debate about autonomy. However, I do not mean autonomy in terms of achieving complete independence and separating markets. Some people, including some in the United States, are concerned that this agency in reality is promoting a "Fortress Europe" regarding industry and technology. It is not. It is, however, very clearly about finding a way to achieve a relatively less dependent and more autonomous technological and industrial base—not a black and white one but a gray one—in order to harvest the fruits of competition. This is what we have in mind when we talk about developing a strong European base, and we do not plan to give up this area of defense. This agency is about strengthening the industrial base in Europe. As I said at the beginning of my presentation, it is also a place where capabilities and cooperative efforts come together in the interests of all the member-states.

# Chapter 41

## International Cooperation: Providing the Technologies

Dr. Stefano Bortoli[1]

During the past 10 years, the defense and aerospace industry in Europe and North America experienced vigorous consolidation, a process that has led on the one hand to the formation of giant conglomerates that are active worldwide and on the other to the start-up of many joint ventures and other forms of industrial cooperation. While the former has been unanimously greeted by economists, politicians, and public opinion as both necessary and welcome, industrial cooperation continues to be the subject of debate and sometimes criticism.

The question I should like to address today is this: Is there an alternative to cooperation between companies in a sector such as aerospace and defense? This is the real question we need to ask when looking at this subject.

We in the industry, at least as far as Europe is concerned, have already answered this question and the answer was a resounding "No." There is no alternative; yet today this is not a sign of weakness on the part of the old continent but, rather, a sign of our strength. From Eurofighter to EH101, from NH90 to A400M, from ATR to Airbus and the Meteor missile, not to mention the Galileo satellite, we have an entire series of programs that are without rival in the world, programs that represent the state of the art in the industry and the finest technological and operational solutions for satisfying the ever-more-stringent requirements of both the civilian and the military fields.

### GUARANTEEING THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY

Let's cast our minds back down memory lane to Concorde or, even better, to Tornado and remember how European industry set this process in motion more than 30 years ago in the face of great political difficulties, bitter debate among the various political and social players and leading columnists, and the need to raise huge financial investments. The result of that decision is that we have succeeded in developing systems that both technologically and operationally are at the leading edge.

---

1 Dr. Stefano Bortoli is Co-Director General for Strategies, Business Development, International and Military Sales at Alenia Aeronautica, S.p.A.

Put very simply, the aerospace industry was forced in the past to cooperate on the international level in order to foster innovation, stand at the forefront of technology, and invest in research and development in order to guarantee its own future. And that is what it must continue to do today.

Seen from this perspective, the subject of security requires us to reflect on a number of points. It is obvious that without guaranteed stability and security, there will be no economic or industrial progress. Security, therefore, is and must be a key objective for every government; but it is an objective that requires enormous resources and that today more than ever represents the final aim of seamless, indivisible, global well-being. Any initiative that seeks to protect and defend what security implies must be promoted and supported.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been without question only one single superpower left on the international stage, the United States of America. Its economic, industrial, and military power is without equal in the world. In some cases, this power has as its companion a certain isolationism, which, in the eyes of some observers, is due in part to the inability of other countries, including those usually counted among the ranks of the technologically advanced, to keep up with the pace of American technological innovation and strategic thinking. At the same time, there are others who maintain that American isolationism is a specific strategy, one that reflects the unwillingness of the United States to accept the multilateral approach or to adapt to it only on a limited basis—the so-called coalition of the willing concept—and otherwise refrain from broader dialogue of any kind.

## BRIDGING THE TRANSATLANTIC TECHNOLOGY GAP

For years the question of whether Europe is capable of bridging the transatlantic gap in terms of military investment and therefore technological capabilities, especially when it comes to funding for research and development, has been the subject of much discussion. Since September 11, in view of the financial effort made by the United States and the relative stagnation of the budgets of the states in the European Union, this gap has become even wider.

As we have seen, Europe's defense industries, especially Italy's, have partnership in their chromosomes. As far back as the First World War, Italian and French industry cooperated in defining, developing, and producing aircraft that were flown successfully during the Great War. With the end of the Second World War and the disastrous post-war situation, Europe found itself forced, one might say, to cooperate in terms of defense, albeit at first with the financial support and under the guidance of the United States.

The NATO G.91 competition; the production of the F-104 on the old continent; the first bilateral programs such as Transall, Atlantic, and Jaguar; the Puma and Gazelle helicopter programs; and, on the civilian front, the first shy steps toward industrial collaboration marked by Mercure and, as I have already mentioned, Concorde—these were the forerunners of what is today an unquestionable reality: Europe's defense industry does work together, sometimes with a certain amount of difficulty but always on the basis of a decades-old common interest and shared operational conditions that by now are consolidated at every level, from the young engineer who has just been hired to the armed forces to our governments, who in the face of lean defense and R&D budgets know that they have no choice.

In Europe, despite the fact that there still is some resistance to what should be by now an evident state of affairs, we have progressed very rapidly from being independent companies, each capable of developing its own advanced aircraft in complete autonomy, to forming a network of companies whose pooled capabilities have created systems that are successful in the market and that represent the leading edge of technology. And it cannot be denied that those who were unwilling or unable to take part in this great experience are now really feeling the pinch.

## TAKING ON MAJOR DEFENSE INDUSTRY CHALLENGES

Europe's defense industry has had to take up two major challenges, the one following the other in relatively short order. The first, which emerged during the early and middle 1990s, was how to reconcile the gradual budget shrinkage following the end of the Cold War with the need to provide systems that would meet the operational requirements of our governments. The second, which came out of the new, post-2001 strategic scenario and which continues to emerge today, is how to accelerate the process of orientation toward the innovative, so-called enabling technologies.

Industry responded to the first challenge by initiating a robust rationalization and consolidation process to create economies of scale and pool capabilities and resources. Our flagship corporation, Finmeccanica, of which Alenia Aeronautica is a wholly owned subsidiary, was a leader in this European process, assuming the role of strategic aerospace and defense player in Europe and forging collaborative partnerships for structural agreements and programs with other European partners. In turn, Alenia Aeronautica has played a key role in the main European programs, either as a full partner, such as in Tornado or Eurofighter, or as a major subcontractor promoting its own technological capabilities, as with Airbus.

Europe's defense industry is responding to the second challenge by launching an internal reorganization process designed to put itself forward to the end user as a supplier of complex solutions and systems architectures capable of meeting government's security and defense requirements. Here, too, Finmeccanica, as Italy's leading high-technology group, is committed to asserting its own identity by focusing on its core business—aerospace and defense—and by forming strategic alliances and strengthening its own areas of excellence. And what are the group's recent acquisitions, such as its acquisition of 50% of AgustaWestland, the agreement with Alcatel in the space sector, and the agreement with BAe Systems in the key defense electronics sector, if not the clearest signal of the determination of Italian industry to continue down the road of industrial cooperation?

The acquisition of a company cannot, however, determine a sudden change of mind or an operating method if it is not accompanied by a clear desire for integration at all levels. This is exactly what is required in these huge partnerships, those that have successfully developed such excellent systems as today's Eurofighter. This intra-European dynamic is mirrored in the Finmeccanica Group's determined targeting of the United States market, in which our presence is now taking the form of structural investment. This includes, for example, the recently opened AgustaWestland plant in Pennsylvania; that company's successful bid, together with Lockheed Martin, in the US101 program for the future presidential fleet; and, above all, since Alenia Aeronautica itself is involved, the competition for the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force Joint Cargo Aircraft in which we are tendering our C-27J twin-engine tactical transport aircraft. To achieve this goal, the Global Military Aircraft Systems (GMAS) Team, a joint venture developed together with L# Communications and Boeing, is proposing an aircraft with outstanding operating characteristics, the only one in its category on the market that has been specifically designed for tactical transport. In practice, with this program, Alenia Aeronautica is promoting an industrial cooperation model in the United States that has already been thoroughly tested and that would have Boeing not as prime contractor, as many would have expected, but simply as a partner capable of contributing its own specific industrial and production experience to the success of the program.

## THE NEED FOR A NETWORK OF COOPERATION

Alenia Aeronautica and Boeing know each other well. We have worked together for over 40 years, starting from the days of the DC-9 of what was then Douglas and gradually gathering momentum through the B767, B777, and B757 programs right down to the great B787 Dreamliner project of today,

an innovative program for which Boeing has chosen the path of international collaboration in a decisive step forward in its relationship with its partners. The fact that most of the fuselage—which, with its structure made entirely of composite materials, is surely the most innovative component of the new aircraft—is to be produced in Italy is a clear sign that Boeing has fully absorbed the joint venture culture.

Unfortunately, the same cannot always be said of other transatlantic programs, and here I would like to return to isolationism, which I mentioned earlier. The fact that the Joint Strike Fighter program has had problems is no industrial secret. Steered from the start by Lockheed Martin, the program has been characterized by an innovative approach to cooperation, one based on an investment requirement that did not use traditional offset policies but instead called for competition between the venture partners for components and systems to be developed within the framework of the project. This approach called for a considerable initial commitment by the governments that decided to join the project and then by the companies themselves.

But the approach has had difficulty surviving the normal everyday shifts in policy, those due to changes in government needs and desires, especially considering the number of countries involved. Indeed, it is not hard to understand why, in the face of their own domestic industry and domestic public opinion, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Italy are underlining the need to have, alongside the partners, a specific, precise investment program. The history of successful European cooperation shows that the prime contractor's readiness to grow in technological terms along with its partners leads to a successful product. In practice, only a network of cooperation will bring the desired results.

We too accept the fact that the time of the offset being a magic word for gaining market entry anywhere and at any time is approaching the end of its useful life. The world of the aerospace industry is evolving—today we have to follow another model. Cooperation must start at the project definition phase, involve the partners in development, and favor real growth in technological capabilities, not just in industry but also at the universities and in the fundamental research and development sector. This will enable us to respond immediately to the demands that will come from our political and military authorities and from civil society.

On this foundation rests the starting point for a new phase in the process of consolidating Europe's aerospace and defense industry and in its collaboration with partners from across the Atlantic, a relationship that holds the promise of making the systems still more efficient and competitive. This process can be stimulated and facilitated by our European governments through procurement action, where far-reaching reforms are needed so that we can move toward a Europe whose armed forces are organized on more rational lines, a Europe that, if not exactly united, will at least be a little more relevant on the geopolitical stage. It can also be facilitated through research and development to reduce the handicap our companies inevitably have when facing their American counterparts.

# Chapter 42

## The U.S. Technology Transfer System

Vice Admiral Norman Ray[1]

### APPROACHES TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

I am going to talk about the problems both industrialists and those who are not industrialists face with the American technology transfer system. The American technology assurance system is driven by considerations not only for the security of the United States but for that of friends and allies. It is a system designed to insure that when American technology is transferred it creates a net benefit to the security of the United States or its allies. Working with this system the United States, if I can speak for the United States, does not view itself so much as an arms exporter as a security exporter. That is what I call the high-road approach.

Some who use the system, however, take the low road approach, as is perhaps inevitable. A number of players, not the least of which are the armed services, believe in what I call the crown jewel argument of security technology transfer, which goes something like, "That's my crown jewel, I paid for it, I am the best in the world, and I intend to be the best in the world simply because I want to be the best in the world." That is the very narrow-minded low-road approach with which we have to contend.

There is also what I would call the invisible road. That road is the political lever the technology transfer system provides—to the United States vis-à-vis foreign governments to use with the Congress of the United States, the Department of Defense, and the armed services.

Using these three approaches, technology transfer is here to stay. It has a tremendous number of constituents who see some very important benefits from it, some of which are very altruistic and very important to global security and others that are more narrow and of a more political nature.

### THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROCESS

But technology transfer is not an event; it is a process practiced in the United States. The actual disclosure part of technology transfer takes place in the Department of Defense, and for something significant it can very often take as much as two years. That is two years after you have worked with an American company to seek a disclosure or after you have formally requested that disclosure from the United States.

---

1 Vice Admiral Norman Ray is President, Raytheon International Europe.

And then once you get permission to sell something, you have to go to the Department of State to get a license, which could take four months, and then you have to give congressional notification, which can take many more months. So the whole process is very long, but as Ambassador Giovanni Jannuzzi, a former Italian representative to the North Atlantic Council, once said famously, on a different subject, This is tragic but it is not serious.

I think that what Ambassador Jannuzzi said is true if you examine closely the technology transfer problems we live with. If an Allied customer wants American technology in a certain area because he really wants to have that capability and the security that goes with it, and if an American industry interest really wants to sell it, meaning that it does not think it would erode our commercial advantage if we transferred it, then we would sell it and we would all be very patient. I do not think there have been many times when the United States did not ultimately transfer an appropriate technology, so the situation is usually tragic but not serious.

If some of you think that I am describing a victimless crime, it is not. First of all, obviously, it is not a crime. The industry point of view may be "Poor us," we are victims of this as businesses, because the long timeline and the difficulties with requirements very often greatly complicate our ability to be competitive. To be competitive, we have to come to market at the right time and in a timely way and we have to be flexible in terms of meeting customer requirements. At a glance, the technology transfer system greatly complicates our ability to be a good provider to our international customers and also complicates our ability to plan. Why is that important? Performing to plan affects our stock price, which is important to us and to our stockholders. So in a small way those in business are victims.

Those who are not in business also suffer from difficulties with technology transfer. They suffer because they are trying to increase their capability in some area and the fact that it takes so long to get there slows their ability to progress, and their capability is probably less than it might be otherwise. This, of course, complicates their strategic thinking and their joint operations because it complicates their ability to work jointly.

It also very much complicates political harmony among Allies. Recently, there was a tremendous amount of noise on the network regarding the erosion of sovereignty associated with certain cooperative projects that require technology transfer. This is political friction we really do not need in the face of the current challenges we have been discussing. We also do not need the damage that can be done when we have to develop a system from scratch in the face of certain countries R&D limits or when a certain technology cannot be transferred to a country because it does not satisfy either its requirements or its technology industrial base growth and viability requirements.

## MAKING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FASTER AND MORE EFFECTIVE

To solve these problems, industry needs to work the process in the United States. We have to work very early with the armed services, with the State Department, and with the Department of Defense to satisfy all the questions that are necessary to gain disclosure. I said that took up to two years, but we can greatly shorten the time if we in industry do our jobs better. We can do a very good job of explaining what it is we are trying to transfer and thinking about how we can transfer it in a way that is better designed to satisfy U.S. security issues. But we also need to work with you to moderate your expectations. By that I mean that too often we market things to you that we sincerely know we are going to have real problems transferring. We ought not to do that; ultimately it is foolish and counterproductive.

You on your part, need to include us in your requirement discussions as soon as you identify the possibility that you might need an American partner. The sooner you do that, the faster we can move through the United States' system and the better we can satisfy all parties. You also need to keep pressuring the

United States' government, because if you do not, the process slows down, I can assure you. And last, you have to be serious, because nothing gums up the United States' system more than having various international companies or governments seeking technology transfer of things that they are really not serious about buying or operating.

Finally, I want to remind you that technology transfer in the context of international relations is a symptom, not the disease. It is a symptom of striving for security in an atmosphere in which we have not yet achieved full trust in one another. Despite this, NATO has a very strong record of success in technology transfer—the United States has transferred tremendous amounts of technology throughout its long period of successful Allied association. There is no reason for despair, there is no reason to think we cannot do better. We can do better. Growing confidence is both a journey and a habit and I know of nothing better than increased confidence to facilitate transfer and to open markets on both sides of the Atlantic through partnerships that facilitate non-U.S. access to the U.S. market and vice versa.

# Chapter 43

## The Evolving Nature of the Transatlantic Defense Relationship

Dr. Scott Harris[1]

The presentation we have just heard from Dr. Linnenkamp was an excellent and succinct summary of the goals and focus of the European Defense Agency. I think it illuminated a number of issues, and I am going to comment on a couple of them.

### CREATING AN INTEGRATED AND COOPERATIVE INDUSTRIAL BASE

At Lockheed Martin we believe that the transatlantic marketplace should be integrated, that ultimately it will be integrated, and that the amount of spending available for defense in Europe will not be sufficient to achieve the objective of a strong and autonomous industrial base. Given that, we believe that the best course is to create an integrated and cooperative industrial base as rapidly as possible, with emphasis on the "as possible."

There is a major reason for this and it was illuminated by the comments on numbers that we heard. The figure given was 2.3 billion euros for R&T (research and technology). I use a figure based on a broader definition or R&D (research and development), which is based on U.S. Department of Defense budget categories. According to this definition, the number would be about $12 billion on research and development in NATO Europe compared to approximately $70 plus billion in the U.S. So the procurement ratios are 2 to 1, that is, twice as much procurement spending in the United States as in all of NATO Europe, and 7 to 1 for R&D—seven times as much R&D spending in the United States as in Europe. The figure I heard Tom Enders (Co-CEO of EADS) use at ILA was 12 billion euros, and that corresponds roughly to my figure. So that's an industry view of what has been spent on R&D in Europe.

Now, with that kind of quantitative imbalance, the inevitable reaction of European industry will be to try to access the U.S. market, because that is where the money is. The imperative for industry is to be cooperative and to be integrative, because the European industry obviously wants to be able to access as much of the available resources as possible.

---

1 Dr. Scott Harris is President, Continental Europe, at Lockheed Martin Global, Inc.

## OPENING THE TRANSATLANTIC MARKETPLACE

If this desire to integrate the marketplace and access the collective spending is real and if it is the future, the question becomes, how far in the future is it? I must confess I am not optimistic. I believe that Europe is currently in a phase of trying to modernize and support its industrial base with an old intellectual model, which is a state-supported and state-directed industrial policy. It is designing weapon system requirements that make it impossible for American companies to compete. It is protecting local markets. It is using all kinds of informal barriers to prevent competition. I welcome, as does all American industry, the efforts by the EDA and the European Commission to open up the European defense market. This is terrific. Butt they are opening it up to each other, i.e., trying to create a competitive market within Europe, not to transatlantic competition and cooperation.

So we need to see the next step, which is a truly open transatlantic marketplace. And to those who would say "the American market is closed to Europeans so what you really want is both markets," I would say, I recognize the basis for that statement. I recognize that it has some historical validity. But I would also say that industry, my company in particular, is working to break down those barriers. We are bringing as many European partners to the American marketplace as we possibly can, and we are working to set up cooperative programs in which American technology flows to Europe without the European taxpayer having to pay the full price of that technology. We are working to make the American marketplace as open as we possibly can.

In other words, we have an open business model instead of the closed business model that I am afraid I see a little too often on this side of the ocean. Just as an example, in the American littoral combat ship—the next generation of surface vessels that will operate near coasts for the U.S. Navy—Lockheed Martin, which is one of the teams that has a ship in the competition, has more than 20% European content on it. We have an open business model and are sourcing globally, and that is what we think the future should be.

U.S. cooperative programs, such as Joint Strike Fighter and the medium-extended air defense system (MEADS) in which Germany, Italy, and the U.S. are all cooperating, is the other way to achieve transatlantic cooperation and integration. In cooperative programs, however, we could face some significant challenges in the next couple of years. We always face the political challenge of whether governments, including the U.S. government, are committed and whether they are committed to the cooperative approach. We also face the issue of technology sharing, technology release, and cooperative technology development. In addition we face a problem of burden sharing, a difficulty that arises in programs in which one partner is spending 90% and the other partner is spending 10% but the 10% partner wants 100% access to the technology. That is going to create problems as we go forward.

## REDUCING BARRIERS AND PROVIDING ADEQUATE RESOURCES

What is the solution? I think the solution lies in reducing barriers to competition. I think it also frankly relies on reducing state ownership. European industry would be much better off and well served if the state would give up its ownership and permit industry to operate as industry, free of political interference and free of the political objectives of politicians, which do not always coincide with those of businesses. I do not mean give up the relationship because, after all, governments are our customers and our regulators—we are totally involved in the government-business relationship. But when government is the owner selling to itself with an obligation for industrial base and employment issues as well as capabilities and technology, then you have a pretty vicious circle. This is what SACEUR Jim Jones was referring to when he addressed this conference and referred to a 26-nation industrial base competition each time there is an available NATO procurement.

The other thing I think we need, which I believe is the least arguable point I am making, is adequate resources to meet the requirements. My estimate of Germany's defense budget is that it is 25% underfunded for stated requirements—Germany needs an additional billion euros in its procurement accounts just to meet its stated requirements. If that money is not going to show up, then something has to happen: the requirement must be restated or work must be done on the budget issue. This is true not just in Germany but in every country, including the United States. We all know that Defense Ministries' appetites are always bigger than Finance Ministries can satisfy.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Having said all that, the two things I think we could most profit from are 1) cooperative sharing of R&D and of the requirements side of the budget—the more harmonized the requirements and the more cooperative the programs, the more efficiently we can spend the resources that are available—and 2) allowing industry to form transatlantic teams and participate in this marketplace in a cost-effective and efficient way. Industry, if permitted, will deliver more cost-effective solutions to governments than are currently being provided—in other words, more capability for very limited resources. These two initiatives would do a great deal to enhance our common security capabilities and, at the same time, to preserve the health of our transatlantic industrial base

# Part Seven

# Chapter 44

## Wrap-up Remarks

Dr. Werner Fasslabend[1]

I would like to talk about a few of the points that struck me during this conference. The first one concerns the new global role of the new NATO. In this new role I believe the relationship between Europe and the States—the transatlantic defense partnership—will continue. General Schuwirth remarked unofficially that this is not a procedural problem, just a question of will. When I think about how things were 10, 20, or even 30 years ago, I am not sure whether the two sides of the Atlantic have come closer together or moved a little bit apart, but we need to think about how we can strengthen the relationship, especially as NATO gets bigger and confronts increasing global problems.

What can we do to strengthen the transatlantic partnership? It is not so easy to decide as we sit here now. But I believe we should think it over and try to come up with several programs that will tighten the connections and preserve the valuable transatlantic programs. Doing so should help us resolve problems in the future.

### MISSION PROBLEMS

Another point that struck me during the workshop concerns mission problems. For example, General Back said that we do not have enough helicopters in Afghanistan. The question for me is, if we realize we have such problems, what can we do on the political stage to find solutions? I think it is not enough just to talk about such problems here, among specialists. We need to answer them on the political stage.

### THE AFRICA STRATEGY

Another point that struck me concerns our Africa strategy: What *is* our Africa strategy? When I look at a map I see the current hot spots in Africa, but if I look into the future I see more and more striking hot spots. So I believe it is not enough just to pay a small amount of attention there. Africa appears to be a major problem, not simply several little ones.

---

1 Dr. Werner Fasslabend is a member of the Austrian Parliament and a former Minister of Defense of Austria.

## MILITARY ARTICULATION

Another thing that struck me is the issue of how the military should articulate itself to the rest of society. I believe as we move from the Industrial Age to the Information Age that we need not only more technology but also more communication. We need to invest not only in military equipment to become stronger but also invest in all those structures that are helping us to make the change to this new age.

## IRAN

Of course, the Iranian issue struck me most. The discussion of that issue was probably the most interesting panel discussion here, and several of its many facets were truly fascinating. What the panel said is that we have two current problems regarding this issue: 1) the Middle East power question and 2) the fact that the non-proliferation treaty is at a crossroads. If we lose the treaty, we will have a very different situation in the future. So I believe we should consider not only the goals but also the consequences and the risks of that from both sides.

I think that at the moment, for the first time, both sides of the Atlantic are trying to find common solutions. This is very important, as is the fact that the five permanent members of the Security Council are also heading in the same direction. We must concentrate on working out solutions but prevent further polarization—polarization is already happening because Ahmadinejad has not only the entire Iranian population but the entire Islamic public behind him. I believe we must go to a strategy that can bring Iran back home to the West, and that should be a real goal.

# Chapter 45

## The European Security System and Strategic Competition with Russia

Ambassador Revaz Adamia[1]

Although in my former life during Soviet times I was a biologist, I will not discuss the threats of infectious viruses or bacteria; I would rather discuss man-made threats. First, I believe that we are on the verge of, if we have not already stepped into, a post-post-Cold War era.

What do I mean by that? When the Cold War suddenly was over, the Socialist Camp, the Warsaw Pact collapsed, the Soviet Union dismantled, and the states, which had been (mostly forcefully) trapped in that camp, found themselves in an "out of the system" situation. Quite a number of these countries moved quickly and joined the Euro-Atlantic security system, thus bringing security to a new, substantial part of the European continent. Others, however, were not so smart—or had more difficult starting positions—and are still on the way to finding their place on the strategic map of Europe.

Meanwhile, things drastically changed for one major, unique player in the European theater—Russia. Ambassador Akram said that strategic competition between Russia and the United States reemerged, but I would put it in a different manner.

During the Workshop, we heard the position of a high-level Russian military official. What we heard was typical, I would say, of a geographically European country that does not consider itself European.

It has always been true that Russia does not consider itself part of Europe, but that fact has become dangerous now for several reasons:

- First, energy prices have allowed Russia to get billions and billions that they intend to spend on the military.
- Second, the rather weak democratic institutions that were there have almost completely disappeared. Thus, the transparency has totally disappeared.
- Third, the autocratic approach of President Putin's rule has now turned from internal governing to the international arena. Recent statements about "Comrade Wolf's diet" and the Russian intention of taking the same approach are not a joke. We Georgians are experiencing it.

1 Ambassador Revaz Adamia is the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations.

All in all, we are witnessing a new attempt, or a trend, to create a Russian-led multi-state security system that, on this stage at least, is not an enemy of NATO but does consider itself an independent rival system to the Euro-Atlantic community. So, I join with General Mazurkevich in his opinion that discussing modern world security without estimating Russia's place in it is counterproductive.

I also believe that the quicker the European countries that aspire to enter NATO achieve their goal, the safer the European security system will be while taking these countries out of the area of Russian ambitions. I should also add here that it is not only Russia but all non-democratic systems worldwide, be they in Europe, Asia or Latin America, that are potential threats to stability and security. That goes to our discussions concerning Iran and North Korea as well as Venezuela.

Minister of Ukraine Tarasyuk raised the issue of protracted conflicts. I totally agree that this is a major threat to the security and development of the European continent. We heard from Ambassador Nuland that being late coming up with solutions to such a complicated problem is always very costly. We also heard that Kosovo is a European problem while the other conflicts—that are in the post-Soviet space—are Russian affairs. That means that a solution to Kosovo will be found while the Dniester region, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh will remain frozen—unless much more pressure is put on Russia to allow the unfolding of the regulatory processes that are at the disposal of international organizations such as the U.N. and the OSCE. I do not want you to think that I have a prejudice toward Russia. I am just bringing up some of the ideas that are being discussed behind the scenes. Nobody wants to irritate an elephant bearing nuclear weapons which is already in a china shop.

All of us Europeans, integrated with the Euro-Atlantic structures or not, should decide what we do want. Do we want to be a major player in the economic, political, and security systems of the modern world or do we prefer to be in the shadow of U.S. military strength and enjoy life in modest apartments but with comfortable furniture? The answer to this question will largely define the strategic map of this century. I hope at a future workshop that we will have more answers than the questions and problems we have today.

# Chapter 46

## Adjusting the International Structure For More Effective Results

Ambassador Gabor Brodi[1]

I believe that the wrap-up of such a detailed and good workshop should be brief. Otherwise, there is the temptation to share again all the important views and ideas that were presented during this conference—it is amazing how many developments there have been regarding the ways we are meeting the new global security challenges and providing the necessary capabilities to do so.

### USING OUR CAPABILITIES

It was very impressive to learn how much success NATO has had in adapting to the new challenges, but most of its achievements have been on the military field. The NATO Response Force, the introduced changes in the command and control structure, training, and reshaping the partnerships have been very successful, but when it comes to using this global tool, I am afraid not much has happened, both regarding decision making about how to use these capabilities and regarding the international legal framework. Regarding the latter unfortunately, nothing there has changed.

It seems a bit of a contradiction to develop a missionary capability, with the desire and political will to use it quickly if it is necessary, and then not to have the political machinery which makes it possible to use it. The waiting undertaking in Darfur, Sudan, which involves several different international organizations, is an excellent example for this problem. The situation there represents a great challenge for the international community, involving the role of the P5, the five permanent representative countries on the U.N. Security Council. But what if there is no agreement within the Security Council? Agreement involves the consent of the government of Sudan, that failed to provide security for its citizens, so it is a partly failed state situation. It involves a regional arrangement which should be supported to meet fully fledged compliance with its undertaking but is not able to do so, and then an environment which is rather hostile regarding any international institution, not only NATO but the United Nations as well, to take any role. I guess that is the real challenge of our time, which suggests that we are not ready or capable of

---

1 Ambassador Gabor Brodi is the Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations.

doing the job properly. We need to think about collectively how to adjust the international structure to be able to do so and to live up to the "responsibility to protect".

## THE NEED FOR GREATER REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

Regarding the development of the ESDP and the possible strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union, it has been seen as a challenge and also as an opportunity. I agree with those who believe that Berlin Plus should be implemented and that the new opportunities will reinforce the viability of the arrangement. But when it comes to strategic partnerships and joint political analysis and decision making, we still do not see many results. However, I believe that many of the issues we face together could be solved in partnership, if from the very start our possible courses of action and our decisions are identical. This will develop, obviously, when the EU assumes its global role, but while the battle group concept and other capabilities need to be prepared via common foreign and security policy, the EU, I am afraid, is again lagging behind.

## UNITED NATIONS REFORM

But I do not mean to be only critical of our very important regional organizations. I believe that the United Nations, where I work, has similar problems, because we operate and face global challenges working with a post-Second World War structure. We have just started to think about its possible reform and, in fact, during the last U.N. summit meeting significant reform steps were decided on and some have been implemented, including setting up a peace-building council, a new peace-building commission, and a new human rights commission. However, I am afraid that there has not been much progress regarding the revitalization of the General Assembly and especially the reform of the Security Council.

Reforming the council is not a problem in itself, but its consequence is our real problem. Dr. Fasslabend said that it was Iran and the Iranian debate that caught his eye and it caught mine too—the lack of reform was especially visible there. Dr. Fasslabend also mentioned that the NPT will be at a crossroads if we fail to solve the Iranian problem. I believe it is not the NPT that is at a crossroads but the whole international structure. Last May I attended the NPT review conference and witnessed how the division of states prevented us from addressing the legal background of the Iranian case, which involved, as Ambassador Akram noted, Article10 of the Treaty, which discusses withdrawal. There was a proposal that, if a member-state is out of compliance with the treaty, it should not withdraw voluntarily but should understand the consequences, and that the Security Council could then take appropriate actions. But one question was not answered during our deliberation, which is, What are the consequences if Iran walks out of the NPT? The answer is none. Under the treaty, it is Iran's right to withdraw from the treaty, but you have no means within the framework of the treaty to do anything about it.

To a certain extent, that is also true regarding the reinforced surveillance structure of the IAEA. Iran could take it up but could withdraw easily. The panel was quite united in describing the situation, but clearly the Security Council might be divided and there would be no action.

## INCREASED ROLES FOR REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

This brings me to another important lesson of this conference, which is that with international structures under reform, regional organizations such as NATO and the European Union might have increased roles. I fully agree with Ambassador Akram's suggestion that a regional security structure will be needed to take into account the legitimate security interests of all the countries in the region and to engage them in international cooperation.

# Chapter 47

## Defining Our Identity

Ingénieur Général Robert Ranquet[1]

In an attempt to keep my wrap-up remarks short—as they always should be—I am going to concentrate on the two questions that crossed my mind as I was going through the notes I took during the three days of the workshop.

### APPRECIATING DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES

First, I would like to refer to Minister Jung's opening speech in which he told us how we—individual nations, NATO, the EU, the U.N.—face common threats and share a common responsibility to act, making it less and less relevant to ask which organization should do what. He also told us that we had to look for some sort of global response, more or less regardless of the specific organization we are talking about. With that in mind, it seems to me that we should be cautious about the assumption that the globalization of threats blurs the picture of how different organizations should react. Of course, we share the same global context and to some degree the same challenges, but we need to recognize that, depending on one's specific situation on the globe, things may look very different from one perspective to the other. For example, an inhabitant of the east coast of the U.S. does not have the same perspective as one on the west coast or one in western Europe or the Balkans or Russia or China (see the speech by Minister Meimarakis). So, we have different perspectives on identical global challenges depending on geography.

We have also different perspectives depending on our specific interests. For instance, a lot has been said during the workshop about the energy issue, but this issue does not mean the same thing for different organizations. Obviously, individual nations and organizations may have problems with energy—the U.S. may have problems with energy and the EU, an economic power by itself, may have problems with energy. But NATO? What do we mean when we say that NATO should be involved with the energy issue? NATO, as a military alliance, does not have energy problems, or at least not in the same way that the U.S. or the EU does. So any involvement by NATO in this issue would probably be of a totally different nature than that of the U.S. or the EU.

Another issue on which different entities have different perspectives is one of the new global threats that is often referred to: migration. Because the U.S. has a territory and borders it may have migration

[1] Ingénieur Général de l'Armement Robert Ranquet is Deputy Director of Strategic Affairs in the French Ministry of Defense.

problems. So may Russia and the EU (the so-called Schengen area). But, again, what do we mean when we talk about NATO confronting this type of problem? NATO has no territory, no borders, so what does it have to do with migrations?

Still another example is public support and public opinion (see the speech by Ambassador Juneau). Again, there is U.S. public opinion and more and more there is EU public opinion. But there are no NATO nationals, no NATO citizenship, so to what do we refer when we speak of NATO public opinion?

All of this is to say that we should be careful about saying that globalization of the challenges we face is driving us to some sort of global, undifferentiated response. We must keep in mind that the nature of the various actors is different, their interests are different, and thus their courses of actions are different. Of course, this is not to say that different actors should act as rivals or compete; it is just to say that they are different, and thus we should expect them to act according to their own nature and interests.

## DEFINING WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE WANT

This drives me to my second and last point. Obviously our organizations have a problem with identity. This was very clearly stated by two military commanders during the Workshop: Lieutenant General Perruche concerning the EU and General Jones concerning NATO. The EU has, among other problems, the problem of its aborted Constitution and its membership. NATO also has a membership problem as well as an outreach problem: Where does it stop--Afghanistan, Japan, New Zealand? And do its missions include energy, migration, the avian flu? In short, the question is, What do we want? What do we want to achieve and who do we want to be?

This question has been a large part of our discussions during this Workshop.

For instance, when we talked about Afghanistan (see the presentation by General Back), we asked what we wanted the final stage to be there, what we want to achieve. Do we want to wait to see the last poppy crop eradicated? Do we want to wait to see this country reach western standards on governance, economic prosperity, and democracy? Or do we have in mind a calendar-driven exit strategy: three more months, three more years, or three more decades? I have heard much about what we collectively agree we want to prevent in Afghanistan but very little about what we want to happen.

The same goes for Iran (see the exciting discussion between Ambassador Akram and General Zhan). It is relatively easy to see what we do not want Iran to do. But what is it that we do want Iran to do? What is the role we want for that country? What sort of security framework do we want to see in the region? We seem to have tremendous difficulty coming to some sort of common understanding on these issues. And, as was clear from our discussions, we cannot design a strategy from "do not want" approaches.

Clearly, many of the issues that were raised during this extraordinarily exciting Workshop will have no answers until we can answer the basic question "Who are we and what do we want?"

# Chapter 48

## Prospects for Peace and Security in South Asia

Ambassador Asif Ezdi[1]

The subject I will be speaking on is one that I think has considerable relevance for the theme of this conference. I will be talking on the prospects of peace and security in South Asia following the India-U.S. nuclear agreement. South Asia is not currently among the top subjects that preoccupy the international security community. That is a good thing. The region is currently going through a period of relative calm – dialogue is taking place between Pakistan and India and the level of rhetoric between them is considerably less heated than what the world has been used to for a long time. But the question must be asked: How real and how lasting is this calm?

### PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS FOLLOWING 9/11

To put the matter in perspective, I would like to go back to how things were about five years ago immediately before September 11. Two months before the terrorist attacks on the United States, the president of Pakistan and the prime minister of India met at Agra, the first meeting of the leaders of the two countries in two years. The fact that they met at all was a significant development, because, until then, the Indian prime minister had refused to meet the Pakistani president unless certain preconditions were met, the principal demand being that Pakistan end its support for the freedom movement of the Kashmiri people, which India describes as "cross-border terrorism." But the Agra summit failed because hard-liners in India's military and political circles overruled those who were in favor of dialogue with Pakistan.

September 11 was a godsend to Indian hard-liners because it made terrorism, in particular "Islamic terrorism", the number one international enemy. This fit in with India's effort to portray the Kashmiri freedom struggle¾which India maintains is nothing but "cross-border terrorism"¾as not just India's problem but a problem for the entire international community. In pointing its finger at Pakistan as the "epicenter" of terrorism, India not only cited Pakistan's support for the freedom movement in Kashmir but also Pakistan's close ties with the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Pakistan's decision in October 2001 to disassociate itself from the Taliban government in Afghanistan and to join the international

---

1 Ambassador Asif Ezdi is the Ambassador of Pakistan to Germany.

coalition against terrorism was a disappointment to India because it stymied the Indian plan to isolate Pakistan diplomatically.

When the Indian parliament was attacked by terrorists in December 2001, India saw it as an opportunity to pursue its aims towards Pakistan and accused the country of complicity in the attack. It refused to accept Pakistan's proposal for an international inquiry and made a series of peremptory demands on Pakistan. To maximize pressure on Pakistan, India took a number of steps calculated to escalate the already tense situation that culminated in the massing of nearly one million Indian soldiers in battle positions on Pakistan's borders.

Indian leaders described this policy as one of "coercive diplomacy." As a result, Pakistan and India were brought to the brink of conflict. Fortunately, good sense ultimately prevailed, and 2003 saw a gradual de-escalation by India. In January 2004, the structured bilateral dialogue¾the so-called "composite dialogue"¾that had been launched in 1999 but interrupted by India was resumed. This dialogue has taken place on two tracks: confidence-building and dispute resolution. While there have been some developments in the area of confidence-building measures, little headway has been made in dispute resolution, in particular on the core question of Kashmir. Pakistan believes that without a resolution of this dispute, lasting peace and stability in South Asia will continue to elude us.

## LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

The deliberate escalation of tension pursued by India in 2002 in order to "coerce" Pakistan had one significant consequence which India had probably not foreseen and did not intend: The fact that active hostilities did not break out showed to the world the stabilizing effect of the nuclear capability that the two countries had demonstrated by conducting nuclear tests in 1998, a situation not unlike the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The hope now must be that just as the American–Soviet confrontation of 1962 was followed by détente, the Pakistan-India confrontation of 2002 will also lead to the realization that the military option is no longer available for a resolution of political problems and differences.

Whether this hope will be fulfilled remains to be seen, for two reasons. First, only about four years have elapsed since the events of 2002, which is too short at time for us to form a judgment on their long-term impact on the behavior of future Indian military and political decision-makers. The second reason is that the recent conclusion of a civil nuclear cooperation agreement between India and the United States has increased the chances of miscalculation by Indian leaders regarding possible future military confrontation with Pakistan.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

In my country's view, the import of nuclear fuel allowed to India under this deal for its civilian program will enable it to divert significant quantities of indigenous fissile material for its nuclear weapons. India already has a record of diverting nuclear technology provided to it in the past for peaceful purposes. It exploded its first nuclear "device" in 1974 by diverting U.S. and Canadian civil nuclear technology. According to one estimate, the India-U.S. nuclear agreement will now enable India to produce about 50 more weapons a year, greatly enhancing its weapons arsenal. This will adversely affect the strategic balance in South Asia, which was established by the nuclear tests of 1998 and which prevented the outbreak of conflict in 2002. In Pakistan's view, the object of strategic stability in South Asia would be better served under a package approach for Pakistan and India aimed at preventing a nuclear arms race in the region and promoting restraints, while ensuring that the legitimate needs of both countries for civilian nuclear power generation are met.

To conclude, I would like to emphasize four points:

1. Peace and stability in south Asia are closely linked to resolving the Kashmir issue and maintaining strategic stability in the region.

2. By enabling India to accelerate its nuclear weapons program, the India-U.S. nuclear deal is likely to have a negative impact on strategic stability in South Asia and will make the region a more dangerous place.

3. The India-U.S. deal has reduced the incentive for India to resolve the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. As a result, progress in the current Pakistan-India dialogue has become more difficult.

4. The members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) who have been asked to approve the U.S.-India deal should take into account the consequences that such a step would have on the peace and security of South Asia.